In Re: John Jay Hooker - Order
John Jay Hooker has filed a motion requesting this Court (1) to set aside its June 21, 2010 order directing the Clerk of the Appellate Courts to decline to accept any of his further filings in this case and (2) to rescind its January 7, 2010 order enforcing the October 20, 2008 order of the Chancery Court for Davidson County suspending his license to practice law for thirty days. Mr. Hooker has also requested that all the members of the Court recuse themselves from this proceeding because they “are prejudiced against him as a consequence of a contentious political dispute before the legislature . . . regarding the [c]onstitutionality of the [r]etention [e]lection [s]tatute.” In order to address Mr. Hooker’s first two requests, the Court must first address his renewed insistence that all the members of this Court are disqualified from any proceedings involving his law license. It is, therefore, ordered that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts is directed to accept and file the motion lodged by Mr. Hooker on January 14, 2011. It is further ordered that Mr. Hooker’s motion requesting all the members of this Court to recuse themselves from this proceeding is denied. |
Supreme Court | ||
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al.
After the death of her husband, the plaintiff filed suit against their agents/financial planners based upon several theories of recovery in regard to the termination of a life insurance policy from one company and the acquisition of a replacement policy from a second company. After initially contesting the award of benefits, the second company, which was also named as a defendant in the suit, settled with the plaintiff. At the conclusion of the bench trial as to the liability of the agents, the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages as to each policy based upon various theories of recovery: the agents’ failure to procure a life insurance policy as directed, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, but held that the damages in contract relating to the failure to procure should be offset by the amount of the plaintiff’s pre-trial settlement with the second insurance company. Because of the nature of the issues presented, this Court granted permission to appeal. As to the policy for which benefits were denied by the second company, we hold that (1) a cause of action may arise for the failure of the agents to procure a policy not subject to contest; (2) the claim for failure to procure may be actionable, notwithstanding the policy holders’ admission that they did not read the insurance application; and (3) because the settlement by the second life insurance company was not specifically resolved based upon contract, the agents are not entitled to a credit against damages caused by their failure to procure. As to the policy terminated by the plaintiff, we hold that the evidence preponderates against any award of damages based upon negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finally, we hold that the ad damnum clause in the complaint provided the agents with sufficient notice to support a damage award in the amount of $1,000,000 plus pre-judgment interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for determination of post-judgment interest. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al. - Dissent
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al. - Dissent
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford House et al.
The administratrix of the estate of the deceased brought this wrongful death suit against the defendant nursing home and its controlling entities, alleging damages as the result of ordinary negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act applied to the ordinary negligence claims, thereby precluding allegations of negligence per se or violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court also dismissed a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the portion of the order dismissing the punitive damages claim. This Court granted the administratix’s application for permission to appeal in an effort to clarify the standards governing nursing home liability and to resolve a conflict in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. We hold that, because the administratrix of the estate of the deceased has alleged violations of the standard of care pertaining to both medical treatment and routine care, she has made claims based upon both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Further, she may offer proof of negligence per se and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act as support for her ordinary negligence claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the punitive damages claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford House et al. - Dissenting
This appeal involves important questions regarding the process for adjudicating the liability of nursing homes for injuries to their residents. In particular, it requires this Court to articulate the principles that should be used to decide whether a claim based in part on the conduct of a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”) should be treated as a medical malpractice claim or as an ordinary negligence claim. The Court has determined that claims involving the adequacy of CNAs’ training, the sufficiency of the staffing at a particular nursing home, and the adherence of CNAs to a patient’s plan of care are ordinary negligence claims that can be substantiated without the introduction of expert proof. The Court has also decided that the negligence per se doctrine permits the use of federal and state regulations regarding the licensing of nursing homes to create and define the scope of the duty of care that nursing homes owe to their patients. I cannot concur with either decision. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Genaro Dorantes
The defendant, who was extradited from Mexico to face charges for aggravated child abuse |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Blue Bell Creameries, LP v. Richard Roberts, Commissioner, Department of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Taxpayer is a Delaware limited partnership that produces, sells, and distributes ice cream in Tennessee and elsewhere. At issue in this appeal is the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s excise tax assessment on capital gains from a one-time stock transaction between Taxpayer and its holding company. Taxpayer sought a refund in chancery court, challenging the validity of the tax assessment on statutory and federal constitutional grounds. Both Taxpayer and the Department moved for summary judgment. The chancery court granted summary judgment to Taxpayer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Based on the uncontested facts in the record, we hold that Taxpayer’s capital gains were business earnings pursuant to the functional test provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-2004(1) (Supp. 2000) and therefore subject to the excise tax. Additionally, we hold that the tax assessment was constitutional pursuant to the unitary business principle. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter summary judgment for the Department. We remand to the trial court to determine the amount of excise tax related to Taxpayer’s capital gains. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Garrett
The defendant was indicted separately for two different criminal episodes, one involving an aggravated robbery and the other involving a homicide and an especially aggravated robbery. On the State’s motion but over the defendant’s objection, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court consolidated the indictments for a single trial. The jury convicted the defendant of all offenses charged, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in consolidating the offenses. We hold that the trial court erred both as to methodology and as to result in consolidating the indictments. When a defendant objects to the State’s pretrial motion to consolidate offenses, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the motion under the severance provisions of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), not the provisions of Rule 8(b). We also hold that a prosecutor should refrain from seeking the consolidation of offenses over a defendant’s objection unless the prosecutor has a good faith basis for arguing that the requirements of Rule 14(b)(1) will be met. The trial court’s error in ordering consolidation requires that we reverse the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and remand for a new trial on that charge. The trial court’s error was harmless as to the defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and we affirm those convictions. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Bob Fannon, Individually and as a City Councilman for the City of LaFollette v. City of LaFollotte, et al.
An elected council member of the City of LaFollette filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that three other members of the council had violated the terms of the Open Meetings Act in the process of adopting a resolution to increase the pay of various city employees. The trial court, after a hearing, granted a temporary restraining order, restricting implementation of the pay raises until the City complied with the procedural requirements of the City Charter. The order did not address the Open Meetings Act allegations. At a subsequent meeting, the Council, apparently in accordance with the requisite guidelines, approved the pay raises. After the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and then a motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court dismissed the Open Meetings Act claim as moot, but awarded fees and costs to the council member who had initiated the suit. The order did not address a challenge by the City to the council member’s standing to sue. On direct appeal by the City, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the council member had standing as a taxpayer, rather than in his official capacity, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Because the litigation involves issues of public interest, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that the council member had no standing to sue as a council member or a taxpayer, but that he did have standing based upon his allegations of an Open Meetings Act violation. As the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of discretionary costs, but not attorney’s fees. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Bob Fannon v. City of LaFollette et al. - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Fannon has standing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-106(a) (2002) to seek judicial relief from his colleagues’ violation of the Sunshine Law [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-44-101 to -111 (2002 & Supp. 2010)]. I also agree that Mr. Fannon was the prevailing party in the proceedings below and that he was entitled to recover discretionary fees under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) but not attorney’s fees. I am constrained to prepare this separate opinion because, unlike the Court, I have concluded that Mr. Fannon’s status as a public official provides an independently sufficient basis to confer standing on him to challenge the conduct of his fellow members of the LaFollette City Council. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court v. F. Chris Cawood
Disciplinary Counsel of the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against attorney F. Chris Cawood for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct. After Disciplinary Counsel’s presentation of evidence, the Hearing Panel dismissed the petition. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the Hearing Panel’s dismissal. The Board appealed the decision of the chancery court to this Court. We hold that the Board of Professional Responsibility’s petition for certiorari failed to meet the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 and that the chancery court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Order
The matter before this Court arises from a petition to relocate filed by Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) following her divorce from Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) and the appeal from the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008, granting the petition and awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We granted Father permission to appeal and scheduled the appeal for argument. Mother requests that Father’s appeal be dismissed as moot. For the reasons stated below, we grant Mother’s request. In addition, we vacate the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Michael Sanford v. Waugh & Company, Inc. et al.
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether an individual creditor of an insolvent corporation may bring a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporate directors and officers. We hold that a creditor of an insolvent corporation may not bring a direct claim, only a derivative claim, against officers and directors for breach of the fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation. We adopt the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), observing that corporate creditors are adequately protected by existing law, and that recognizing a new direct cause of action is unnecessary and would impede corporate governance. We further hold that the trial court properly excluded evidence of conspiracy to interfere with contract and dismissed the claim for punitive damages. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Phelps
The defendant, a convicted violent sexual offender, was released on parole in 2006. He registered pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 20041 (“the Registration Act”), listing a primary address in Bedford County and a secondary address in Rutherford County. He was subsequently arrested in Lincoln County and charged with violating the Registration Act. Defendant tendered an “open” guilty plea but moved to withdraw his plea prior to being sentenced. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendant had “merely had a change of heart” and denied the motion. The trial court later sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision on his motion to withdraw plea and his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply the correct analysis in determining whether the defendant had established a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea. We further hold that Defendant established sufficient grounds for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is granted, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Charles A. Trost, Commissioner of Revenue
This appeal involves a corporation’s liability for the payment of use tax following its purchase of a business jet. After it received an assessment from the Tennessee Department of Revenue for over $700,000, the corporation paid the tax and filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(a) (28)(A) (Supp. 2004) because it had leased the aircraft to another corporation. Both the corporation and the Department filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the corporation’s motion for summary judgment, and the Department appealed. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the trial court. CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Chumley, No. M2008-01679-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1492230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009). We granted the Department’s application for permission to appeal. We have now determined that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because material disputes exist regarding the factual inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Debra M. Barkes, et al. v. River Park Hospital, Inc.
River Park Hospital has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider its opinion filed on October 20, 2010. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and appellate briefs, from all of which we conclude that our opinion addressed and considered all issues raised by River Park in its appeal. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is respectfully denied and the costs of this petition are taxed to River Park Hospital, Inc., d/b/a River Park Hospital, for which execution may issue if necessary. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Dawn Brown, et al. vs. Tennessee Title Loans, Inc.
We granted this interlocutory appeal to answer a single question of first impression: whether the Tennessee Title Pledge Act, Tenn. Code Ann. __ 45-15-101 to -120 (2000), permits a private right of action on behalf of pledgors against title pledge lenders who allegedly charged excessive interest and prohibited fees. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Title Pledge Act allegations for failure to state a claim, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the Title Pledge Act does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Lou Ella Sherrill, et al. v. Bob T. Souder, M.D., et al.
This litigation involves a claim of medical malpractice against the two defendants, a physician and the corporation operating his clinical practice, alleging negligence in the prescription of a drug. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds that the suit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The question before the Court is the propriety of summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Although the trial court properly concluded that the cause of action accrued more than a year before the suit was filed, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the limitations period. Because the suit was not time-barred as a matter of law, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Davis, et al. v. Patrick J. McGuigan, et al. - Dissenting
This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Davis, et al. v. Patrick J. McGuigan, et al.
This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Joann Abshure And Billy Jack Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals
This appeal involves a vicarious liability claim against a hospital based on the conduct of an emergency room physician. A patient and her husband filed a medical malpractice suit in the Circuit Court for Shelby County against a hospital and two physicians, one of whom had treated the patient in the hospital's emergency room. Among other things, the complaint broadly alleged that the hospital was vicariously liable for the conduct of its agents. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against both physicians for the second time, the hospital sought the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims against its apparent agent, the emergency room physician, were barred by operation of law. The trial court granted the hospital's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims against the hospital. Abshure v. Upshaw, No. W2008-01486-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 690804, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2009). We granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed by the patient and her husband to determine whether their vicarious liability claims against the hospital should be dismissed under the facts of this case. We have determined that the lower courts erred by dismissing the vicarious liability claims against the hospital. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Debra M. Barkes, et al. v. River Park Hospital, Inc.
In this medical negligence case, we review a jury verdict against a hospital based on the hospital's failure to enforce its policies and procedures in patient care. Tennessee law has long recognized that a hospital has a duty to its patients to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in its community. After reviewing the record, we hold that material evidence supports the jury's determination that the hospital was 100% at fault for the patient's death. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdict of the jury. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Martha Graham v. Clinton Caples et al.
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a Regional Medical Center v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
Kevin L. Holt, injured in an automobile accident in Arkansas, was first taken by ambulance to an Arkansas hospital and then transported to the Regional Medical Center in Memphis, where he incurred $33,823.02 in expenses. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, the operator of the Regional Medical Center, filed affidavits for a lien as prescribed by statute. Thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, which had medical coverage for Holt with limits of $5,000, paid $1,290 for ambulance services and $3,710 to the Arkansas hospital. Shelby County Health Care Corporation sued Nationwide for impairment of its lien, seeking as recovery the entire amount due for its medical services to Holt. The trial court awarded $5,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals revised the amount of the judgment to $33,823.02. Because we have determined that liens under the Hospital Lien Act do not attach to medical payment benefits paid pursuant to an insurance policy, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is dismissed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |
