APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The claimant is a licensed time-share salesperson who sold time-share interests at a resort owned by Westgate in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. When resort management terminated the business relationship, the claimant filed for state unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The initial agency decision, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review affirmed an award of benefits to the claimant, concluding that a time-share salesperson is not a licensed real estate agent and therefore is not subject to the Tennessee Employment Security Law’s exclusion for services performed by a “qualified real estate agent.” Westgate sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that a time-share salesperson is a “licensed real estate agent” and that the claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a “qualified real estate agent.” The Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s findings, and Westgate appealed. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the chancery court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Patrick Scott Riley, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence.  He previously entered a guilty plea to burglary and received an eight-year suspended sentence.  On appeal, Riley argues that the trial court unreasonably conditioned his community corrections sentence on the requirement that he “get off any and all opiates or other medications that have any addictive qualities” within sixty days of the September 5, 2012 sentencing hearing.  Upon review, we conclude that the issue challenging the conditions of his community corrections sentence is waived by Riley’s failure to timely appeal the trial court’s initial order.  We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Riley’s community corrections sentence and ordering his original eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this real property dispute, the plaintiffs, three siblings, brought a complaint against the defendant landowner, a fourth sibling, alleging that he was trespassing on an approximately 15-acre parcel of land deeded to them by their mother and requesting that the trial court declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the disputed acreage. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that despite an ambiguity in the relevant deed, the parties’ mother intended to convey the disputed acreage to the defendant as part of a larger 28.33-acre parcel in 1988. The plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Billy Jackson Coffelt, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1983 conviction for robbery by the use of a deadly weapon and resulting life sentence after being found to be a habitual criminal offender. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Reid R. Crumpton (“Plaintiff”) sued Patricia G. Grissom (“Affiliate Broker”), Ashley Carpenter, and Mary Bea Corbitt (“Managing Broker”) in connection with a real estate sales contract for real property containing both a house and a business. The Managing Broker filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in part, that she was not personally involved in Plaintiff’s purchase of the real property at issue and had no knowledge of the details of the transaction, and, therefore, could not be held liable for the actions of the Affiliate Broker. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting the Managing Broker summary judgment and making its judgment final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker. We find and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 62-13-101, et seq. creates a duty on the part of the Managing Broker, and that the Managing Broker failed to show that she met the standard of care sufficient to satisfy her duty. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Charles Martin, Jr., pled guilty to one count of kidnapping, as a Range II, multiple offender, with an agreed upon eight-year sentence.  The trial court determined the manner of service, and the Defendant was placed in the Community Corrections Program and ordered to serve 180 days in confinement.  A violation warrant was filed.  Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon the Defendant’s commission of new crimes and his consumption of alcohol while at a local grocery store.  The Defendant appeals the order of total incarceration.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner in a divorce proceeding filed a motion to disqualify the trial court alleging that the court made comments and exhibited conduct at a hearing which indicated that the court was biased against her and that she could not receive a fair trial. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion to disqualify.

The Defendant, Dominic Eric Frausto, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the State did not prove the corpus delicti, (2) the trial court erred in failing to comply with Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 24 during jury selection, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum in the range. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-conviction proceeding the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The petitioner also alleged that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(J). The post-conviction trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the record fully supports the post-conviction court’s findings that trial counsel advised the petitioner he would be deported upon pleading guilty and that his guilty plea could have an adverse effect upon his ability to return legally to the United States. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(J) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the proof shows that the petitioner was aware his guilty plea would result in his deportation and could adversely affect his ability to return legally to the United States. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, David Wayne Gross, appeals the sentencing decision denying him an alternative sentence. The defendant pled guilty to violating a habitual traffic offender order, two counts of theft over $1000, two counts of identity theft, two counts of forgery, and theft under $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received an effective four-year sentence and was allowed to petition the court for an alternative sentence. A hearing was held, after which the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of alternative sentencing.

This case involves a complaint for damages alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on several of the claims and awarded damages. Almost a year after the final order was entered, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the order pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but the trial court denied the motion. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Ryan Robert Haase (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault.  The trial court merged the assault convictions into the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in confinement.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges errors in the admission of certain evidence; contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder; contends that the prosecutor engaged in improper argument; and argues that he should have been sentenced as a Range I offender.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Allen Massey, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Bradley County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to promotion of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine, for which he received suspended sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Anthony Dean, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

The defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After merging the murder convictions, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded to the trial court for a proper determination of whether the sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. We hold that, when a trial court places findings on the record to support its sentencing decision, the applicable standard of appellate review for a challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Because, however, the trial court failed to address the factors required to impose consecutive sentences based on the dangerous offender classification, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Robert Charles Taylor, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 conviction for attempt to commit rape of a child. The Petitioner was originally sentenced to thirty years’ confinement, but the court granted post-conviction relief and reduced his sentence to twelve years. The Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by (1) counsel’s failure to ensure his presence during jury selection, (2) counsel’s failure to request a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), and (3) the trial judge’s entry into the jury room during deliberations. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the conviction because the Petitioner was denied his right to be present for the jury selection process.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. We vacate the order denying the motion and remand the case for the court to enter a supplemental order stating its basis for denying the motion.

The petitioner, George William Brady, appeals from the order of the Sevier County Criminal Court dismissing “all pro se actions and pleadings” filed in that court. Although the petitioner filed, and the criminal court denied, a plethora of pro se motions, the petitioner challenges only the denial of his motion to correct the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted Robert Brown, Sr. (“the Defendant”) of one count of rape of a child and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective term of twenty-five years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother of a third-grade student filed a common-law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of school board’s decision to uphold a semester long expulsion of her child. The child was considered disabled due to his diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and was provided with an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Mother argues that the school board was without authority to expel her child and that the school failed to appropriately administer his IEP which caused his misbehavior. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we reject Mother’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s order upholding the expulsion.

The Defendant was found guilty by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of five counts of rape of a child involving the daughter of the Defendant’s then-girlfriend. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (1997). She was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty years for each conviction to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective sixty-year sentence. In the Defendant’s previous appeal, she contended that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) there was a material variance between the presentment, the bill of particulars, the election of offenses, and the proof; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charges due to pre-accusation delay; (4) the court erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of Department of Children’s Services (DCS) records; and (5) the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Gwendolyn Hagerman, No. E2011-00233-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013). After we affirmed the Defendant’s convictions, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted her application for permission to appeal and remanded the case in order for this court to order that the record be supplemented with the victim’s DCS records and for reconsideration of the case in light of the supplemented record. State v. Gwendolyn Hagerman, No. E2011-00233-CCA-R3-SC (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013) (per curiam) (order). Having ordered that the record be supplemented and having reviewed the DCS records, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully, but with a lack of total commitment, disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of Wife’s motion to alter or amend and to remand this matter for the trial court to further consider the motion.
 

Amir Karshenas, doing business as American Bonding Company, appeals his suspension as a bondsperson in the Twenty-First Judicial District.  Because the trial court did not provide the appellant notice pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b) (Supp. 2011), we vacate the suspension and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a provision of the unlawful detainer statute, which requires that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from a general sessions court’s judgment in favor of a landlord must post a bond equal to one year’s rent of the premises, applies regardless of whether the tenant has surrendered possession of the property prior to the appeal. We hold that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-18-130(b)(2) (2012) does not require that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from an adverse general sessions court judgment in an unlawful detainer action post a bond corresponding to one year’s rent of the premises if the tenant has surrendered possession of the premises prior to the appeal. Accordingly, the cost bond that the tenants have already posted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103(a) (2000) is sufficient to perfect their appeal and confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Circuit Court. We affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment denying the landlords’ motion to dismiss and remand the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Father filed petition to modify a parenting plan, asserting that a material change of circumstance had occurred since the entry of the original parenting plan and seeking to be named primary residential parent.  At the close of Father’s proof, Mother moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the evidence did not show a material change of circumstance; the court denied the motion and adjourned the hearing, expressing a desire to hear testimony from the child’s counselor and receive evidence regarding the child’s performance in school. Following the adjourned hearing, the court granted Father’s petition. Mother appeals, asserting that the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss and hearing further proof, in granting Father’s petition and in making certain evidentiary rulings. Father appeals the court’s award of attorney fees to Mother. We vacate the award of attorney fees and remand the case for entry of a supplemental order relative to the award; in other respects the judgment is affirmed.