APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a parental termination appeal brought by the incarcerated biological father. The child at issue was placed with the petitioners shortly after her birth five years ago. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the ground for termination and clear and convincing evidence that such termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning an employment contract between United States Metal Powders, Inc. and Plaintiffs, who claimed that they were owed vacation and severance pay when the company ceased production and sold its assets. United States Metal Powders, Inc. denied that Plaintiffs were owed vacation and severance pay. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded severance pay but denied the claim for vacation pay. United States Metal Powders, Inc. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  After review of the entire record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As the majority says, this appeal presents a close case. After much consideration, I respectfully conclude that one error requires a reversal and a new trial.

This is a termination of parental rights action focusing on the two minor children (“the Children”) of mother, Sandra W. (“Mother”). A termination petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after the third custody proceeding involving the Children. The petition alleges the statutory grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistent conditions. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason McCallum, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine in a drug-free school zone and his eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Ken Parker, charging him with first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years for facilitation of first degree murder and ten years for attempted second degree murder with the sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a life sentence that Defendant had received in a separate case. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain writings and drawings found on Defendant’s person and in his backpack at the time of his arrest; and (3) that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect which facts it relied upon to establish the offense of attempted second degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Courtney Wesley, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years and four years, respectively. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him as a child sexual predator and that he therefore should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery. The State acknowledges that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was erroneously sentenced as a child predator but argues that the appropriate remedy is the entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the petitioner is to serve his three sentences for aggravated sexual battery at 100% as a violent offender, rather than as a child predator. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the petitioner’s correct sentencing status.

The defendant, Daniel Clarke Doyle, pled guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony, in the Carroll County Circuit Court and was sentenced to one year and six months in the county jail, suspended to supervised probation upon serving eighteen days. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of split confinement instead of a grant of judicial diversion or full probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Herbert B. Ward, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305; 39-13-304; 39-13-111. He received a seventeen-year sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping, a nine-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, and an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence for domestic assault, all to be served concurrently for an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated kidnapping of his wife and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping of his eleven-year-old daughter. The State contends that with regard to the kidnapping convictions, the trial court did not instruct the jury in accord with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We vacate the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and dismiss the charge. We reverse the aggravated kidnapping conviction and remand for a new trial. We affirm the domestic assault conviction.

Defendant, Frederick Herron, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve 25 years at 100%. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the State could ask Defendant about prior arrests and an unnamed prior felony conviction if Defendant chose to testify; 3) the State failed to ensure a unanimous verdict by electing an offense that occurred on an unspecified date, and the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the offense; 4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a State’s witness testified about Defendant’s alleged prior DUI conviction; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding a letter written by the victim to her sister; and 6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Stanley Jason Daniels, pled guilty to sexual contact with an inmate and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In keeping with the directions provided in State v. James Allen Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013), the majority takes a reasonable (and what I feel may be the preferred) action suggested by the Tennessee Supreme Court and elects to simply remand this case due to the trial court’s failure to discuss some of the seven legally-relevant factors (listed in State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)) during its sentencing soliloquy. Like the majority, I too believe that trial courts should endeavor to address each and every criterion discussed in Electroplating during their judicial diversion decisions, and I urge them to do so in order to avoid having their cases remanded. In this case, however, I would address the trial court’s omission by simply choosing the other option provided by our supreme court in Pollard: “conduct[ing] a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis” for the trial court’s decision. See Pollard, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011, at *32.

A jury convicted Omar Biviano (“the Defendant”) of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, and one count of facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years’ confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a Governmental Tort Liability action. Plaintiff/Appellant was injured when his motorcycle hit a pothole. Appellant sued the Appellee The City of Memphis for negligence. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to rove that the City had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition on its roadway so as to lift immunity under ennessee Code Annotated §29-20-203(b). Accordingly, the court dismissed the lawsuit. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the City had no notice of this dangerous condition. Affirmed and remanded.

Roosevelt Brice, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years’ incarceration for his attempted premeditated first degree murder conviction and fifteen years’ incarceration for his aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted premeditated first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stephen McKinley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In the wake of her firing from the University of Tennessee Regional Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee, a nurse brought an employment action raising numerous claims. At the time the nurse originally began working at the medical center, it was owned and managed by the University of Tennessee and she was considered an employee of the university. In 1999, the university executed a lease and transfer agreement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-9-112, by which the operation of the medical center was transferred to a private, nonprofit corporation. Hospital personnel, like the nurse, who had been university employees prior to the transfer, were thereafter “leased” by the private, nonprofit corporation from the university. This interlocutory appeal stems from the trial court’s sua sponte ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-9-112(a) is unconstitutional. We reverse the determination of the trial court.

An employee sustained a work-related injury to her shoulder while working as a licensed practical nurse at her employer’s hospital. After returning to work in a modified-duty position for several months after a second shoulder surgery, the employee elected to have knee replacement surgery to remedy pre-existing arthritis that was unrelated to her work. Unfortunately, the knee replacement surgery caused the employee to develop “foot drop.” The employee subsequently exhausted her available leave time because of a prolonged recovery, and the employer terminated her employment. The employee filed the present action seeking permanent total disability benefits. The trial court initially found that the employee had a meaningful return to work and capped her award at one and one-half times her anatomical impairment. The court, however, granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and found that she did not have a meaningful return to work and  that she was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and both parties appealed. We conclude that the employee is not permanently and totally disabled and that she  made a meaningful return to work after her shoulder surgeries. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The employee was injured when a concrete grinder he was operating exploded, breaking his jaw and several teeth. After his jaw was surgically repaired and he underwent extensive dental treatment, the employee did not return to work for his employer. The employee filed an action in the Chancery Court for Sullivan County seeking permanent disability benefits. The trial court found that the employee sustained a permanent vocational disability of 35%. The employer appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the testimony of the treating dentist and by finding that the employee sustained any permanent disability. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal calls into question the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of workers’ compensation disability benefits related to the aggravation of a pre-existing cervical injury. After settling a claim for an earlier lumbar and cervical injury, the employee filed a new claim in the Circuit Court for Williamson County seeking compensation for aggravation of that injury. The employer insisted that the employee’s condition was a continuation of the prior injury. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that, as a result of performing repetitive tasks, the employee had sustained a new cervical injury and awarded the employee permanent total disability benefits. The employer appealed, asserting (1) that the evidence preponderates against the findings regarding causation and permanency and (2) that the testimony of the employee’s examining physician should be disregarded because it does not comply with the AMA Guides. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We have determined that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the employee sustained a new injury and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Antonio Dockery, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, stalking, and aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty-four years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on aggravated kidnapping; (3) the convictions for aggravated assault and stalking violate double jeopardy; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a review of the record and the authorities, we determine: (1) that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault and stalking do not violate double jeopardy where the trial court properly instructed the jury on the evidence to consider when reviewing the stalking charge; and (3) Appellant waived any issue with respect to the admission of prior bad acts for failing to raise the issue in a motion for new trial. Further, we determine that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aggravated kidnapping by failing to give the instruction from State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Appellant’s aggravated kidnapping conviction must be reversed, and he must receive a new trial at which the jury is instructed in accord with White. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Brandi Clutts, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Clutts argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sentence of full confinement rather than imposing split confinement.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Mark Weatherly, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and two counts of aggravated assault. The jury acquitted Appellant of vehicular homicide and was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide and the other charged offense of aggravated assault. The trial court declared a mistrial with regard to these offenses. Appellant’s request for pretrial diversion was denied by the prosecutor. Appellant filed a writ of certiorari with the trial court. The trial court granted Appellant’s writ of certiorari and concluded that the assistant district attorney general had abused his discretion and ordered the prosecutor to enter into a memorandum of understanding that placed Appellant on pretrial diversion. This Court granted the State’s application for interlocutory appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court’s decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm.