APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Frank E. Fankam, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of rape. A petit jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years with one year to be served in confinement and nine years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) it was plain error for the trial court to allow into evidence text messages between Defendant and the victim; 2) the State impermissibly delayed in bringing an indictment against him in order to gain a tactical advantage at trial; 3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its cross-examination of Defendant and during closing argument; 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; and 5) cumulative error requires reversal. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellants filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion

Petitioner, Gabriel Dotson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by conceding guilt during closing argument against Petitioner’s wishes. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Before the court is the petition of the Defendant, Erwin Tyrone Halfacre, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2, seeking
review of the trial court’s December 30, 2025 order denying the Defendant’s motion for
recusal. The Defendant also seeks a stay of the trial proceedings, which are scheduled to
begin on January 6, 2026. On January 5, 2026, this court denied the Defendant’s request
for a stay. Following our de novo review, we now affirm the trial court’s order denying
the Defendant’s motion for recusal.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for parental relocation and its entry of a modified permanent parenting plan naming Father/Appellee the child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court magistrate entered a plan that modified the residential parenting schedule and gave the mother sole decision-making authority over all educational and non-emergency health care decisions. The father argues that the magistrate did not maximize his participation in the children’s lives as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and that there was no basis for modifying the allocation of decision-making authority. We affirm the judgment in all respects. We have also determined that the mother, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The Defendant, Charles Randolph Carter, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
probationary sentence stemming from his guilty-pled convictions for attempted aggravated
assault and aggravated cruelty to animals. While on probation, the Defendant absconded
from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses, among other violations.
Following several revocation hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s three-year
and eight-month probationary sentence and ordered him to serve the balance in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion (1)
by determining that he violated his probation based upon disciplinary infractions
committed while in custody on this sentence and (2) by fully revoking his probation given
his contrition and need for additional drug treatment. Following our review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice in the parking lot of a grocery store, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the store, the owner of the parking lot, and the company hired to perform snow and ice removal services for the parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants because the court found that the proof at the summary judgment stage showed conclusively that reasonable minds could not differ that the man was at least fifty percent at fault for the injuries he alleged to have suffered. Discerning that the evidence shows that a dispute of material fact exists, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan in which the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and awarded the mother supervised visitation. We now affirm.

The Defendant, Billy J. Coffelt, was convicted in March 2000 by a Davidson County jury of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective ninety-year sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence and that his consecutive sentencing was not consistent with other similarly situated defendants. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Dewayne Stinnett, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner is serving an effective eighteen-year sentence following his jury trial convictions for multiple drug-related offenses. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s failures to: (1) move for a dismissal for one count of the indictment, (2) object to the State’s introduction of evidence, and (3) request a jury instruction. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive life sentences. In his direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, during which the trial court was to address the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). State v. Campbell, No. M2023-00779-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3888342, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2024). Following a hearing in which no new proof was presented, the court again aligned the sentences consecutively. Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in doing so. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kwame D. Chihombori-Quao, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of statutory rape, for which he was sentenced to two years in confinement and six years on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex offender. Following our review, we affirm.

This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm.

This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions.

The petitioner, Marcus Willingham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount.

A Williamson County jury convicted Jeremy Michael Fowler (“Defendant”) in Case No. W-CR22-213-A (“the Waffle House Case”) of seven counts of Class A misdemeanor reckless endangerment (Counts 1-7), two counts Class C felony aggravated assault (Counts 8 and 9), and one count of Class A misdemeanor unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (Count 11). At the outset of the sentencing hearing in the Waffle House Case, Defendant entered guilty pleas in Case No. W-CR230286 (“the Jail Case”) to two counts of Class A misdemeanor assault, which stemmed from incidents that occurred while Defendant was incarcerated awaiting trial in the Waffle House Case. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant in the Waffle House Case to two consecutive terms of six years on the aggravated assault convictions, six consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the reckless endangerment convictions, and a consecutive term of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the weapons charge. The court merged the reckless endangerment conviction in Count 7 with Count 6. Additionally, pursuant to his plea agreement in the Jail Case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the assault convictions and ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence in the Waffle House Case. On appeal, Defendant claims the court erred by (1) failing to merge all the reckless endangerment convictions in the Waffle House Case, (2) misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors resulting in an excessive sentence, and (3) imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon the proof presented at trial, the indictment, and the jury verdicts in the reckless endangerment offenses, we reverse the court’s merger of Count 7 into Count 6 and remand for the trial court to enter an amended judgment omitting the merger language in Count 7 and aligning the sentence in Count 7 concurrently with Count 6. In all other regards, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting.  The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case.