State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little
The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the robbery charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred by failing to inform the jury that he had been acquitted of the robbery charges, by prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning the acquittals in closing argument, and by allowing the State to refer to the robbery during its closing argument. The defendant also alleged that the trial court committed error during jury instructions and that the cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee
Tennessee prisoners whose convictions and sentences are upheld on appeal have one year to file a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge their convictions and sentences. This appeal involves the narrow circumstances in which fundamental fairness demands the tolling of this deadline. A prisoner filed his petition for post-conviction relief after the statutory deadline had passed because his former attorney provided him the wrong deadline date and failed to give the prisoner his legal files until after the actual deadline had passed. Following a hearing, the Criminal Court for Shelby County dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3912856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal. We find that the facts of this case reflect that the prisoner was effectively abandoned by his appellate attorney after his petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court. This abandonment impeded the prisoner’s otherwise diligent efforts to file a timely post-conviction petition. Therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remand the prisoner’s case to the trial court so the prisoner may pursue his petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process requires tolling of Mr. Whitehead’s post-conviction statute of limitations based on attorney abandonment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re: The Adoption of Angela E. et al.
In a prior appeal in this case, we reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights and remanded to the trial court for a new hearing on Mother and Stepfather’s amended petition. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court declined to terminate Father’s parental rights, finding that Mother and Stepfather had not proven either proffered ground for abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Stepfather appealed. In a divided opinion, a majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly established abandonment by both willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We hold that Mother and Stepfather established by clear and convincing evidence abandonment by willful failure to visit but failed to establish willful failure to support. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because Mother and Stepfather have demonstrated one ground for termination of Father’s parental rights, we remand the case to the trial court to consider whether termination is in the best interests of the children. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman
The primary issue we address in this appeal is whether certain evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. This case arose out of the death of Raymond Smallman and the ensuing dispute between his two sons from a previous marriage and Linda Caraway, whom he married two weeks before his death. Mr. Smallman’s sons challenged the validity of their father’s marriage to Ms. Caraway and the validity of the lost will that Ms. Caraway sought to have established. Ms. Caraway claimed to be Mr. Smallman’s surviving spouse and the sole beneficiary of his estate pursuant to the terms of his will. The case went to trial, and the jury was allowed to hear evidence about Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and her late mother’s will. The jury found in favor of Mr. Smallman’s sons. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Ms. Caraway permission to appeal to address whether Mr. Smallman’s sons had standing to contest the validity of their father’s second marriage and whether the introduction of evidence regarding Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will and her real estate holdings was error and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. We hold that Ms. Caraway waived her argument that Mr. Smallman’s sons lacked standing to contest the validity of her marriage to their father. We further hold that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real property holdings and her late mother’s will. Because this evidence more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman - Concur and Dissent
I concur with the Court’s decision to remand this case for a new trial because the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and regarding the execution and substance of Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will. However, I disagree with the Court’s refusal to address Ms. Caraway’s challenge to the standing of Mr. Smallman’s sons to contest the validity of her marriage to their father and with the Court’s decision that Ms. Caraway may not raise the standing issue on remand. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc. et al.
The issue presented is whether the jury verdict against the management company of an assisted living facility for negligence based on understaffing is supported by material evidence. Mable Farrar’s physician prescribed Ms.Farrara daily dose of an over-the-counter medicine for constipation. The nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Ms. Farrar lived did not give the medicine to her as often as prescribed. As a result, Ms. Farrar became constipated and returned to see her doctor. Ms. Farrar’s doctor notified the nursing staff at the assisted living facility to give Ms. Farrar three to four enemas each day beginning on May 27, 2004. A facility nurse gave Ms. Farrar one enema on the evening of May 27, none on May 28, and one enema on the evening of May 29. Very soon after receiving the last enema on May 29, Ms. Farrar died from a perforated colon. Her daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enema, the director of nursing at the assisted living facility, the owner of the facility, and its management company. The suit alleged that the negligence of the staff, the owner, and its management company caused Ms. Farrar’s death. The jury returned a verdict finding the nurse thirty percent at fault, the director of nursing twenty percent at fault, and the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The management company appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Ms. Farrar’s death. We hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the award of punitive damages. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
Christopher Furlough v. Spherion Atlantic Workforce, LLC
We accepted review of this appeal to determine whether, when a workers’ compensation settlement involving an employee represented by counsel is approved by the Department of Labor and the SD-1 form is submitted contemporaneously with the settlement agreement, a court may set the settlement aside as non-final based on the court’s determination that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We hold that when the Department of Labor approves a settlement, it implicitly approves the accompanying SD-1 form, and a court has no authority to set the settlement aside based on its independent finding that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We therefore reverse the judgments of the Panel and of the trial court and dismiss the employee’s petition. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Taylor B. W. et al.
Mother and Father entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan for their two minor children. Mother subsequently injected Father with a chemical used to euthanize animals. She pleaded guilty to the attempted second degree murder of Father and was sentenced to twelve years incarceration. Mother and Father entered into an amended parenting plan that provided for the children’s visitation with their maternal grandmother and with Mother in prison. The amended parenting plan also provided for the resumption of the original parenting plan after Mother’s release from prison. Father remarried while Mother was incarcerated. Father and Stepmother filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and a petition for adoption by Stepmother. The trial court found that there was a statutory ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court subsequently amended its order, concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the best interests of the children and denying the petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights. Father and Stepmother appealed, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the original order. We conclude that Father and Stepmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the amended order of the trial court. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Brandon Mobley v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a petition for post-conviction relief based on multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court for Knox County of two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of setting fire to personal property. His convictions were affirmed and his sentences were modified on direct appeal. State v. Mobley, No. E2006-00469-CCAR3-CD, 2007 WL 1670195 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2007). Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on numerous instances of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance and on several instances of alleged trial court errors. Following a two-day hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the petitioner’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial after determining that the petitioner’s trial counsel had been ineffective with regard to limitations placed on the ability of a defense expert to testify that the petitioner’s mental condition rendered him unable to premeditate. Mobley v. State, No. E2010-00379-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3652535 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2011). We granted the State’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief based on the manner in which his trial counsel dealt with the limitations placed on the defense’s expert witness. However, we have also determined that the record does not permit the reviewing courts to determine whether the performance of the petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient with regard to the requirement that the petitioner wear a stun belt during the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts denying post-conviction relief based on the alleged errors of the trial court and on all the ineffective assistance of counsel claims except the claims based on the testimony of the defense’s mental health expert and the use of the stun belt during the trial. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to elicit a specific opinion from the defense’s mental health expert. We also reverse the judgment of the lower courts denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to trial counsel’s failure to object to the use of a stun belt during the trial and remand that issue alone to the post-conviction court for a new hearing. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. ex rel. Linda Martiniano v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sidney S. Stanton III v. State of Tennessee
The defendant was indicted on sixteen counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide necessary food and care to horses on his farm in Warren County. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion, but the assistant district attorney general, acting for the district attorney general, determined that the defendant was not an appropriate candidate for pretrial diversion. The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking a review by the trial court. The trial court found no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Timmy Dale Britt v. Dyer's Employment Agency, Inc. et al.
The employer, a temporary staffing agency, assigned the employee to work temporarily at a manufacturing facility. The employee sustained a compensable work-related injury three weeks into the assignment and reported the injury to the employer. At about the same time, the manufacturing facility notified the employer that employee’s assignment had ended. Consistent with its business practice, the employer terminated the employee’s employment and did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded benefits; however, citing the temporary nature of the employment, the trial court applied the statute capping the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a determination of whether the employee had a meaningful return to work. We hold that because the employer neither returned the employee to work after his injury, nor offered him an opportunity to return to work, nor terminated his employment for misconduct, the award of benefits is governed by the statute authorizing benefits up to six times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6241(d)(2)(A), not by the statute capping benefits at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The judgments of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel and trial court are vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision |
Decatur | Supreme Court | |
Dick Broadcasting Company, Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. et al.
The legal issues in this appeal revolve around the assignment of three agreements. The first is a Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement that allowed for an assignment with the consent of the non-assigning party. The agreement was silent as to the anticipated standard of conduct of the non-assigning party in withholding consent. The other two agreements—a Time Brokerage Agreement and a Consulting Agreement—were assignable without consent. The primary issue we address is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the non-assigning party’s conduct in refusing to consent to an assignment when the agreement does not specify a standard of conduct. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. (“Oak Ridge FM”) contractually agreed for Dick Broadcasting Company (“DBC”) to have a right of first refusal to purchase Oak Ridge FM’s WOKI-FM radio station assets. The agreement was assignable by DBC only with the written consent of Oak Ridge FM. When DBC requested Oak Ridge FM to consent to the assignment of the Right-of-First-Refusal agreement to a prospective buyer, Oak Ridge FM refused to consent. Oak Ridge FM also refused to consent to the assignment of the Consulting Agreement and Time Brokerage Agreement, neither of which contained a consent provision. DBC sued Oak Ridge FM and the other defendants, alleging breach of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. DBC appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment. We hold that where the parties have contracted to allow assignment of an agreement with the consent of the non-assigning party, and the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of conduct in withholding consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies and requires the non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in deciding whether to consent to the assignment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Dick Broadcasting Company, Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. et al. - Concur
I concur with the Court’s decision to apply the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the three contracts involved in this case. I also concur with the Court’s decision that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because the current record reflects genuine disputes regarding the facts material to their claims and defenses. However, because there is no consensus regarding the scope of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of arm’s length commercial transactions, I write separately to address this important point. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Joshua Cooper et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp. et al.
An employee was injured at work as a result of the actions of a third-party tortfeasor. The employee suffered permanent injuries that required future medical care. The injured employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and filed a lawsuit against the third-party tortfeasor. The employer intervened in the lawsuit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 (2008) to protect its subrogation lien against any recovery from the third-partytortfeasor. The employee settled the lawsuit with the third-partytortfeasor and voluntarily dismissed the case. The employer requested that the case be set for trial, claiming that it was entitled to a lien against the settlement proceeds for the cost of future medical benefits that may be paid on behalf of the injured employee. We hold that the employer’s subrogation lien provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 does not include the cost of future medical benefits that may be provided to an injured employee. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Joshua Cooper et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp. et al. - Dissent
Employees’work-related injuries are, on occasion, caused by the fault of third parties. Approximately fifty years ago, the Tennessee General Assembly addressed how recoveries from these third parties should be apportioned between the employee and the employer. This appeal requires us to interpret and apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c) (2008), one of these fifty-year-old statutes. Rather than applying the plain statutory language, the Court has undertaken to harmonize Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 with other changes in the Workers’ Compensation Law that were made after Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 was enacted. There is no doubt that the Tennessee General Assembly should revisit Tenn.Code Ann.§ 50-6-112. However, until the General Assembly does, I would interpret and apply the statute according to its plain meaning. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Saundra Thompson v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education
We granted this appeal to determine whether a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave amounts to a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. We hold that, although a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. Accordingly, by dismissing the plaintiff tenured teacher without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing, the defendant board of education violated her rights under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional right to due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, back pay consisting of her full salary, compensatory damages for the actual harm she sustained, and attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the trial court, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1991. Nineteen years later, he filed a petition in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purportedly showing that he could not be executed by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010) because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court declined to hold a hearing and denied the prisoner’s petition. The trial court determined, as a matter of the law, that the prisoner’s newly-obtained I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence of the offenses to which he earlier pleaded guilty. The prisoner filed an application for permission to appeal the denial of his petition to reopen in the Court of Criminal Appeals. In addition to asserting that the newly-obtained I.Q. test score was new scientific evidence of his actual innocence, the prisoner asserted that this Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), announced a new constitutional right and, therefore, provided another basis for reopening his petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order on June 29, 2011, affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition to reopen because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2006) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) encompasses ineligibility for the death penalty in addition to actual innocence of the underlying crime and whether our holding in Coleman v. State established a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-30-117(a)(1). We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. We also hold that Coleman v. State did not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30117(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals denying the prisoner’s petition to reopen his post-conviction petition. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
In Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tenn. 2001), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of [intellectually disabled] individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” The next year, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
In 2000, an affidavit of complaint was issued charging “John Doe” with an aggravated rape that had occurred in 1994. The affidavit, which included a detailed DNA profile of “John Doe,” led to the issuance of an arrest warrant. In 2008, police officers discovered that fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime matched those of the defendant. Later, police determined that the DNA profile was that of the defendant,and a superseding indictmentwas issued in his name. The defendant was tried and convicted of attempted aggravated rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the “John Doe” warrant with the DNA profile was adequate to identify the defendant and commence prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. Because the issue is one of first impression in this state, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that a criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile. Furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant’s proper name provides the requisite notice of the charge. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Patricia Carlene Mayfield v. Phillip Harold Mayfield
We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s denial of transitional alimony. The trial court divided the parties’ real and personal property, awarded custody of their children to the wife, and declined to award spousal support to the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s custody determination and, except for the trial court’s refusal to divide the wife’s post-separation income, upheld the classification and division of the marital estate. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the wife to pay the husband transitional alimony in the amount of $2000 per month for thirty-six months. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the husband transitional alimony. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment awarding the husband transitional alimony but affirm in all other respects the intermediate appellate court’s decision. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudle
The defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply certain mitigating factors and byfailing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after declining to review the sentences because the defendant had failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas, affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon a presumption that the evidence was sufficient to support the sentences. After granting the defendant’s application forpermission to appealbecause of conflicting opinions bythe Court of Criminal Appeals as to whether the absence of a transcript of a guilty plea submission hearing precludes appellate review on the merits, we ordered that the record be supplemented. In this instance, the record was adequate for a meaningful review of the sentences either with or without the transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas. By use of the recently adopted abuse of discretion standard for the review of sentences, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Supreme Court |
