Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

A husband and wife filed a claim against a county hospital alleging that the negligence of the hospital and its employees caused the death of their son. The claim was filed approximately fifteen months after their son’s death in accordance with the provisions of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012). The county hospital, a governmental entity, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). The couple responded that their complaint was timely filed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) extended the GTLA statute of limitations by 120 days. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the Rule 9 application and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the hospital’s motion to dismiss. We granted the hospital permission to appeal. We hold that the 120-day extension provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not apply to the plaintiffs’ claim brought under the GTLA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the hospital’s motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham’s complaint.

I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion on the issue of estoppel. On the statute of limitations issue, however, I respectfully dissent.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this hearing-loss case, the employer raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in finding that employee’s workers’ compensation claim is not barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court’s judgment finding that the claim was timely.

The Defendant, Terrance Megel Jordan, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-503 (2010) (rape), 39-13-506 (2010) (amended 2012) (aggravated statutory rape), 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest). The rape and aggravated statutory rape convictions were merged with the aggravated rape conviction, although the trial court later vacated the aggravated statutory rape count. For aggravated rape, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years, to be served at 100%. For evading arrest, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. The sentences were imposed concurrrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated rape and rape; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s statements to a social worker; and (3) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the rape and aggravated rape judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions

In 2007, the employee suffered a work-related back injury, for which he filed a workers’ compensation claim. After conservative treatment failed to provide relief, the employee obtained an unauthorized fusion surgery. The parties settled the workers’ compensation action in 2009. The settlement provided for “future medical benefits relating to the back injury” of 2007, while precluding future benefits for unauthorized care. In 2011, the employee sought authorization for a second surgerybyan authorized surgeon. The employer refused. The trial court ordered the employer to payfor the second surgery, and the employer has appealed. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the employer has appealed an order that is not final and that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Thus, this appeal is dismissed.
 

The Petitioner, Mario Ramirez Rodriguez, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Petitioner claims his allegations regarding the age of the victim, his incorrect release eligibility noted on the judgment form for Count 2, and the failure of the trial court to impose the required statutory fines, could be proven upon an evidentiary hearing and should not have been deemed merely clerical errors. We conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.
 

In this delayed appeal, the defendant, James William Axford, II, contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve in confinement the originally imposed sentence of three years for his convictions of fraudulently obtaining a controlled substance, evading arrest, identity theft, and aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Thomas G. McConnell, appeals a certified question of law from the Williamson County Circuit Court, where he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). The reserved certified question challenges on constitutional grounds a police officer’s basis for stopping his vehicle. The State concedes that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle violated his constitutional protection from unreasonable seizure and advocates reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Because we agree with the parties that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the defendant.
 

The Petitioner, Marcus Pearson, challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. He contends, and the State concedes, (1) that the date the trial court used to determine the timeliness of the petition was incorrect and (2) that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. We agree. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the post-conviction petition is reversed, and the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
 

The Defendant, Ray Neil Thompson, entered an “open” plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range III, persistent offender and imposed sentences of twenty-three years at 100% for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. The trial court further ordered that those sentences were to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a prior twenty-seven-year sentence at 100% for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that trial court erred by ordering 100% release eligibility for his aggravated robbery convictions pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(k)(2) and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

I have carefully considered Judge Stafford’s energetic dissent in this case, and find that I cannot agree. I submit this separate concurrence to explain my position.