APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff homeowners’ association filed this lawsuit against certain defendant homeowners who owned homes within its subdivision, seeking to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rentals.  After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment that focused on interpretation of the association’s restrictive covenants with respect to short-term rental properties.  Following a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant homeowners and concomitantly denied the association’s motion.  The trial court concluded that the language of the restrictive covenants was ambiguous as to short-term rentals and therefore unenforceable to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rental properties.  The association has appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Defendant, Clayton Nelvis, was arrested in January 2023, and 1st Out Bonding Company secured his release by executing a bail bond as surety. After the Defendant failed to appear for his initial arraignment, the trial court issued a conditional judgment forfeiting the bail bond. After 180 days, the trial court entered a final judgment of forfeiture when the surety failed to appear for the scheduled hearing. Two weeks later, the surety moved to set aside the final judgment, asserting that it was not liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-139(d), which relieves a surety of liability where the defendant is not timely entered into a state or federal fugitive database following a failure to appear. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the request for relief was untimely. On appeal, the surety contends that the statute extinguished its liability and that the trial court had no authority to enter a final forfeiture. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Trameisha L. Farris, of first degree felony murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. More specifically, she argues that (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that a robbery occurred; and (2) even assuming that a robbery occurred, the State failed to prove that she participated in that crime. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Plaintiffs in this case, who live in the Dominican Republic, were allegedly injured by toxic herbicides used in the sugar cane industry. Following the Plaintiffs’ filing of a lawsuit against the Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, pursuant to the Tennessee Products Liability Act, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case on several grounds. Although the trial court rejected the viability of a number of these defenses asserted by the Defendant at the motion to dismiss stage, the trial court concluded that the case should be dismissed on the basis that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application.” The trial court also opined that, “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic” but noted that the Plaintiffs “have only set forth a specific claim under the TPLA.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case.

The primary question in this case is whether the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ action on the basis of extraterritoriality. In answering that question, the trial court ruled that because no Tennessee law was on point to address the issue, federal law provided an appropriate framework to resolve the dispute. Under that framework, a court is tasked with answering two questions. First, “whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016). If the statute does not give a clear indication of extraterritoriality, all is not lost, however, so long as there can be a domestic application of the statute.

The Defendant, James Brent Wall, pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance and two counts of TennCare fraud. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence, which it suspended to probation. The State later alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation by refusing to submit to drug screening, failing to pay restitution, and absconding from supervision. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the suspended sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the court clerk retired the case, recalled the violation warrants, and issued an alias capias. Upon our review, we agree. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the proceedings.

Defendant, Christopher Kenn Baker, pleaded guilty to solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape for which he received a sentence of two years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Monroe County jury found the Defendant, Russell Matthew Morgan, guilty of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape and solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528 prohibits solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Bobby V. Summers, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Following our review of the entire record, briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Michael Joe Cunningham, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of making a false report and one count possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine. He received an effective fourteen-year community corrections sentence that was later transferred to probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation based on Defendant’s arrest for new offenses, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation rather than ordering treatment for his drug addiction. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Daniel J. Dreaden, for three counts of rape. On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed Count 3. Defendant waived a jury trial, and following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted on the remaining two counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of eight years, with ten months to serve and the balance to be supervised on probation. Defendant appeals his convictions, asserting 1) that his confrontation right was violated when the trial court prohibited him from cross-examining the victim, Defendant’s then-wife, about her extra-marital affair to establish her motive for the allegations of rape; and 2) that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant raped the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for entry of a judgment form in Count 3 to reflect dismissal of that count.

In January 2019, the Petitioner, James David Duncan, pled guilty to possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve ten years and placed him on supervised probation. In January 2020, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s probation sentence. On appeal, this court affirmed the revocation. State v. Duncan, No. E2020-00827-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 3403152, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2021). In December 2021, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief that was amended with the assistance of counsel in July 2023. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Tylar Scott Johnson, of four counts of rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-six years in confinement at a one hundred-percent service rate. On appeal, the Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, that improper argument by the State affected the verdict, and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm.

This appeal concerns counterclaims and third-party claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Pay Act of 1991, and enforcement of a lien. The counter-plaintiff, C4 Sourcing Solutions, LLC, alleged that a third-party defendant, Capital City Construction, LLC, breached its agreement to purchase 171 custom-fabricated steel containers for use in an apartment complex. C4 also sought to enforce a lien against the complex property, which was owned by the plaintiff, 83 Freight, LLC. After a trial, the jury found Capital City breached its contract with C4 and awarded $866,000 in compensatory damages. And after a post-trial hearing, the court granted C4’s request to collect on its lien. Capital City and 83 Freight raise numerous issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.

This appeal stems from a trial court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement regarding a
long-running business divorce. However, because the appellants’ notice of appeal is
untimely, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.

The Defendant, Brendan T. Negron, appeals from his conviction for aggravated domestic assault. Specifically, he contends that evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish only a conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault because the barstool utilized in the assault did not constitute a deadly weapon. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rex A. Martin, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, assault, preventing another from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under a court order, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he was sentenced to an effective term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to seven of his eight convictions - aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault, preventing another from making an emergency call, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a verified claim against an estate seeking the repayment of a purported loan made to the decedent by his mother. The decedent’s surviving girlfriend, as executrix of the estate, claimed the funds provided to the decedent by his mother were a gift as opposed to a loan. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the funds were a loan and entered an order in favor of the mother. The estate timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A self-represented defendant moved to recuse the trial judge. This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal filed after the trial court’s denial of the motion. We dismiss the appeal because the defendant failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.

The petitioner, Leavy L. Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a commercial lease of property operated as a convenience store in Memphis. The lease provided that it was to be construed and enforced in accordance with Georgia law. The lease was for an initial term of ten years, but it provided that the tenant had the option to renew the lease for two additional terms of five years commencing at the expiration of the initial term. Near the end of the initial ten-year term, the landlord sent a notice of nonrenewal to the tenant, notifying the tenant that the lease was scheduled to expire because the tenant had failed to timely exercise the option to renew it. One week later, the tenant sent the landlord written notice of its intent to exercise the option to extend the lease for an additional five years. The tenant’s letter asserted that the provision of the lease regarding when notice was to be provided “[did] not make any sense” and informed the landlord that the tenant was thereby exercising the option. The landlord filed this lawsuit, asking the trial court to hold that the lease had expired by its terms when the tenant did not timely exercise the option to extend it, and therefore, the landlord was entitled to possession of the property and a judgment for rent at the holdover rate provided in the lease. The tenant filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the lease was ambiguous but that the only reasonable interpretation of the lease was that notice of intent to exercise the option was due ninety days before the end of the initial term. Because the tenant failed to provide notice by that date, the trial court concluded that the initial term of the lease expired, the landlord was entitled to possession, and the tenant was liable for holdover rent and attorney fees. The tenant appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

A three-judge panel was convened in this case to determine the constitutionality of 2023 Tennessee Public Chapter 21. While the case was pending, the trial court temporarily stayed implementation of subsection 1(b) of the legislation, the result of which was that the deadlines contained therein were rendered moot. In considering competing summary judgment motions, the trial court unanimously ruled that subsection 1(a) of the act was not also moot. In a divided decision, however, the trial court concluded that the legislation violated two provisions of the Tennessee Constitution: the home rule amendment and a clause exempting metropolitan governments from a twenty-five-member cap on county legislative bodies. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that subsection 1(a) is not moot. We reverse, however, its conclusion that the statute is barred by either constitutional provision at issue

I write separately to address what I consider to be an erroneous reading of Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Article”), which provides, in relevant part:

 The legislative body shall not exceed twenty-five members . . . Any county organized under the consolidated government provision of Article XI, Section 9, of this Constitution shall be exempt from having a county or legislative body as described in this paragraph. 

(Emphases added). It is undisputed that Metro qualifies for the exemption contained in the Article. The obvious reason for exempting a consolidated government from the restriction on the size of its membership is to accommodate the far larger population of a consolidated government as compared to a single county or municipality.