APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, David Wayne Hearing, is appealing the trial court’s summary dismissal of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence in which the Appellant claimed he bargained for a life sentence with possibility of parole but was sentenced to life. The trial court found that the same issue was raised in the Appellant’s prior Rule 36.1 motion. The prior motion that was dismissed by the trial court and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal by this court. The trial court’s order summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed under Rule 20.

The Petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals as of right from the Polk County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the placement of the minor child Isaiah R. (“the Child”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his parents’ custody and placed the Child in a foster home. Certain of the Child’s paternal relatives (“Respondents,” collectively) intervened in an effort to obtain custody of the Child and take him to California. The Circuit Court for Cocke County (“the Trial Court”) adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, dismissed DCS from the action, and awarded legal and physical custody of the Child to the Child’s paternal great uncle. DCS appealed to this Court. We hold that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“the Compact”) applies in this case, that no exemptions to the Compact apply, and that the Trial Court erred in transferring custody of the Child to his great uncle in California without California’s approval. We further find that transferring the Child to California is not a proper disposition for the Child given certain troubling facts in the record. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

An employee injured his cervical spine in a fall while working for his employer. The trial
court found the employee failed to make a meaningful return to work and awarded the
employee permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, arguing the
employee (1) failed to provide credible evidence of adequate and timely notice to the
employer of the injury, and (2) failed to meet his burden of proving medical causation of
his cervical spine condition. After our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Petitioner, Mario D. Jones, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than fifty (50) grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied his due process rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to call unspecified witnesses to challenge the weight of the tablets that he possessed and (2) failed to call the officer who was responsible for the storage of evidence. Petitioner also argues that he was denied due process by a State sentencing offer that was contingent upon his payment of a $500,000 fine. Finally, petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by excluding from the evidentiary hearing an incomplete transcript of a sentencing hearing in an unrelated case regarding an officer involved in petitioner‟s case. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, David Lewis, entered pleas of guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun while intoxicated. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years at 30% for the first count of aggravated assault, three years and six months at 30% for the second count, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of a handgun while intoxicated. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion or a suspension of his sentences, and his sole issue on appeal is that the court erred in these determinations. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to reflect the defendant's conviction offense as possession of a handgun while intoxicated.

This appeal results from the trial court‘s entry of a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue in this conservatorship action is the amount and type of support the spouse of a ward is entitled to receive from the ward's estate pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109, which authorizes the court to “establish the amount of financial support to which the spouse . . . [is] entitled.” The ward's son and step-son from a previous marriage filed a petition for the appointment of a conservator; the ward's wife opposed the conservatorship. A conservatorship was created, and the court appointed third-party conservators for the ward's estate and person. Thereafter, the wife requested over $19,250 per month as spousal support, which included attorney's fees she incurred in the trial court proceedings. At the court's request, she filed statements of her expenses over a twelve-month period preceding the appointment of the conservator. The petitioners opposed her request contending it was excessive and that her separate assets should be considered in awarding support. After excluding “outlier” expenses that were significantly larger than her average monthly expenses and the attorney's fees the wife sought to recover as miscellaneous expenses, the trial court awarded spousal support of $9,010 per month. Petitioners and the wife appeal. Petitioners contend the award was excessive. The wife contends the court erroneously excluded bona fide expenses including, particularly, the attorney's fees she incurred in these proceedings. We affirm.

The defendant, Frederick DeWayne Gross, filed a motion to correct illegal sentences under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his sentences were improperly ordered to be served concurrently.  The trial court reviewed the motion and dismissed it without holding a hearing, having determined that the defendant did not present a colorable claim because there was no statute mandating consecutive sentencing in his case.  The defendant appeals the trial court’s dismissal.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jarus Smith, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for facilitation of attempted second degree murder, possession of contraband in a penal institution, and two counts of aggravated assault.  One count of aggravated assault was merged into the facilitation conviction, and the trial court imposed consecutive terms of ten years for each of the remaining three convictions, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether hearsay statements made by one of the victims were grounds for a mistrial and the curative instructions given were inadequate to address the harm; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendant’s motion for a continuance; (4) whether the superseding indictment, which added multiple counts of aggravated assault, should been dismissed as violative of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (5) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the length of his sentencing terms for his facilitation of attempted second degree murder and contraband possession convictions.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Elashanti Dean, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery in 1998. He filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his concurrent sentences were illegal because he was released on bond in one case at the time he committed the crimes in four other cases. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion. Upon our thorough review of the record, we determine that Defendant has not presented a colorable claim for relief because the judgments are silent as to whether his sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1. I also write separately to address the majority's discussion relative to whether a claim raised pursuant to Rule 36.1 is moot if a defendant has fully served the relevant sentence and to address my concerns that Rule 36.1 permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea to which a sentence has expired.

The petitioner, Travis Ware, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because he received illegal concurrent sentences for crimes that he committed while released on bail. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a petitioner is not entitled to seek relief under Rule 36.1 when his sentence has been fully served. “On its face, Rule 36.1 does not limit the time within which a person seeking relief must file a motion, nor does it require the person seeking relief to be restrained of liberty.” State v. Donald Terrell, No. W2014-00340-CCA-R3-CO, 2014 WL 6883706, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 8, 2014).

The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Lavelle Ewing, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  He previously pled guilty to two counts of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and received concurrent eight-year sentences.  He was ordered to serve one year in confinement with the remainder suspended and Ewing placed on probation.  On appeal, Ewing argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching a decision that was unsupported by the evidence.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court approved Petitioners'/Conservators' petition to establish a Supplemental Needs Trust for their Ward but declined to approve a proposed remainder provision naming two charities as beneficiaries. The trial court ruled that any amounts remaining in the Trust when it terminated would be distributed under the laws of intestate succession. The trial court also excluded evidence offered by Petitioners to demonstrate what they asserted was the Ward's intent. We affirm, as modified.

In this case a same-sex couple lawfully married in Iowa sought to obtain a divorce in Tennessee and raised a constitutional challenge to Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 (collectively “the Anti-Recognition Laws”). Tennessee‟s Attorney General was granted leave to intervene in the suit. After a hearing the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) held, inter alia, that the Anti-Recognition Laws did not violate the United States Constitution. Frederick Michael Borman appealed to this Court. While the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) holding, inter alia, that a State may not refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court's judgment.

Defendant, Glen B. Howard, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury with five counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery as charged and one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape of a child. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty years in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, and in light of State v. John J. Ortega, Jr., No. M2014-01042-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1870095 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2015), we determine that Defendant‟s conviction for aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape of a child was improper. We are unable to determine from the record whether the evidence supports a conviction for the next properly charged lesser included offense, child abuse. Consequently, we vacate the conviction for aggravated sexual battery. The remaining convictions and fifty year sentence are affirmed. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Dewayne Leggs, is appealing the order of the trial court denying his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  The motion is hereby granted.

Petitioner, Leroy Johnson, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis that was summarily dismissed by the trial court as being time-barred and for failing to allege newly discovered evidence. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Caleb Joseph Latham, entered guilty pleas to driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, and DUI per se. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. As a part of his guilty pleas, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) challenging his warrantless seizure. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motion to suppress because he was subjected to a seizure without reasonable suspicion. The ruling of the trial court is reversed, and the charges against the Defendant are dismissed.

The defendant, Darrell Anderson, was convicted of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Danny Branam, of felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction with a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the aggravated child abuse conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an inaccuracy in the prosecution's election of offenses amounted to plain error that entitles the defendant to relief. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by failing to subject the election issue to plain error analysis, we hold, after thoroughly reviewing the record pursuant to the plain error doctrine, that the election error does not entitle the defendant to relief. Despite the inaccuracy, the election was sufficiently specific to eliminate any substantial risk that the jury would return a non-unanimous verdict. Additionally, the defendant has failed to provide a complete record of the proceedings in the trial court. Accordingly, under these circumstances, we affirm, on the separate grounds stated, the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment upholding the defendant's conviction of rape of a child.

Robert T. Stooksbury, Jr. (the creditor) obtained a judgment in federal district court against, among others, Rebecca Ross Jordan, the daughter of Patricia Ross, the plaintiff in the case now before us. The creditor then attempted, in federal court, to garnish the funds in three bank accounts jointly held by Jordan and plaintiff. Plaintiff argued to the federal court that the funds should not be subject to garnishment because, according to her, they were solely owned by plaintiff. The federal district court, applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a) (2007), held that the “applicable statutory authority directs that the moneys deposited into the account[s] owned by both Ms. Ross and Ms. Rebecca Ross Jordan are subject to the claims of creditors of either depositor . . .” and, consequently, the federal court allowed execution on and garnishment of the funds. The federal court later ordered, without objection by plaintiff, disbursement of the funds to the creditor. Plaintiff then brought this action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a), which provides in pertinent part that “any other depositor not indebted to the creditor may, by commencing a separate action against the creditor, establish the rights that the depositor may have in the funds.” The creditor in the case now before us filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.