APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant brought this action after his car was painted the wrong color. During the course
of the proceedings, the trial court ordered the parties to submit to mediation subject to
certain guidelines requiring good faith participation, denied Appellant’s motion to recuse,
granted Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Appellant’s claim for
punitive damages, and ultimately granted Appellees’ motion to confess judgment as to
Appellant’s claims for breach of contract and negligence. Appellant appeals each of these
rulings. We reverse the trial court’s ruling as to Appellees’ motion to confess judgment,
but affirm in all other respects.

Defendant, Richard Lawrence Canada, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of eight counts of rape. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eleven-year sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner was employed at the Light, Gas, and Water Division of the City of Memphis (“MLGW”). During his employment, the employee participated in a pension plan. The employee was terminated in July 2016 but did not apply for his pension benefits. In 2022, the employee filed two retirement applications that were rejected. Both applications sought the payment of pension benefits retroactive to the 2016 termination date. The employee appealed to MLGW’s pension board. The pension board accepted the second application and instituted the payment of benefits as of its filing date. However, the board declined to award benefits retroactive to 2016. The employee sought judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The court held that the decision to deny the first application was arbitrary and capricious and ordered the payment of benefits to be deemed effective as of the date it was filed. However, it found that the decision to deny the claim for retroactive benefits stemming from the date of termination was not arbitrary and capricious as it was in accordance with the pension system’s plan. The employee appeals. We affirm.

In this appeal, an employee of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department challenges the termination of her employment on the ground that she lacked a required certification to serve as a police officer after a psychological examiner deemed her not qualified to hold her position. The local civil service board initially upheld the termination, but that decision was vacated by the trial court, and the matter remanded. On remand, the local civil service board disapproved of the termination and reinstated the officer. The matter was appealed once again to the trial court, where a different judge held that the board’s decision was based on improper procedure, unsupported by substantial and material evidence, and arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the decision of the local civil service board.

Defendant, Montrell Reid, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for harassment and stalking, both Class A misdemeanors. Under the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At sentencing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments as to the denial of probation, but we remand for a determination of the percentage of service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-302(d).

Defendant, Louis Thomas Smith, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s revocation of his supervised probation and the imposition of his original, ten-year sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he violated the terms of his probation by absconding and asks this court to reverse that finding and “remand the case back to the trial court as a technical violation.” Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The University of Memphis initiated termination proceedings against a tenured faculty
member. An administrative hearing was held before a panel comprised of four other
tenured faculty members. The panel issued a report in which the majority of its members
found that the university had not proven adequate cause for the faculty member’s
termination. The report and a record of the hearing were provided to the university’s
president, who disagreed and signed a letter terminating the faculty member. The faculty
member sought review of the termination in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The
chancery court held that the university president did not have authority to issue a decision
contradictory to that of the faculty panel. The chancery court also held that the facts
contained in the record did not amount to clear and convincing evidence of adequate cause
for termination and ordered the faculty member be reinstated with backpay. The university
appeals. We reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Kortney Ball, for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s order denying his pretrial motion to recuse. The Defendant waived his right to counsel and is proceeding on his own in the trial court. Upon review, and for the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

The Defendant, Stephen David Sterling, appeals from the trial court’s reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement following the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to enter an intensive residential drug and alcohol treatment program.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Justin Darnay Graves, appeals his convictions for the sale and delivery of heroin and the sale and delivery of methamphetamine in an amount of one-half gram or greater. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that Madison County was the proper venue in which to prosecute him for these drug charges, contending the proof established that the transaction occurred entirely in Gibson County. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for the delivery counts. We reverse the Defendant’s convictions for the sale of heroin and methamphetamine and remand the case for further proceedings.

I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it reverses the Defendant’s convictions for the sale of heroin and methamphetamine. Because I disagree that Madison County had venue as to the charges pertaining to the Defendant’s delivery of those drugs, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of those convictions.

I agree with the majority in its legal conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s and jury’s findings that the State had proven venue in Madison County on the counts of delivery of heroin and delivery of methamphetamine by a preponderance of the evidence. However, I must respectfully dissent from its finding that the State failed to establish venue in Madison County on the counts of sale of heroin and sale of methamphetamine by a preponderance of the evidence.

Following lengthy proceedings arising out of a delinquent tax sale of real property and attempted redemptions by two parties, the chancery court concluded that the taxpayer properly redeemed her property.  The court then awarded the tax sale purchaser interest on the amount he had tendered for the sale, to be paid in part by the redeeming taxpayer and in part by another party that had unsuccessfully attempted redemption.  The purchaser appeals, arguing that the court should have awarded him greater interest.  The party that unsuccessfully attempted redemption argues that the trial court improperly disbursed to the purchaser funds beyond those to which he was entitled. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees in a conservatorship action. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm as modified.

Petitioner, Vernon Lee Ivey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner of his full sentencing exposure and statutory ineligibility for probation before Petitioner entered an open guilty plea. Petitioner also presents a stand-alone claim arguing that the post-conviction court erred when it determined that he intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Kevin Smith, appeals his conviction for vandalism of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, for which he received a thirty-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for one count of first degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of the victim, Michael Hawkins, Jr. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress his statement to the police, both of which the trial court denied. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress a photographic line-up identification. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his statement. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing one of the trial witnesses to identify him in court. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. We remand this matter for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

The State appeals from the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant, Carmen Noe Garcia Guox, to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by imposing a Class A misdemeanor sentence because Defendant’s conviction is a Class B felony offense. Defendant responds that he entered a best interest plea to a Class A misdemeanor and that the relevant statute does not authorize a Class B felony conviction or sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s plea, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this zoning matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent county and property development company and dismissed the petitioners’ declaratory judgment action. The petitioners had challenged a sector plan amendment and rezoning as illegal. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the trial court specifically found that the county zoning body maintained the authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to impose conditions on the rezoning of the subject property. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In March 2019, the Petitioner, Sean William Lee, pleaded guilty to attempting to violate the Sex Offender Registry Act (“SORA”), and the trial court ordered him to serve 270 days in jail. In July 2025, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that a federal preliminary injunction issued in his favor applied retroactively and rendered void his conviction for attempting to violate the registry. He also alleged that the State and his trial counsel failed to give him proper notice that he was required to register as a sex offender. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining on appeal that his conviction for attempting to violate SORA is void, and that he was not properly informed by the State or his trial counsel that he would be required to register as a sex offender. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2025. The notice of appeal
was not provided to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility to mail to the
Appellate Court Clerk until December 26, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of
entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of
appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Donavous Drennon, was indicted with one count of second degree murder in Count 1, one count of aggravated assault resulting in death in Count 2, one count of tampering with evidence in Count 3, two counts of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense in Counts 4 and 5, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after being convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 6 and 7. Prior to trial, the trial court merged Count 5 into Count 4 and bifurcated Counts 6 and 7. After trial, a jury acquitted Defendant on Counts 1 and 2 but convicted him on Counts 3 and 4, and the trial court dismissed Counts 6 and 7. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error by improperly implying to the jury that the defense of self-defense did not apply to Defendant’s charge of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense; (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents retrial upon reversal of his conviction for the same; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence. After review, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

The Petitioner, Santory Alexander Johnson, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s dismissal of his untimely petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by (1) finding he forfeited his right to
counsel and requiring him to proceed pro se and (2) finding due process did not require the
tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Steve F. Mabe, Jr., appeals from his Smith County Criminal Court convictions for evading arrest, simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, and manufacture of a Schedule VI controlled substance, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress all evidence against him and that the indictment should have been dismissed based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.