APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed.

In this grandparent visitation action, the grandparents filed a contempt petition, alleging that the child’s father had violated provisions of a previously entered visitation order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court rendered an oral ruling and found the father in contempt. Before the trial court’s entry of a written order regarding contempt, however, the father filed a motion seeking the trial court judge’s recusal. The trial court entered orders adjudicating the contempt charges and the father’s bond before entering a written order adjudicating the recusal issue. The trial court then entered orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. The father has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the trial court erred by entering further orders before entering an order adjudicating the recusal motion. We therefore vacate the trial court’s August 2023 bond orders and the August 2023 order regarding the second contempt petition, which were entered while the motion to recuse was pending. We reverse the trial court’s orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In 2023, a Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Demetruice Bennett, of assault,
several offenses involving the possession of a weapon and evading arrest. The trial court
sentenced the Defendant, a Range II offender, to a total effective sentence of twenty years,
to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred
when it admitted a video showing that he possessed a firearm on a day different from the
day upon which the indicted offenses occurred; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admissibility of the video; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions related to his possession of a firearm. After review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from a premises liability, slip-and-fall claim against the owner of a shopping center. The husband slipped and fell while trying to get into his vehicle at a shopping center owned by the defendant company. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Jayshawn Edward Williams, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder
for the shooting death of Travis Brown in Knoxville. The trial court sentenced Defendant
to a thirty-six-year sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the proof did
not establish his identity and because he acted in self-defense. Because we determine the
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an attorney discipline case. Elliott J. Schuchardt was licensed to practice law in Tennessee in 2008. Beginning in 2019, several individuals reported Mr. Schuchardt to the Board of Professional Responsibility. These complaints detailed conduct that implicated the following rules of professional conduct (“RPC”): RPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)–(b) (Communication), 1.5(b) (Fees), 1.7(a)(1) (Conflict of Interest), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.2 (Communication with a Person Represented by Counsel), 4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons), 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.2(a)(2) (Judicial and Legal Officials), 8.4(c) (Misconduct-Dishonesty/Fraud/Deceit/Misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Misconduct-Administration of Justice). A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that Mr. Schuchardt violated these RPCs on forty-seven occasions and recommended disbarment. The Knox County Chancery Court affirmed. Mr. Schuchardt now asks us to reverse. Because ample evidence supports the decisions below, we affirm Mr. Schuchardt’s disbarment.

The Defendant, Tyrome Cameron Ferguson, was charged by a Monroe County grand jury
with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a
deadly weapon relating to an alleged road-rage incident. On the first day of the Defendant’s
trial, the trial court found that the State had violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 and declared a mistrial. In a subsequent hearing, the trial court ordered the State to pay
defense counsel $500 “as a contribution toward his attorney[’s] fees” as a sanction for its
discovery violation. The Defendant’s charges were ultimately dismissed by agreement.
The State thereafter filed both an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 and a petition for common law writ of certiorari
challenging the trial court’s assessment of $500. We denied the State’s application for an
extraordinary appeal but granted its petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Ferguson, No.
E2025-00044-CCA-WR-CO (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2025) (Order). Finding that the
trial court’s order violated the State of Tennessee’s sovereign immunity from suit, we grant
certiorari and reverse and vacate the trial court’s order.

Petitioner, Vonda Star Smith, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying her claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying her claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) obtain a DNA expert, (2) object to a comment made by the trial court, (3) object to the State’s introduction of an undisclosed impeachment statement, and (4) call a corroborating witness. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendants, James and Kelli Hewitt, for review of the conditions of their pretrial release. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes. For the reasons discussed below, the Defendants’ motion is denied.

Ronald Matthew Lacy was a luxury car middleman. In 2015, through a series of electronic communications sent from Kentucky, Lacy persuaded the owner of a car dealership in Tennessee to wire him funds for a Mercedes. But Lacy never delivered the Mercedes or returned the funds. In this appeal, we consider whether a Tennessee court had statutory territorial jurisdiction to convict Lacy of theft for that conduct. We conclude that it did. We further conclude that Lacy’s theft conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. We therefore uphold Lacy’s conviction and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals

The Petitioner, Jaylun Malik Currie, appeals from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of counsel’s alleged multiple instances of deficient performance. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant filed a complaint for judicial review of the Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s decision to deny his request for property tax relief. Because Appellant sought review of an administrative order that had not become final under the applicable version of tax relief statutes, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1) (“A person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review”) (emphasis added). Affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., of first-degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a life sentence without parole and a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Coy J. Cotham, Jr., M2012-01150-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3778613, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2014). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to DNA testing of a blue towel recovered from his vehicle. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Crystal Lee Martin, entered an Alford or “best interest” plea to DUI on March 17, 2025, and her sentence was immediately executed as time served. On July 17, 2025, the Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction motions, including a “post-conviction relief packet,” which was related to her DUI offense, and also to a separate offense to which she had previously pleaded guilty, been given probation, and her ensuing probation violation convictions. The post-conviction court entered an order stating that the petition was not signed under oath subject to penalty of perjury and gave the Petitioner fifteen days to file an amended petition, and it denied all her other motions. The Petitioner filed a motion stating that her petition was, in fact, properly verified and indicating her refusal to file an amended petition. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jacque Bouvier Bennett, of aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and assault by offensive touching. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective fifty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it found the victim competent to testify; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the victim’s mother to be present during the victim’s testimony; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (4) the victim failed to identify the Defendant at trial; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors undermined the Defendant’s right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The parties entered into an agreement in which the defendant provided funds and the
plaintiff used those funds to trade stocks. At one point, the defendant agreed to make a
$50,000 loan to the plaintiff so that the trading could continue. The agreement was
evidenced by a promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to repay the loan and to share
any losses incurred. The loan was secured by a deed of trust executed on the plaintiff’s
residence. Subsequently, the parties lost approximately $210,342. The plaintiff then filed
a declaratory judgment action in which he claimed that the deed of trust was void because
the loan funds had never been disbursed. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim
alleging that the plaintiff owed him the balance of the loan plus interest. He also sought
reimbursement for a portion of the losses that the parties had incurred. The chancery court
determined that the defendant had never disbursed the loan funds. Accordingly, it held that
the deed of trust and the portion of the promissory note which required repayment of the
loan balance were void due to a lack of consideration. However, the chancery court also
held that the portion of the promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to share losses
was effective and left the defendant entitled to damages. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Blake Shemar Swann, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Parnell Quinn Short, of theft of property
valued between $1000 and $2500, a Class E felony and fixed a fine of $1750. The trial
court imposed the fine fixed by the jury and sentenced the Defendant, as a career offender,
to serve six years to run consecutively to the Defendant’s convictions in other cases. On
appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) admitted three of his
prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and (2) imposed the fine set by the jury
without making the statutorily required findings. After review, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment but vacate the imposition of the fine. We remand the case for a sentencing
hearing with respect to the imposition of the fine.

The defendant, Timothy Sedman, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, and
the trial court imposed a sentence of six years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request
for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected
judgment forms in counts one through five and counts seven through twenty.

The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine and resisting arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to suppress to challenge the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, and trial counsel’s failure to appeal his sentence. The Petitioner also claimed that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to trial counsel’s misleading advice that he would likely be sentenced to probation. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief, in part, and ordered a delayed appeal based on trial counsel’s failure to appeal the Petitioner’s sentence. This court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s request to serve his sentence on community corrections. See State v. Taylor, No. M2024-00192-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3879116, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2024), appeal denied (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2024). The post-conviction court entered an order denying the issues that were held in abeyance, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a two-day hearing regarding the mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. At the conclusion of the hearing, the father moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41. The trial court granted the motion, determining that modification of the parenting plan was not warranted because the mother had not met her burden to prove that there had been a material change of circumstance affecting the minor child’s well-being. The trial court accordingly dismissed the mother’s petition with prejudice and awarded the father his reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We further determine that Father is entitled to his reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

This appeal involves a mother and stepfather’s petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his surviving child after the death of the parties’ other child. The petition alleged two grounds for termination of parental rights – abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse. The chancery court found that neither ground had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also reviewed the statutory best interest factors and concluded that it was not in the best interest of the child for the father’s parental rights to be terminated. The mother and stepfather appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment after Appellant’s counsel failed to respond or otherwise appear to oppose the motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

It is often said that “hard cases make bad law.” This case is more than hard — it is tragic. In circumstances such as these, which evoke strong emotions, this Court must resist the temptation to bypass the limits of our appellate review and re-try cases and re-evaluate facts to achieve what some deem to be a more just result. Unfortunately, in my view, the majority’s opinion does exactly this – essentially abrogating the role of the trial judge as a factfinder. Specifically, the majority opinion reverses the trial court’s determination that no grounds existed for termination, reverses the trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights is not in Braxton’s (“the Child’s”) best interest, reverses factual findings made by the trial court, and even disregards credibility findings made by the trial court. I agree that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). The majority and I then choose different paths. Although I would reverse the trial court’s ruling as to abandonment, I would affirm in all other respects. In my view the majority ignores the presumption of correctness in the standard of review and does not give sufficient weight to the trial court’s credibility findings to travel the path they deem just. I do not agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact, nor that the aggregation of the individual facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest.

The petitioner, Charles Lane, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by
the Sevier County Circuit Court, arguing the habeas court erred in dismissing the petition.
The petitioner asserts that his pretrial jail credits were not applied properly and that his
request for transcripts was erroneously denied. Following our review, we affirm the habeas
court’s dismissal of the petition as the petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief.