Supreme Court Opinions

Format: 08/22/2014
Format: 08/22/2014
State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson
W2009-01709-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The defendant was charged with the June 2005 first degree premeditated murder of her
mother. The jury convicted her of second degree murder after a trial in which the evidence
was entirely circumstantial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed her conviction and
sentence, although the judges on the Panel were not unanimous as to the rationale for the
decision. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the
lead prosecutor’s remark during final closing argument at trial amounted to a constitutionally
impermissible comment upon the defendant’s exercise of her state and federal constitutional
right to remain silent and not testify. We also hold that the prosecution violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process by failing to turn over until after trial the third
statement a key witness gave to law enforcement officers investigating the murder. The State
has failed to establish that these constitutional errors were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand for a new
trial.

Shelby County Supreme Court 08/22/14
Quantel Taylor v. State of Tennessee
W2012-00760-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn Peeples

The petitioner pled guilty to charges of attempted first degree murder, second degree murder,
and especially aggravated robbery. Later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly
and voluntarily made. When the petitioner subpoenaed his three co-defendants to testify at
the post-conviction hearing, the State filed a motion to quash because the co-defendants were
all incarcerated. The post-conviction court granted the State’s motion. The Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that the post-conviction court had erred, but held that the error was
harmless under the circumstances. We hold that the post-conviction court committed
prejudicial error by applying an incorrect legal standard and by failing to consider whether
the proposed testimony by the co-defendants was material to the petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the record is insufficient for the issue to be
resolved on appeal, we remand for the post-conviction court to reconsider the motion to
quash under the proper standard. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11

Crockett County Supreme Court 08/21/14
R. Sadler Bailey v. Board of Professional Responsibility
W2013-01979-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers

The Board of Professional Responsibility instituted a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against an attorney based on complaints it received from a judge and opposing counsel regarding the attorney’s disruptive behavior during trial proceedings. A hearing panel found that the attorney had violated several Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for sixty days. On appeal, the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed the hearing panel’s finding that the attorney had violated several ethical rules but reversed the suspension, instead recommending a public censure. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to this Court. We reverse the Chancery Court’s reduction of discipline and reinstate the hearing panel’s imposition of a sixty-day suspension.

Shelby County Supreme Court 08/18/14
Mack Phillips, Et Al. v. Montgomery County, Tennessee, Et Al.
M2012-00737-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution requires a government to compensate a property owner for a regulatory taking of private property. We hold that article I, section 21 encompasses regulatory takings in the same manner as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the property owners’ complaint alleging a state constitutional regulatory takings claim and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Montgomery County Supreme Court 08/18/14
Cha Yang v. Nissan North America, Inc. et al.
M2012-01196-SC-WCM-WC
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Mark Rogers

The employee suffered bilateral shoulder injuries in January and March of 2008. After undergoing separate surgeries on each shoulder, the employee agreed to a voluntary buyout of his employment. Later, he filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits and assessed a 90% permanent partial disability award after determining that the employee’s permanent partial disability benefits were not capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating. The employer appealed and, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the case was referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. The Panel ruled that the employee’s benefits should have been capped at one and one-half times his impairment rating and reduced the award of permanent partial disability benefits to 37.5%. We granted the employee’s motion for full Court review and have determined that because the employee acted reasonably by accepting the voluntary buyout for reasons related to his work injuries, the award for permanent partial disability is not subject to the one-and-one-half-times cap. The judgment of the Panel is, therefore, modified to the extent that the trial court’s award for permanent partial disability benefits is reinstated, but otherwise affirmed.

Rutherford County Supreme Court 08/11/14
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.
W2013-00471-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

The plaintiff filed a civil action in the general sessions court asserting a health care liability claim against the defendant. Following a trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. The next day, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and deposited $211.50 with the general sessions court clerk, which represents the amount of the standard court cost of $150 for an appeal to the circuit court required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) plus state and local litigation taxes. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to file a bond “with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that payment of the standard court cost is sufficient to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. After a thorough review of the statutory scheme at issue, we conclude that the plaintiff’s cash bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal to the circuit court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Shelby County Supreme Court 07/21/14
Mary C. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., et al.
W2011-02405-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This appeal involves the manner in which a trial court granted motions for summary judgment in a proceeding involving the death of a patient whose treatment for viral encephalitis was delayed because he was also being assessed for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The widow of the deceased patient filed suit against three health care providers in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. In her original complaint and four subsequent amended complaints, the widow asserted eight causes of action against one or more of the providers. The trial court eventually granted a series of summary judgments dismissing all the claims against one of the providers without explaining the grounds for its decisions and requested counsel for the provider to prepare appropriate orders “establish[ing] the rationale for the [c]ourt’s ruling in quite specific detail.” The provider’s counsel prepared detailed orders adopting all the arguments the provider had made in favor of its summary judgment motions, and the trial court signed these orders over the widow’s objections. The widow appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to provide reasons for its decisions and that the orders did not accurately reflect what had occurred at the summary judgment hearings. The Court of Appeals vacated the disputed orders because the trial court had failed to state the legal grounds for its decisions as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and remanded the case to the trial court. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 210250, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). We granted the provider’s application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the record establishes that the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, and therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

Shelby County Supreme Court 07/15/14
State of Tennessee v. Glover P. Smith
M2011-00440-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The defendant was indicted on two counts of fabricating evidence and on six counts of making a false report arising out of the disappearance of his wife. A jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the trial court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail followed by six years on probation. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court affirmed the convictions for making a false report but dismissed the convictions for fabricating evidence after concluding that no investigation was “pending” when the defendant fabricated evidence. Both the State and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, dismissed as multiplicitous two convictions for making a false report, and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant permission to appeal. Although we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reinstatement of the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, we conclude that two of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report should be dismissed because the evidence is insufficient to support these convictions. We also conclude that three of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report are multiplicitous and therefore dismiss two of those convictions. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects.

Rutherford County Supreme Court 06/19/14
Fletcher Whaley Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
M2013-01042-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Don R. Ash

A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney had violated multiple disciplinary rules and imposed a public censure. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s decision. On appeal to this Court, the attorney raises a number of issues, including a facial constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, we reject the attorney’s constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, and we conclude that his other issues are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Montgomery County Supreme Court 06/04/14
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
E2012-02703-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby R. McGee

In January of 2002, Guadalupe Arroyo (the “Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court imposed two twelve-year sentences to be served consecutively—an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Petitioner successfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis that the trial court had imposed consecutive sentencing based upon the “dangerous offender” classification in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4) (2010) without first addressing the requisite factors set forth in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). A second appeal on the same issue also resulted in a second remand to the trial court. In a third sentencing order, the trial court held that the sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and were necessary to protect the public, grounds essential for the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the “dangerous offender” classification. Id. at 938; see also State v. Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *9-10 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). The reasons cited were as follows: [One,] during the prior sentencing hearing the [Petitioner] admitted to underage drinking on a daily basis, confirmed in the pre-sentence report; Two, the [Petitioner] admitted to driving without a license daily; and Three, the [Petitioner] has been illegally within this country since his arrival.

Knox County Supreme Court 05/21/14
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee
E2012-02703-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby R. McGee

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive twelve-year terms for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant twice appealed the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Each time, the trial court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence. The defendant did not appeal the third sentencing order. Later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and the defendant discussed the futility of a third appeal and the defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The defendant denied that he and his trial counsel discussed a third appeal. Trial counsel did not file a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) waiver of appeal. The post-conviction court found trial counsel to be more credible than the defendant. Based on that finding, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know of his right to appeal or that he otherwise did not waive that right. His trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal was not per se deficient performance, but was a fact properly considered by the trial court on the issue of whether trial counsel rendered effective representation. Based on the credibility determinations made by the post-conviction court, we hold that the defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective
representation. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are
affirmed.

Knox County Supreme Court 05/21/14
Richard Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC et al.
M2012-02270-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

Sixty days prior to filing his complaint, the plaintiff in this health care liability action sent written notice of his potential claim to each of the health care providers that would be named as defendants. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2013). The plaintiff served the pre-suit notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by statute.  Id. § 29-26-121(a)(3)(B). In his subsequent complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had complied with the statutory requirement of pre-suit notice, id. § 29-26-121(b), but the plaintiff failed to file with the complaint “an affidavit of the party mailing the [pre-suit] notice establishing that the specified notice was timely mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested,” id. § 29-26-121(a)(4). The defendants moved for dismissal of the lawsuit, citing the plaintiff’s failure to file with the complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The defendants did not allege that the lack of the affidavit resulted in prejudice. Instead, the defendants contended that the pre-suit notice statute demands strict compliance with all its requirements and that dismissal is the mandatory remedy for noncompliance. The trial court “reluctantly” agreed with the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed but noted the “harsh results”  strict compliance produces in cases, such as this one, where no prejudice is alleged. We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the statutory requirement of an affidavit of the person who sent pre-suit notice by certified mail may be satisfied by substantial compliance. We also hold that the plaintiff substantially complied with the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’sdismissal of the complaint is reversed; the complaint is reinstated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Montgomery County Supreme Court 04/24/14
Larry O. Evans v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company
M2013-00763-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Craig Johnson

An employee sustained a compensable injury. The trial court ruled that the employee’s partial disability award should be apportioned to the arm. The employee has appealed, asserting that the award should have been apportioned to his thumb. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Coffee County Supreme Court 04/16/14
Jose Rodriguez a.k.a. Alex Lopez v. State of Tennessee
M2011-01485-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

The petitioner, a Mexican citizen, entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge of patronizing prostitution and was granted judicial diversion. After successfully completing his diversion, the petitioner’s criminal record was expunged. More than three years after the entry of his plea, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel failed to advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a petitioner whose record has been expunged may not obtain post-conviction relief and affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition. We granted the petitioner permission to appeal. Following our review, we conclude that a guilty plea expunged after successful completion of judicial diversion is not a conviction subject to collateral review under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Davidson County Supreme Court 04/04/14
Roger David Hyman v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
E2012-02091-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that a Knoxville attorney violated a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months and his attendance at six hours of ethics and professionalism coursesin addition to those mandatedby Tennessee Supreme CourtRule 21, section 3.01. The attorney timely filed a petition for certiorari in the Circuit Court for Knox County under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3. In his petition, the attorneyalleged thatthe hearing panel improperlyconsidered his disciplinaryhistoryand that his six-month suspension was excessive. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
 

Knox County Supreme Court 03/31/14