In Re Angel S. Et Al.
This appeal involves our review of the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her two minor children. Having carefully reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of John A. Queener v. Jim Griffith
The Estate of John A. Queener (the “Estate”), by and through Personal Representative, Carolyn Q. Junck, seeks to recover funds paid out with respect to two certificates of deposit (“CDs”) owned by the decedent, John A. Queener (the “Decedent”), at the time of his death and funds paid from the Decedent’s checking account during his lifetime. The Estate sued Jim Griffith (“Mr. Griffith”), stepson of the Decedent, and relied upon legal theories of undue influence, fraud and/or fraud in the inducement, lack of competency in the contract, and conversion. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Estate $13,355.05 plus pre- and post-judgment interest against Mr. Griffith to reimburse the Estate for a number of checks that Mr. Griffith wrote from the Decedent’s checking account during the Decedent’s lifetime. The trial court denied the Estate any recovery with respect to the CDs. On appeal, the Estate and Mr. Griffith both raise issues with the trial court’s judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
The Wise Group, Inc. et al. v. Dwight Holland et al.
Appellees brought suit under the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to recover attorney’s fees incurred in attempting to collect an underlying judgment from one of the Appellants. The trial court awarded Appellees’ attorney’s fees. Because the Act does not authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darlene Hall v. Quality Center for Rehabilitation and Healing, LLC
This is an appeal from an order denying a nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings in a wrongful death action commenced by a former resident’s wife. The nursing home argued that the wife was bound by an optional arbitration agreement that she signed during her husband’s admission to the facility. However, the trial court held that the wife was not bound by the arbitration agreement because she signed it in a representative capacity and was not a party to the agreement. This appeal followed. Following the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC, 685 S.W.3d 718 (Tenn. 2024), we hold that the wife lacked the legal authority to bind her husband to the optional arbitration agreement because she had the powers of only a healthcare agent, and entering into the optional arbitration agreement was not a healthcare decision. Thus, neither the wife nor any of the resident’s heirs are precluded from bringing and maintaining a wrongful death action on the resident’s behalf. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit on different grounds, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Rainwaters, et al. v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, et al.
Acting under authorization of subsections (1) and (7) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 70-1-305, officers of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), suspecting violations of wildlife laws, entered onto the Plaintiffs’ properties on multiple occasions, seeking to enforce restrictions upon hunting. The TWRA’s officers did so without a warrant or consent. The Plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that the statute authorizing these entries is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. A three-judge trial court panel concluded the statute is unconstitutional on its face and granted declaratory judgment and nominal damages. The three-judge panel divided on two issues. One, the majority pretermitted the as-applied constitutional challenge, while the third judge would have found the statute unconstitutional as applied. Two, the majority declined to grant injunctive relief while the third judge would have granted injunctive relief. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency appeals. We conclude the statute is facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied. We affirm the award of nominal damages. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Justus P.
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of: (1) the parenting plan for the minor child; and (2) Appellee/Father’s child support obligations. Because the trial court erred in setting the parties’ respective monthly gross incomes for child support purposes, we vacate its order concerning child support and remand for recalculation. The trial court’s order granting Father the federal Child Tax Credit is also vacated. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Oliver et al. v. Kroger Limited Partnership I
A woman fell in a Gallatin, Tennessee grocery store and suffered a labral hip tear. She and her husband filed suit against the grocery store, alleging claims for premises liability and loss of consortium. The case proceeded to a jury trial. After the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the store moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs put forth no proof of constructive notice. The plaintiffs appeal; discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re A'Jayi A.
Two relatives filed competing petitions to adopt a minor child after his mother’s death. The child’s father was unknown. The trial court conducted a comparative fitness analysis and found that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the child’s maternal grandfather. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Allison S.
This appeal concerns a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her young daughter. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to Mother: (1) persistent conditions; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Stockdale et al. v. Kim Helper
The plaintiffs, who are former employees of a municipal police department, were discharged after the District Attorney General sent an email to the city manager stating that the plaintiffs’ testimony at hearings may be impeached without independent corroboration, thus allegedly “creating challenges for the State in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” The plaintiffs thereafter brought suit against the District Attorney General and specifically asserted claims for official oppression under a negligence per se theory and for tortious interference with a business relationship and prospective business relationships. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of qualified immunity and absolute immunity. The plaintiffs appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, the District Attorney General died. The personal representative of her estate, who was substituted as the appellee in the wake of her death, has argued that this case abated upon her death because the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is “for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference abated upon the District Attorney General’s death. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs’ separate pursuit of recovery under a negligence per se theory did not abate, we nonetheless affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se theory due to their failure to raise an effective challenge to the dismissal of the theory in their appellate briefing. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Royalty Y.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that four statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make findings concerning the mother’s affirmative defense of lack of willfulness relative to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to visit and support the child, we reverse the trial court’s reliance on those grounds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kurt M. Chambliss Et Al. v. Terry L. Rutledge Et Al.
The parties are all of the owners of four neighboring lots in a small, exclusive residential development. Each lot is subject to restrictive covenants. Kurt M. Chambless and Jill S. Chambless originally filed suit against Terry L. Rutledge and Cynthia L. Rutledge, averring that the Rutledges were violating the restrictive covenants. While the Chamblesses’ suit was pending, all of the lot owners (other than the Chamblesses) voted to amend the restrictive covenants. The Chamblesses amended their suit to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the amended covenants and seeking a refund of certain monies they paid to Mr. Rutledge for the benefit of the homeowners’ association.1Each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Chamblesses’ declaratory judgment claim due to their failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, in part, and ruled that the amended covenants were valid and enforceable. The Chamblesses timely appealed to this Court. Upon careful review, we find that the trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim after determining that the amended covenants are valid and enforceable. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of those parts of the Amended Complaint challenging the validity of the amended covenants, and we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order declaring that the amended covenants are valid and enforceable. Further, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim against the Maxwells and the Dotys arising out of Mr.Rutledge’s use of association funds but decline to award the Maxwells and the Dotys their attorneys’ fees on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timberlake Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Timberlake Development, LLC Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Laronda Johnson v. Jacob C. Morton
Mother seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motions to recuse both the trial judge and the child support magistrate. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse the trial judge. We transfer the appeal of the denial of the motion to recuse the child support magistrate to the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County v. Delinquent Taxpayers 2018 (Blight Authority of Memphis)
In this appeal, the trial court granted a motion to rescind a tax sale with respect to a particular parcel. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law reflecting the basis for its decision. To the extent that a constitutional challenge is raised, the trial court should also determine on remand whether notice must be provided to the Tennessee Attorney General pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.04. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ruth Mitchell v. City of Franklin, Tennessee
This is the second appeal in this personal injury matter involving the plaintiff’s injury from an uneven sidewalk owned by the defendant city. In the first appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to consider expert testimony that had been erroneously excluded by the trial court. On remand, the trial court heard expert testimony on the issue of the city’s maintenance and inspection of its sidewalks. Because the evidence on remand did not include any new evidence regarding the length of time that the sidewalk defect had existed, we have concluded that the issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal are pretermitted by the law of the case doctrine. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Werner Reichenberger v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner, et al.
In this appeal, the petitioner sought judicial review of a decision made by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development denying his application for unemployment compensation benefits. The chancery court reversed the Department’s decision, concluding that it was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The Department appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Easley v. City of Memphis
This is an appeal of a Governmental Tort Liability Act case and concerns a judgment received by the plaintiff, who stepped off of a curb in the middle of the block, not at the crosswalk, and was struck by a city-owned vehicle while attempting to cross between two stopped vehicles when the light changed. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we reverse the trial court’s judgment that the city defendant is liable for the negligent hiring and retention of its employee because the record fails to show that evidence was introduced at trial in support of this claim. Moreover, we reverse the trial court’s allocation of fault, concluding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the plaintiff is at least 50% at fault. Because the plaintiff is accordingly barred from obtaining a recovery, we dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dominion Real Estate, LLC v. The Wise Group, Inc. et al.
Appellee Dominion Real Estate, LLC (“Dominion”) filed a malicious prosecution action against the Wise Group, Inc. (the “Wise Group”), the Lux Development Group, LLC (the “Lux Group”) (together with the Wise Group, “Wise and Lux”), and Alan Wise (together with Wise and Lux, “the Wise Defendants” or “Appellants”). The trial court dismissed Dominion’s case, and Dominion appealed. 1 In their brief, the Wise Defendants asked this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Dominion subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal. Although this Court granted the motion to dismiss, it reserved the issue of frivolous appeal damages, which is the sole issue addressed herein. Because Dominion’s appeal had no reasonable chance of success, it was frivolous, and the Wise Defendants are entitled to damages. Accordingly, we grant the Wise Defendants’ motion and remand the case for calculation of the Wise Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal and for entry of judgment on same. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Heritage Construction Group, LLC v. Karen Vest
A homebuilder sought to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitration award. It claimed the arbitrator exceeded his powers in failing to award attorney’s fees and penalties under its contract with the homeowner. The chancery court denied the requested relief and awarded the homeowner attorney’s fees for defending against the homebuilder’s motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Marcie Elizabeth Rasnick v. Jason Dean Rasnick
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer A. Seiber v. David S. Seiber
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company (Dissenting)
A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Eric O. Carter v. Howard Gentry, et al.
This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Eric O. Carter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Howard Gentry (“Gentry”), Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk, 1 and Frank Strada (“Strada”), Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), asking that the criminal judgment entered against him be expunged because it was not properly endorsed under the applicable rules and statutes. The Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he only wants a ministerial act performed and is not challenging his sentence. We find that Petitioner is in fact challenging his sentence, and the Trial Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear that challenge. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
