APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action involves interpretation of a right-of-first-refusal provision originally executed
in 1953 within four property deeds. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who was seeking to enforce
the provision as to two parcels of real property in the chains of title descending from the
1953 deeds. In the 1953 deeds, the rights of first refusal had been extended to adult
descendants of the original grantor and secondarily to other title holders of the parcels. The
defendants are two grandchildren of the original grantor and two trusts. The plaintiff is a
great-grandson of the original grantor. The defendants filed third-party claims for
declaratory judgment against all living adult descendants of the original grantor, seeking
to establish that the rights of first refusal had expired. One of the third-party defendants
was the plaintiff’s mother, who joined in the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
determining that although the rights of first refusal may have expired on their own terms
each time one of the properties involved had been sold, the provisions had been renewed
by language in subsequent deeds that incorporated prior restrictions. The trial court
ordered specific performance of the sale of the defendants’ parcel to the plaintiff. The
court also ordered that a 2019 deed, wherein the individual defendants had transferred a
portion of another parcel to one of the defendant trusts, be set aside to allow the original
grantor’s adult descendants the option to exercise the right of first refusal. The trial court
denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the defendants. The trial court subsequently
entered a “Final Judgment,” concluding that the right remained enforceable in each of the
deeds. The defendants have appealed.1 Determining that the rights of first refusal in the
subject deeds have expired and are unenforceable, we reverse the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the court’s order of specific performance
against the defendants. We also reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims and accordingly grant declaratory
judgment that the rights of first refusal at issue on appeal are expired and unenforceable.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her minor child based on several statutory grounds. The mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The plaintiffs were injured by gunfire when the police were called to their residence to stop a domestic incident and burglary in progress. The plaintiffs sued the defendant city, arguing that their employee police officers were negligent in failing to adhere to department policies and rules. Some years after the case had been filed, the city filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claims involved civil rights and that the city’s governmental immunity was not removed under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court agreed and granted the city’s motion, dismissing the case. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding whether one homeowner in a subdivision has the exclusive right to access a private road within the subdivision. The homeowner asserted that it had exclusive access to the road pursuant to a contractual agreement between the homeowner’s association and a previous owner of the property, so it maintained a gate across the road, preventing other homeowners from accessing it. The trial court ruled, in the context of various summary judgment motions, that the contractual agreement did not give the homeowner exclusive access to the road, and it ordered the homeowner to provide access to all HOA members. The trial court also awarded attorney fees to the respondents, which included the homeowner’s association and the owners of a neighboring property. The petitioning homeowner appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks this court to review the trial court’s suppression of Defendant’s blood alcohol test. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test.

A Dyer County jury convicted the Defendant, Guy Willie Toles, of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one and a half years of confinement, suspended to probation after the service of sixty days of incarceration, and it imposed a $750 fine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it set his fine because the trial court failed to place any findings on the record in support of the fine. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jerome Cole, Jr., pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony and aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received concurrent
eight-year sentences with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a
sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve the sentences in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative
sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, John M. Bybee, for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Upon full consideration, the application is denied for the reasons stated below. 

Rule 9 outlines the procedure for obtaining interlocutory appellate review of a trial court order. Both the trial and appellate court must approve the appeal. To that end, a party must first file a motion in the trial court requesting the appeal within thirty days of the order being appealed. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(b). If the trial court determines the interlocutory appeal shall be allowed to proceed, the party must then file an application for permission to appeal in this Court within ten days of the trial court’s order granting the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c). The application must be accompanied by copies of the trial court order from which appellate review is being sought, the trial court’s statement of reasons for granting the appeal, and the other parts of the record necessary for consideration of the application. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(d). Thus, and because there is generally no record already on file when a party seeks a Rule 9 appeal, it is that party’s responsibility to provide this Court with an ad hoc record of the proceeding below. The Defendant’s application is sufficient for this Court’s review.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

On July 31, 2025, the pro se Appellant filed a notice of appeal seeking an appeal as
of right from the trial court’s July 22, 2025 order denying a motion for resentencing
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). Recognizing that an appeal
as of right does not lie from the challenged order, see State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2023), the Appellant has now filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of the trial court’s order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-102(a)(2). The State has not
filed a response in opposition to the Appellant’s petition.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for default judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant, Marty Ray Rouse, appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his full sentence in confinement after Defendant admitted to violating his probation. Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by focusing on Defendant’s past criminal history and failing to apply the correct legal standard in determining the consequence of Defendant’s probation violation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Marcus Wilson, appeals from the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan that designates her and her former spouse joint primary residential parents and grants them equal residential parenting time. Because the parties did not agree to be joint primary residential parents, we modify the parenting plan to name the mother primary residential parent. Otherwise, we affirm.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The defendant landowner appeals the trial court’s finding that the restrictive covenants applicable to her property prohibited the construction of a second residence.  We affirm. 

This appeal concerns Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e), an ethics rule requiring that a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm be agreed to by the client in writing.  Trinity Clark (“Clark”) entered into a retainer agreement with attorney Troy Jones (“Jones”) on a 1/3 contingency fee.  Jones brought Clark’s matter to attorney Lance Baker (“Baker”), who was not in a firm with Jones.  Clark later entered an agreement with Baker on a 45% contingency fee.  The Clark-Baker agreement provided, in writing, that Baker could associate other attorneys on the case, but that Clark’s overall fee obligation would not increase.  The agreement neither identified any other attorneys nor specified how fees would be divided between them.  After Clark’s case settled, Clark sued Baker in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), alleging Baker’s fee was unreasonable.  Jones joined the lawsuit, arguing he was entitled to a share of the fees (“Plaintiffs,” Jones and Clark collectively).  Baker filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Trial Court denied Baker’s motion, finding that both the Clark-Jones agreement and the Clark-Baker agreement were invalid for noncompliance with Rule 1.5(e).  This interlocutory appeal followed.  We find the Clark-Jones agreement invalid.  However, with respect to the Clark-Baker agreement, we find that the entire arrangement and Clark’s assent thereto satisfied Rule 1.5(e).  We reverse on this issue and find that the Clark-Baker agreement is not invalid for failure of compliance with Rule 1.5(e).  We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

This appeal arises from a complaint filed by a faculty member against The Vanderbilt University (“Vanderbilt”) after Vanderbilt rejected her applications for promotion and tenure during the academic years 2015-16 and 2018-19. The faculty member initially alleged one count each of gender discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract but subsequently amended her complaint to omit the gender discrimination and retaliation claims. Concerning her breach of contract claim, the faculty member alleged that Vanderbilt had not followed its own policies and procedures for promotion and tenure when reviewing her tenure file and had shown bias against her, thus exhibiting a substantial departure from accepted academic norms and procedural regularity. After discovery, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court adopted this Court’s deferential standard for reviewing promotion and tenure decisions by academic institutions as set forth in Figal v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2012-02516-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5459021 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013), and determined that Vanderbilt had not exhibited a substantial departure from accepted academic norms or procedural regularity in denying tenure to the faculty member. The trial court then determined that Vanderbilt had met its burden of negating an essential element of the breach of contract claim because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Vanderbilt had failed to follow its own tenure review process. The trial court further determined that the faculty member had failed to establish undisputed material facts that would entitle her to summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court denied the faculty member’s motion for summary judgment, granted Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The faculty member timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The owner of a Pitbull mix canine appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside the judgment entered in favor of the canine’s victim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Over ten years ago, Commerce Union Bank, d/b/a Reliant Bank (“the Bank”) obtained a deficiency judgment for a property owned by Dr. Byron V. Bush and Kelly D. Bush (“Plaintiffs”) that Plaintiffs used to secure a loan. Since then, Plaintiffs have filed and lost four appeals related to this case. In March 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for fraudulent breach of contract against the Bank; the late Devan D. Ard, Jr., the former Bank president; Rick Belote, Senior Vice President of the Bank; and William Ronald DeBerry (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.03. The Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, awarded Defendants attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in filing the motion, and imposed a screening mechanism on any future filings by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

After a bench trial in the Tipton County Circuit Court, the Defendant, Travis Michael Barnett, was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and the trial court imposed a six-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender with a 35% release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant asks this Court to order the trial court to remove certain allegedly disparaging comments from the trial transcript and two court orders. Appellant also asks this Court to issue a “letter of reprimand” to the trial judge for the allegedly disparaging comments. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, and because we cannot grant Appellant the relief he seeks, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Michael Chad Owens, appeals his DeKalb County convictions for the sale and delivery of heroin and methamphetamine and resulting forty-five-year effective sentence. Specifically, the Defendant challenges that (1) the State failed to sufficiently establish the chain of custody for the narcotics; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions due to chain of custody issues; (3) his right to confrontation was violated when the confidential informant (“CI”) involved in the controlled buys did not testify at trial; (4) the probative value of the admitted photograph of the CI was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice; (5) the Defendant’s alleged impairment at trial prejudiced the jury against him; (6) his sentences are excessive; and (7) the fines imposed by the trial court are excessive. After review, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing with regard to the fines and for entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the sentence and fine for each conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The appellant has filed a late notice of appeal together with a request to waive the late filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the request to waive the late filing and dismiss the appeal.