APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellant’s application for appeal is untimely under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, §2.02, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed.

This case involves the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206(d) in a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff seeks to proceed directly against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the carrier. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Sean William Lee, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea to multiple child sex offenses was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Specifically, he submits that he was misinformed the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation would be supervising him while he was on the sex offender registry, instead of the Tennessee Department of Correction, the entity actually supervising him, rendering his plea constitutionally infirm. Because this particular issue was not first properly presented in the post-conviction court, this court is without authority to engage in plenary review. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

I agree with the underlying facts of this dispute as stated in the majority opinion. I disagree with the trial court and the majority in their application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-17-1206 (“UM statute”). My disagreement is two-fold. First, the trial court should not have looked any further than the plain language of section (d) of the UM statute. Second, although I would hold section (e) of the UM statute inapplicable here, I also take issue with the trial court’s findings that led to its grant of summary judgment under section (e).

The Defendant, Mario Reed, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of evading arrest involving risk of death or injury, a Class D felony; attempted tampering with evidence, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the evading arrest conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent seven-year sentences for evading arrest and attempted tampering with evidence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment due to a violation of Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (“ICD”), (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted tampering with evidence and the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict for that offense, and (3) his seven-year sentence for evading arrest is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on the reckless endangerment conviction.

Great-Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found one ground for termination but concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Albert Dejuan White, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained during the search of his residence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded.

I write separately from the well-reasoned majority opinion because I would reach a different conclusion regarding whether law enforcement officers violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as explained below. In all other respects, I agree with the opinion and concur in the results.

In this dispute between members of a limited liability company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached her fiduciary duty through the unilateral sale of company assets. The trial court referred the matter to a Special Master, who determined the assets were significantly undervalued in the sale and recommended a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed no objections to the Special Master’s report. The trial court subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s adoption of the report, asserting that the trial court failed to make independent findings. We affirm.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge. The motion to recuse was filed after the entry of a judgment and the denial of a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Because issues related to the denial of the motion to recuse may be raised in petitioner’s appeal of the final judgment, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Gregory Ryan Webb, has filed a Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. The Petitioner alleges that he “does not have the financial means to retain
private counsel in this appeal.” He, therefore, requests “that this Court enter an
Extraordinary Attorney to represent [him] Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 10, Requesting Application for Extraordinary Appeal that requires
urgency.” The Petitioner further states that he is “additionally requesting an Attorney
who will not allow political influence, blackmail, and ‘other,’ to interfere with effective
assistance of counsel.” Because the Petitioner cited to Rule 10 in his pleading, the
appellate court clerk has entered this pleading as an application for an extraordinary
appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Following our review, we deny the requested relief.

The Defendant, Marvin M. Green, has filed a pro se application for extraordinary
appeal seeking dismissal of the indictment “on due process and equal protection grounds.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Alternatively, the Defendant seeks the appointment of conflict-free
counsel and a speedy trial. Following our review, we deny the pro se application for
extraordinary appeal.

The trial court entered an agreed order dismissing some of Appellant’s claims with prejudice, an order granting Appellant’s voluntary dismissal of all of his claims in two consolidated cases without prejudice, and an order awarding discretionary costs to Appellees. Appellant later sought relief from each of these orders pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In litigating the Rule 60 motion, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify Appellees’ counsel and a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas he issued against his own prior counsel, and the parties filed cross-motions for sanctions. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion, motion to disqualify, and motion to compel. The trial court also denied both motions for sanctions; however, Appellant was awarded his attorney’s fees in opposing Appellees’ motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Appellees are also awarded their attorney’s fees for defending this frivolous appeal.

Because the orders from which the appellant has filed an appeal do not constitute a final, appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

As permitted by statute, the plaintiff in a personal injury action amended his complaint to add a nonparty as a new defendant based on the original defendant’s allegations of comparative fault in an amended answer. The new defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims against him because the original defendant lacked permission to file the amended answer. The trial court struck the amended answer and dismissed the claims against the new defendant on statute of limitations grounds. Because the original defendant had written consent to file the amended answer, we reverse.

Defendant, Anthony D. Dean, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County jury of possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, (count two) and possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a Schedule V controlled substance (Gabapentin), a Class E felony (count five), along with other charges not at issue in this appeal. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting prior convictions involving possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, and the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify as both a fact witness and an expert witness. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Husband/Appellant failed to answer Wife/Appellee’s complaint for divorce. On Wife’s motion, the trial court granted default judgment against Husband. Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, through counsel, has filed a “Notice of Appeal” seeking review of the post-conviction court’s order denying a motion for recusal. The one-page pleading informs the court that on February 13, 2026, the post-conviction court “declined to recuse but granted permission to appeal for an interlocutory order.” The pleading further indicates that the “[a]ppeal herein is taken under TRAP 9 and under TRAP 10B (2.01).” The appellate court clerk entered the pleading as an application for interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Following our review of the Petitioner’s pleading, we have determined that a response from the State is not necessary and summarily deny relief.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Demonte Isom, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case stems from an alleged oral promise by the owner of two companies to pay the chief financial officer of one company a bonus of ten percent of the “profits” of both companies for work performed for the companies, including related to the sale of certain real property by one company. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, the companies and their owner, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were barred by the parties’ written contract and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendant as to their defense under the real estate broker statute. Both parties appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and unjust enrichment but reverse as to the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. We also reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on their defense under the real estate broker statute.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends he is entitled to relief due to a defective indictment for his underlying charge of aggravated rape. However, as pointed out by the State, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed late. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner’s explanation for the late filing is based upon a misunderstanding of the “prison mailbox rule,” see Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g), and the nature of his defective indictment issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Carlos Ortiz, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm.

This appeal focuses on whether a Grundy County Resolution that regulates the location of quarries is, in effect, a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of Tennessee’s County Zoning Act (“the CZA”). The Plaintiffs claim the Resolution is invalid because Grundy County did not comply with the procedural requirements for passing a zoning ordinance as mandated by the CZA. The Plaintiffs further contend that the County could not utilize its police powers to regulate the location of quarries because the Resolution was preempted by state law. Grundy County argues that the Resolution was not a zoning ordinance, but rather a valid exercise of the County’s police powers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Grundy County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Tinsley Props., LLC v. Grundy Cnty., No. M2022-01562-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 495700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 27, 2024). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that Grundy County enacted what amounts to a zoning ordinance without complying with the statutory requirements contained in the CZA. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Grundy County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Wendolyn Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the remainder of his claims were either waived or previously determined. The State argues that the post-conviction court lacked the authority to consider Petitioner’s claims because a properly verified post-conviction petition was never filed and that Petitioner has otherwise waived consideration of his issues by failing to prepare an adequate brief. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court had authority to consider Petitioner’s claims, but Petitioner has waived consideration of his claims in this court. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.