APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Michael Dale Rimmer, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Charles Rice, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital intellectual disability proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Defendant, Lerico Sullivan, challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that because the only evidence supporting the revocation was improperly admitted testimonial hearsay, this court should reverse and dismiss the revocation proceeding. Defendant also challenges the trial court’s holding him in contempt twenty times during the hearing and ordering the ten-day sentences imposed for each contempt finding to be served consecutively. The State concedes that the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay but asks this court to remand the case for a new revocation hearing. The State contends that the trial court did not err by holding Defendant in contempt or by aligning the sentences consecutively. Because the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay without making the appropriate findings and because no other evidence supported the allegations that Defendant violated his probation, we reverse the revocation of his probation and dismiss the case. Regarding the twenty findings of contempt and related consecutive sentencing decision, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against three of the findings of contempt and reverse and dismiss those findings. We also conclude that the effective sentence on the contempt convictions should be modified to sixty days to be served in confinement. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified in part and reversed and dismissed in part.

This action arises from the parties’ repeated petitions to modify a permanent parenting plan set forth by the trial court in 2016 regarding co-parenting of the parties’ two minor children. Shortly after the children were born, the mother moved to Virginia with the children, and the father remained in Tennessee. The parenting plan designated the mother as primary residential parent and set forth a schedule wherein the children would reside with the mother and attend school in Virginia during the school year, and reside primarily with the father in Tennessee during the summers. The parenting plan further provided that each parent would enjoy co-parenting time with the children while the children were living with the other parent. Since moving to Virginia in 2016, the mother had filed several motions to change venue to the trial court in Virginia. The mother argued that a change of venue was proper, pursuant to Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the trial court in Tennessee had lost continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and because Tennessee was an inconvenient forum. At the beginning of trial, after considering Mother’s renewed motion to change venue, the trial court determined that it retained subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. The trial court then conducted a three-day hearing on the substantive arguments presented in the parties’ competing motions to modify and motions for contempt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that a material change in circumstance had occurred warranting modification of the parenting plan. Additionally, the trial court found the mother guilty of two counts of civil contempt for violating the parenting plan by failing to allow the father his weekend co-parenting time in October 2023 and by failing to timely return the children to the father for the beginning of his summer co-parenting time in 2024. The trial court fined the mother $100.00 for the civil contempt charges. The trial court also ordered the mother to pay the father’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,000.00 for her actions in prolonging the lawsuit and other violations of court orders. Upon careful review, we vacate the two civil contempt charges and resultant fine of $100.00. In all other respects, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, David Keith Gunn, of one count of possessing fifteen grams or more of fentanyl for resale, one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of possessing drug paraphernalia. The Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of incarceration of seventeen years for these offenses. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress the evidence upon which his trial convictions are based. We find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.

A municipal court determined that property owners repeatedly violated a city zoning ordinance restricting vacation rentals in residential areas. The property owners appealed to circuit court, where the matter was consolidated with another action filed by the City against the property owners in which the City was seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found the property owners in violation of the zoning ordinance and granted a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, and affirmed the municipal court’s rulings as to the violations. The property owners appeal. In doing so, they advance numerous issues challenging the circuit court’s rulings. While significant briefing deficiencies result in the waiver of the majority of these issues, in considering the issues that are properly before this court, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the ordinance. However, because our decision does not fully resolve whether the property owner violated the ordinance, we remand for further proceedings.

The Testator asked her great-niece, a licensed Attorney, to make changes to her will that were to the Attorney’s financial benefit. The Attorney returned to the Testator a revised version of the will, which included the changes requested by the Testator and additional changes. Several months later, the Testator executed the revised will. The Testator’s Nephew, acting as a personal representative, claimed that the Testator lacked capacity and that the new will was a product of undue influence. While the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide which party bore the burden of proof regarding undue influence, the trial court gave the jury a verdict form that definitively indicated that Nephew retained the burden of proof. The jury found in the Attorney’s favor. On appeal, the Nephew presents challenges to several evidentiary rulings as well as a jury instruction concerning the Testator’s capacity, which we affirm. However, Nephew also asserts that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury with respect to his undue influence claim. We conclude that the trial court’s inconsistent instructions regarding the Nephew’s undue influence claim warrant a retrial as to this claim.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court denied Appellant’s 11th motion to recuse, and Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child. By consent of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to twenty-five years’ incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the denial of his pro se “Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus[,] Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence[,] Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Lee Potts, claims the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner claims (1) that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f), which requires that petitioners prove “allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence,” is inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “erects an unconstitutional barrier to relief” and (2) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain and call a use-of-force expert witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Randall Lee Neece, of first degree premeditated murder. On the first day of trial, the Defendant moved for a change of venue, asserting that a newly installed “Victims of Violent Crime” monument outside the courthouse prejudiced prospective jurors. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the denial of a venue change or the adequacy of voir dire but instead contends that the sworn jurors were exposed to extraneous prejudicial information through the monument. Upon our review, we conclude that this claim was not preserved for plenary review and does not warrant plain error relief. We therefore respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This election contest action is before this Court for the second time on appeal. The plaintiff, Robin M. McNabb, initially sought a judgment declaring the August 2022 election for Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge void because the defendant, Gregory H. Harrison, who had received the greatest number of votes, did not meet the one-year “district” residency requirement set forth in Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. After the trial court dismissed Ms. McNabb’s complaint and this Court affirmed the dismissal, our Supreme Court reversed those decisions upon holding that Article VI, Section 4 required a candidate to have been a resident of the municipality for at least one year prior to the election. McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2025) (“McNabb I”). On remand, the trial court declared the election void. Mr. Harrison subsequently filed a motion to set aside that order predicated on a newly enacted statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 16- 18-206, which provides that the McNabb I decision “shall apply prospectively and shall be enforced beginning with the next regularly scheduled election for any affected municipal judgeship after May 21, 2025.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-206(c). Ms. McNabb filed a response opposing Mr. Harrison’s motion, and she filed a motion to amend her complaint wherein she requested that she be declared the “winner” of the August 2022 election. The trial court granted Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside the order and denied Ms. McNabb’s motion to amend her complaint. The trial court found, inter alia, that Ms. McNabb had failed to properly raise a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. Ms. McNabb has appealed. Upon thorough review, we determine that Ms. McNabb sufficiently raised a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding that Ms. McNabb did not raise a constitutional challenge, vacate the trial court’s grant of Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside, and remand for the trial court to consider the constitutionality of § 16-18-206 and to reconsider Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside. However, we affirm the trial court’s finding that under the precepts of § 16-18-206, Mr. Harrison was the de facto Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie Richard Martinez, of first degree
felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective
sentence of life imprisonment plus four years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting three different writings attributed to the Defendant as autobiographical rap lyrics;
(3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to amend the especially
aggravated robbery count the morning of trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Kendra
Ivey to testify to double hearsay; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Specific Discovery Request No. 1, which requested materials necessary for his state-funded
expert; and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a final judgment in a divorce action without children. The wife appeals contending the trial judge was biased against her, the judge erred by denying her petition for divorce while granting the husband’s counterpetition for divorce, and the judge erred in allocating marital assets and debts. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We reverse, holding that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence in support of the alleged statutory grounds of termination.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final decree as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Nicol Cox, appeals from the Scott County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the postconviction
court erred in denying his petition in that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to object, move for a mistrial, or request a curative
instruction after a prospective juror stated she had previously “dealt with” the Petitioner
through her work with child protective services, (2) releasing an alibi witness from his
subpoena when he failed to appear at trial, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner
regarding his right to testify. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of trial
counsel’s errors entitles him to post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a second jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant, Alan Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced him to life for each murder conviction and merged those convictions. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years each for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions, Class A felonies, and ordered that he serve all of the sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) his second trial violated double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court committed plain error by allowing a medical examiner to testify about the victim’s autopsy report when the witness did not prepare the report; (5) the State’s prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination of the defense’s expert witness constituted plain error; (6) the trial court erred by not admitting his entire 911 call into evidence; (7) the trial court’s denial of his request to have retained counsel represent him on his motion for new trial violated his constitutional right to counsel of choice; (8) his effective sentence is excessive; and (9) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error.1 Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and that the trial court incorrectly ordered the Defendant to serve one hundred percent of his sentence for aggravated child neglect. Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect in count four is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for aggravated child neglect in count three. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and effective sentence of life plus fifty years are affirmed.

The Defendant, Marion Brock Foreman, was convicted at a bench trial by the Henderson County Circuit Court of twenty counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of a firearm); § 39- 17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). He was found not guilty of ten counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous offense involving the felony sale or delivery of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. After merger, he received an effective sentence of eight years with a 35% release eligibility for five counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the search of his property and home. We conclude that the trial court erred, reverse the judgments of the court, vacate the convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Lamonte Cole, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Dexter Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court allowed the mother’s counsel to withdraw from representation at the beginning of trial when the mother did not appear. On appeal, the mother asserts that she did not have prior notice of the trial date and that her attorney did not provide her with notice of an intent to withdraw from representation. Based on the circumstances presented and applicable law, we vacate the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights and remand for a new trial.

Marina Kotova (“Plaintiff”) and Thomas Kevin True (“Defendant”), who were formerly married, entered into an agreement whereby Defendant would purchase certain real property owned by Plaintiff pursuant to an installment purchase agreement. The agreement provided that, in the event of a default by Defendant, Plaintiff could sue for monetary damages, specific performance, or both. Additionally, an addendum to the agreement allowed Plaintiff to evict Defendant from the property if he was in default for more than thirty days. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sued him seeking possession of the property and monetary damages. The trial court instead awarded Plaintiff specific performance, which required Plaintiff to sell the property to Defendant upon Defendant curing his default. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s award of specific performance. We find that the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiff a remedy other than what she requested, and we reverse the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Urshawn Miller, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.