APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, David A. Yost, Jr., appeals from his guilty-pled convictions for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a person with a prior felony drug conviction, simple possession
of marijuana, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received
an agreed-to, effective eight-year sentence. The trial court initially denied the Defendant’s
request for alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in
confinement. Following the Defendant’s appeal of this sentencing determination, this court
reversed and remanded the case based on the trial court’s failure to make the appropriate
findings and articulate its reasoning for imposing a sentence of incarceration. On remand,
the trial court again ordered confinement. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges,
for a second time, the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing as an abuse of discretion.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Whitcliffe McLeod, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition for failure to prosecute. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a personal injury action following a motor vehicle collision in Shelby County, Tennessee. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining negligence claim after concluding that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence as to breach of duty and causation. We affirm.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Darryl Deshields, of evading arrest, reckless endangerment, reckless driving, and speeding, and the trial court imposed an effective three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. He also asserts that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in approving the verdict as thirteenth juror. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding the tip that led investigators to his whereabouts. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Nelson, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal
Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, rape, three counts of aggravated rape, and aggravated
assault, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of forty years at 100% in
the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of his aggravated kidnapping and rape convictions
and argues that the trial court erred in declining his request for a special jury instruction on
the lack of consent as an essential element of aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because his sentence in the above-referenced cases was enhanced by prior convictions that were subsequently invalidated by a federal court. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(3). The State has responded in opposition to the motion, arguing that the federal court did not invalidate the Petitioner’s prior convictions but merely ordered that he be resentenced. Upon our review of the application and the State’s response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-117. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the State and deny the application.

The Defendant, Ezekiel Abraham Schmaltz, appeals his Knox County jury convictions of
two counts of observation without consent and one count of assault, for which he received
an effective sentence of two years and six months’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant
argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct by discussing punishment with the prospective jurors during voir
dire, (3) the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic proof of the victim’s prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate her credibility, (4) the trial court erred by restricting the
Defendant’s ability to cross-examine two State’s witnesses, and (5) the cumulative effect
of trial errors entitles him to a new trial. Following our review, we remand the case for
merger of the Defendant’s convictions of observation without consent into a single
conviction and the entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

This case concerns a ground lease for real property upon which a business maintained a billboard. After the landowner sent a letter to the business purporting to terminate the lease, the business sought a declaratory judgment that the lease remained valid and requested damages. The landowner filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the lease was void or had been breached by the business. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the lease had expired and awarded the landowner the rental income from the billboard minus the business’s expenses. On appeal, the business asserts that the trial court erred by denying its equitable defenses and in its award of damages. We conclude that several of these defenses were waived in the trial court and that the business failed to prove the remaining defenses. However, we also conclude that the trial court erred in its award of the rental income and vacate this portion of the order. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence for this Court to determine the proper distribution of the rental income, we remand the matter for further proceedings.

In the Chancery Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”), Robert Simmons (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against his neighbors, Michael and Anna Marie Black (“Defendants”) to establish the correct common boundary line between their two properties. Two competing surveys were presented to the Trial Court, but only one surveyor testified. The Trial Court found Plaintiff’s surveyor, the testifying surveyor, credible and established the common boundary line in accordance with Plaintiff’s survey. Defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a life sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he was not sentenced by a jury, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John F. Curran, III, appeals his Hardin County convictions for passing a worthless check and filing a false lien, for which he received a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to establish territorial jurisdiction because the offenses took place on federal property; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse; (3) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw when counsel explained he lacked knowledge and experience in federal maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction; (4) the trial court violated the Defendant’s due process rights by initially granting his pretrial motion to present affirmative defenses but later ruling those defenses could not be presented to the jury; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for passing a worthless check because the payment was for a pre-existing debt and not to induce services; (6) the State committed two Brady1 violations when it failed to disclose evidence proving the State lacked jurisdiction over the case, which led to false testimony from State witnesses; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence other than the statutory minimum and by imposing an illegal sentence when it failed to cite the victims for each count, failed to order restitution for passing a worthless check, and took no action to remove the lien from the property at issue. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joseph Wert, appeals from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding a text message exchange between two non-testifying individuals discussing the victim’s statement on the day of the shooting; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to read in front of the jury several unauthenticated text messages on the victim’s ex-wife’s cell phone between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument when it referenced the text messages between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter, and the trial court erred by overruling his contemporaneous objection thereto; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction regarding the presumed reasonableness of his use of deadly force against the victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(c), commonly known as “castle doctrine.”; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he contends that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alan Joseph Robertson, appeals the Hickman County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his sale of methamphetamine in an amount of 0.5 gram or more conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case originated as a breach of contract action for the sale of a business. Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 by a specified date. A few days before the deadline, the defendants attempted to gain an extension and/or renegotiate the terms. The negotiations did not result in written modification of the settlement agreement, the defendants failed to pay the agreed-upon sum by the deadline, and the plaintiff sued to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to modification, no written modification, and no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants appeal only the claim that the plaintiff did not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the settlement agreement

In this post-divorce action, the wife, Ann L. Shoemake (“Wife”), filed a petition against the husband, Ronald L. Shoemake (“Husband”), in the Sumner County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to receive her marital share of Husband’s pension payments through the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (“TCRS”). Wife had been awarded a portion of Husband’s TCRS payments in the final decree of divorce (“Final Decree”). Husband filed a counter-petition seeking, inter alia, a reduction of his alimony in futuro obligation. After the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Wife for her portion of his TCRS payments, Husband unilaterally ceased paying his alimony in futuro obligation to Wife and failed to pay the court-ordered TCRS arrearages. This caused Wife to file two motions for contempt against Husband, one in February 2024 and the other in August 2024. In the February 2024 motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband in “willful contempt” until he purged himself of the TCRS shortage and alimony arrearage. On March 4, 2024, the trial court ordered Husband to pay the TCRS shortage and ruled that Husband should continue to pay the $600.00 monthly alimony but declined to rule on the motion for contempt, stating that the court “reserves the issue of granting a judgment pending the approval of the QDRO to be submitted.” Despite the trial court’s ruling, Husband did not resume his alimony payments and did not comply fully with the order concerning his TCRS obligation, and Wife accordingly filed a second motion for contempt in August 2024. In that motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband “in civil contempt for his failure to make payments for [Wife’s] share of TCRS up to August 14, 2024, alimony payments to date of $600.00 per month, and judgment be granted accordingly.” The trial court entered an order on October 9, 2024, granting to Wife a judgment of “$4,812.75 to be paid within 30 days” for Husband’s TCRS obligation and arrearage, but the trial court did not specifically address Wife’s two motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. On October 11, 2024, the trial court entered a second order, denying Husband’s request for a reduction of alimony and granting to Wife her attorney’s fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Again, the trial court did not address Wife’s motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. Husband has appealed. Because the trial court did not fully rule on Wife’s outstanding motions for contempt and did not render a decision regarding Wife’s request for an alimony arrearage in the amount of $3,000.00, there is no final judgment entered by the trial court, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the trial court for further action.

A complaint for ouster was filed nominally on behalf of the Shelby County Attorney against Shelby County Clerk Wanda Halbert. The defendant clerk filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because the complaint was being prosecuted by a deputy county attorney and outside counsel due to a personal conflict of interest by the named county attorney. The plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that a motion to dismiss was not a proper pleading under the ouster statutes. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and permitted the defendant clerk to file an answer. The trial court then dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing. We affirm the denial of the motion for default judgment, reverse the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court awarded attorney’s fees as sanctions against a petitioner and his attorney in this ouster proceeding, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-47-122(b), following a voluntary nonsuit of the petition.  The trial court based its award of sanctions upon, inter alia, its determination that the petition’s allegations were unsupported and that the petitioner’s attorney had acted recklessly when filing the petition by purporting to represent individuals with whom he had neither met nor spoken.  The petitioner and his counsel have appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s award of sanctions against counsel, but we vacate the court’s award of sanctions against the individual petitioner.  We decline to award additional attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, has filed an application for permission to appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10B. The Petitioner asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (“SFFA”), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to his case.

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is hereby DENIED. The Defendant’s Motion to Supplement the Record is also DENIED as moot. Costs associated with this appeal are hereby taxed to the Defendant.

This action arises from the Tennessee Board of Parole’s revocation of an inmate’s parole. Following the inmate’s filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking judicial review, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to make partial payment of the required filing fee. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for dismissal on this basis.

This appeal stems from the dismissal of a premises liability action. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s first amended complaint as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations, finding that the amended complaint, which was filed more than a year after the incident, did not relate back to the original complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. Discerning no error, we affirm.

While I agree with the lion’s share of the majority opinion’s meticulous review of the issues presented by Defendant on appeal, there are a couple of distinct issues on which I disagree: whether the trial court erred in failing to act or serve as the thirteenth juror; and the proper remedy for retrial of offenses, based upon an ambiguous verdict. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the trial court satisfied its role as the thirteenth juror. Furthermore, on retrial, I conclude that the State can proceed on the original charges of felony murder (counts 1 and 2), aggravated child abuse (count three), and aggravated child neglect (count four). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion on these issues.

Defendant, Joseph Kade Abbott, pled guilty in two consolidated cases to three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in exchange for concurrent six-year sentences, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years’ incarceration to be served at 100%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A member of a Tennessee limited liability company filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to operate the company and the dissolution and winding up of the company. The trial court appointed a receiver, the receiver moved to sell the company’s assets, and the member objected to the sale. The member also sought to amend his complaint to add additional claims against additional defendants. The trial court entered an order approving the receiver’s proposed sale of the assets and denying the member’s motion to amend his complaint. The trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale are to be paid into the trial court’s registry and certified its order as a final judgment. We conclude that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment and that the trial court improvidently certified it as such. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal.