APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Gregory Bonds, entered a guilty plea to seven offenses, for which he received a concurrent twelve-year term of imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro-se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter an agreement with the State for an illegal sentence. The Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal because the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony offense was ordered to be served concurrently with other offenses in direct contravention of the law. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim for relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter the plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, William Dejesus Fernandez, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment for count two consistent with this opinion.

In 2020, a Hardeman County jury convicted the Petitioner, Lavonte Douglas, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Douglas, No. W2020-01012-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 4480904, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2023). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, amended by counsel, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to: object to hearsay statements; request in writing a curative jury instruction; and give a closing argument. He further contended that the cumulative effect of these errors entitled him to post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Victor Trezevant, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a life sentence. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

In 2012, a Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dwight Randall Walton, of four
counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of
aggravated sexual battery. For these convictions, he received an effective sentence of fifty
years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. State v. Walton, No. E2014-02319-
CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5554573, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2015), no perm. app.
filed. On direct appeal, this court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
each conviction, except the aggravated sexual battery conviction. Id. Concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated sexual battery conviction, we reversed
and dismissed that conviction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction
court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction
court’s judgment.

This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment.

This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment.

The Defendant, Jeffrey W. Dean, was convicted in the Robertson County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony and received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, through counsel, seeks an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 from (1) the post-conviction court’s preliminary order entered on April 21, 2025; (2) the order denying a motion to strike or vacate that order entered on May 13, 2025; and (3) the order denying an interlocutory appeal entered on August 1, 2025. 1 The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim as being previously determined, and its subsequent denials of requests for rehearing and review, “so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). The Petitioner also requests a stay of the post-conviction proceedings. Upon review of the application and its supporting documents, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated grounds for extraordinary relief under Rule 10. Accordingly, a response from the State is not required, and the application is DENIED. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d).

The Defendant, Kelly Ray Turnbow, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of his three-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding he violated the terms of his probation based on conduct not alleged in the probation violation warrant and (2) failing to articulate its reasoning to support the full revocation of his probation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for additional findings consistent with this opinion.

A buyer signed an agreement with a contractor for the construction of a custom home. After disagreements arose over the construction and its pace, the buyer sued the contractor and its owner seeking damages and to quiet title to the property. The trial court awarded the buyer damages, title to the property, and attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm.

In this dispute between neighboring property owners, the trial court determined that a concrete fence built by one neighbor violated a setback ordinance and entered an injunction requiring the neighbor to remove the fence. We have determined that the trial court erred in so ruling and reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision.

Six years after his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, the Petitioner, Craig Rickard, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. In that petition, he asserted that the two convictions should have merged under principles of double jeopardy. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of the petition. Accordingly, we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

This appeal stems from a boundary line dispute. Mr. Jones sold the Smiths two lots within a subdivision in Hardin County. It is undisputed that the Smiths bought Lots 87 and 88 on September 11, 2012. Several years later, Mr. Jones claimed that the Smiths had encroached on “Lot 89.” The Smiths insisted they occupied only the 80 linear feet purchased from Mr. Jones. When the parties were unable to come to a resolution, the Smiths filed suit in chancery court to quiet title to Lots 87 and 88, declare the lot numbers on the survey misnumbered, and prayed for damages for slander of title and attorney’s fees. Mr. Jones filed a counter-complaint to quiet title to “Lot 89,” for ejectment, conversion and/or civil theft, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, defamation, and punitive damages. After a bench trial, the trial court held that “Lot 89” did not exist, granted damages to the Smiths for slander of title, and dismissed Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We affirm the trial court’s holding that “Lot 89” does not exist and the dismissal of Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We vacate the court’s decision as to slander of title, reverse the grant of attorney’s fees as to damages, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The defendant, Jeremiah Nance, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury for which he was sentenced to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing testimony that the police were responding to a domestic call; (2) the trial court erred in not allowing the victim to assert her Fifth Amendment right not to testify; and (3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the prosecutor to misstate the evidence during closing argument. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the minor child: abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that the Department of Children’s Services failed to meet its burden of proof as to any of the statutory grounds set out in its petition to terminate appellee/mother’s parental rights to the minor child. Although unnecessary in view of its determination that there were no grounds for termination, the trial court undertook a best interest analysis and found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate mother’s rights. Because the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings as to either grounds or best interest, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order terminating appellee/mother’s parental rights

Appellant sued appellees alleging breach of contract, fraud, and property damage. The trial court granted separate default judgments against the two appellees. Appellees moved the trial court to set aside the default judgments due to a lack of personal jurisdiction and due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The trial court set aside the default judgments over the objections of appellant, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court involuntarily dismissed appellant’s complaint at the conclusion of his case-in-chief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

he child’s mother, the child’s biological father, and the mother’s former husband who believed himself to be the child’s biological parent for the majority of her life. After the mother disclosed the child’s parentage to both men, the biological father filed a petition to be named the child’s parent and for a parenting plan to be established. The mother agreed with his petition in all respects. But the mother’s former husband soon intervened with a petition to be awarded stepparent visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-303. Following the filing of the stepparent visitation petition, the mother and the biological father, who at this point had never had any unsupervised or overnight visitation with the child, executed an agreed parenting plan in which they would share joint custody and equal parenting time with the child, as well as waive child support. After a joint hearing on both petitions, the trial court adopted the mother and biological father’s proposed parenting plan, except that the former husband was granted stepparent visitation with the child every other weekend and over the summer holiday; the former husband’s weekend visitation only occurred during the time that the proposed plan would have allotted to the mother. The mother now appeals this decision. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Christopher O. Curry, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. More than a year after his judgment became final, the Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. The trial court granted appellee a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct by the appellant, divided the parties’ assets and debts, and entered a permanent parenting plan designating appellee as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, granting the parties equal co-parenting time, and providing appellee with sole decision-making authority with respect to the child. Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal; however, each of those issues has been waived due to appellant’s failure to comply with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court. Additionally, appellee argues that the trial court erred in awarding the parties equal co-parenting time and requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant mother against the appellee father. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the order of protection.

This is a health care liability case that centers around the application of the discovery rule. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining that the discovery rule did not toll the accrual of the statute of limitations to the time asserted by the plaintiff. The trial court based this determination on two independent bases. The first basis was predicated on certain information provided by the defendants, which was taken from the Tennessee Secretary of State’s website. The trial court took judicial notice of this information and determined that it indicated that a reasonable person would have been able to discover the identity of the defendant. The second basis, an express alternative finding, stated that even if the information was not considered, sufficient information existed in exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s complaint to support its determination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Craig Kitt, has filed a motion seeking review of the trial court’s
order granting the State’s motion to continue the hearing on his motion to reduce bail. The
Defendant seeks relief pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. The State has filed a
response in opposition. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

The Defendant is charged with three counts of aggravated rape and five counts of
rape. The Defendant’s pretrial bond is currently set at $500,000. On July 18, 2025, he
filed a motion to reduce that amount, and a hearing was scheduled for July 28, 2025. The
State filed a motion to continue that hearing. The trial court granted the State’s motion and
continued the hearing until August 11, 2025. The Defendant now seeks review, pursuant
to Rule 8, of the trial court’s decision to grant the State’s motion to continue.

Rule 8 provides the procedural framework for obtaining appellate review of the trial
court’s actions regarding a defendant’s release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144. That rule
states: “Before or after conviction the prosecution or defendant may obtain review of an
order entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of
Criminal Appeals granting, denying, setting or altering conditions of defendant’s release.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 8(a) (emphasis added). By its plain language, Rule 8 does not govern the
challenge presented by the Defendant here. This Court agrees with the State that review
of the trial court’s continuance order must be sought under Rule of Appellate Procedure 9
or 10.

Accordingly, the Defendant’s Rule 8 motion is hereby denied. Because the
Defendant is indigent, costs are taxed to the State.

The Defendant, Desmond Johnson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, in exchange for an agreed sentence of four years as a Range I offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Because the Defendant failed to file a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) certificate of eligibility for judicial diversion with the trial court, we conclude that the trial court was precluded from considering the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.