APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action was brought against Michael McCommon and Memphis Light, Gas, and 2 Water (MLG&W) for personal injuries sustained when McCommon, an employee of MLG&W, struck plaintiff with his vehicle. McCommon was dismissed from the suit prior to trial. Following a bench trial, the lower court held that plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of the defendant and that plaintiff proximately caused her own injuries. Because we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination, we affirm the judgment dismissing plaintiff's case.

After a thirty year marriage,1 Waymon Frederic Axley (Husband) and Beverly Anne Mallette Axley (Wife) were divorced by final decree entered by the trial court in August 1994.2 This appeal concerns the trial court’s award to Wife of $1,500 per month as alimony in futuro and, as additional alimony, $177.62 per month for 36 consecutive months to continue Wife on Husband’s health insurance through his employer. Wife seeks an increase in the award as well as her attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. She frames the issues as follows: I. Did the trial judge err by awarding Wife only $1,500 per month in periodic alimony? II. Should this Court remand this matter to the trial court with the instruction to set a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for this appeal?

After a thirty year marriage,1 Waymon Frederic Axley (Husband) and Beverly Anne Mallette Axley (Wife) were divorced by final decree entered by the trial court in August 1994.2 This appeal concerns the trial court’s award to Wife of $1,500 per month as alimony in futuro and, as additional alimony, $177.62 per month for 36 consecutive months to continue Wife on Husband’s health insurance through his employer. Wife seeks an increase in the award as well as her attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. She frames the issues as follows:

This is a domestic relations case with an unusual twist. On May 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Chester County seeking a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the same time, plaintiff filed a marital dissolution agreement (“agreement”) executed by the parties on May 2, 1994. The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, then ages 13 and 15, with the children residing with plaintiff. No child support was to be paid by either party. In addition, the agreement did not make any allowances for alimony and purported to divide the real and personal property between the parties. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time the parties executed the agreement, but defendant was not. Shortly thereafter, defendant employed counsel and on June 3, 1994, filed a motion to set aside the agreement. In her motion defendant contended that she was forced to sign the agreement under duress and fear of bodily harm. She also contended that the agreement did not adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the parties’ minor children or make an equitable settlement of the 2 parties’ property as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) (1991). Defendant’s motion asked the court to set the agreement aside and allow the parties to proceed with the divorce as if the agreement had never been executed.