APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Billy Drew Massengill, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Cocke County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, the sale and delivery of Oxymorphone, driving on a revoked license, theft of $500 or less, and failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Purchaser of insurance agency sued Seller, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation. Seller filed a counterclaim seeking amount due on Purchaser’s promissory note.  The trial court found Purchaser failed to prove either breach of contract or misrepresentation, and it awarded Seller the balance due on the promissory note.  Purchaser appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

J.S.H. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, L.J., Jr. (the Child). Mother contends that the trial court erred in its finding – said to be made by clear and convincing evidence – that she abandoned the Child by willfully (1) failing to pay support and (2) failing to visit the Child in the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. She also challenges the trial court's holding that she failed to provide the Child a suitable home. Mother argues that the trial court erred when it held that termination is in the Child's best interest. Mother has three other children, B.H., J.T., and A.T. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) was awarded temporary legal custody of all of the four children on September 20, 2012, due to the trial court's finding that each was dependent and neglected. Mother's other three children now live with their paternal grandmother. Only Mother's parental rights with respect to L.J., Jr. are at issue on this appeal. We modify the trial court's judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating Mother's rights is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon and evading arrest in a motor vehicle creating a high risk of death or injury, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded photographs of him taken during his hospitalization after being shot during this incident; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, George Hardin, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1988 conviction for first degree murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) although he has filed two previous petitions for habeas corpus relief, the arguments contained in the petitions were not considered and (2) the 1990 judgment and a 1996 order are void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter them. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, John A. Bailey, appeals as of right from the Madison County Criminal Court's denial of his two separate motions for correction of illegal sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily denying his motions without appointing counsel after he had stated colorable claims for relief regarding the legality of the concurrent nature of his various sentences and his eligibility for community corrections and subsequent placement in that program. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's summary denial of the Appellant's Rule 36.1 motions.

The Defendant, Bruce Marvin Vann, was indicted and, following a jury trial, convicted of three counts of rape of a child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. The trial court imposed sentences of thirty-five years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Curtis Dewayne Staggs, is appealing the order of the trial court denying his motion to correct a clerical error in the judgments of conviction.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

Defendant, James Hawkins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of premeditated first degree murder, see T.C.A. 39-13-202(a)(1); initiating a false report, see id. 39-16-502, a Class D felony; and abuse of a corpse, see id. 39-17-312, a Class E felony. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for the first degree murder conviction based upon its findings that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, see id. ' 39-13-204(i)(2); and that the defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death, see id. 39-13-204(i)(13); and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. For the remaining felonies, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 18 years' incarceration to be served consecutively to the death sentence. On appeal, Defendant alleges that (1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements given to the police; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to accept Defendant's guilty pleas to counts two and three of the indictment; (3) the trial court erred by admitting statements made by the victim through the victim's children, through Melvin Gaither, and through an application for order of protection; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of bone fragments taken from the victim;(6) the trial court erred by admitting crime scene photographs that had not been provided during pretrial discovery; (7) the trial court erred by permitting improper closing argument by the State; (8) the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of first degree murder; (9) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to provide discovery concerning an ongoing investigation of sexual abuse committed by Defendant's father against Defendant's sisters for use in the penalty phase of the trial; (10) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's special jury instruction request to charge the jury on the presumption that any sentence imposed for the first degree murder conviction would be carried out according to the laws of this State; (11) myriad aspects of Tennessee's death penalty statutes and procedure are unconstitutional in general and as applied to Defendant; (12) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in both length and manner of service relative to the sentences for filing a false report and abuse of a corpse; and (13) the cumulative effect of these errors violated Defendant's right to due process. As an additional issue, Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following oral argument at the Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law at the University of Memphis and this court's full consideration, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Sandra Mitchell, pled guilty to theft of property of $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony. She received a twelve-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. On appeal, she challenges the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a claim for, inter alia, intentional interference with business relationships. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants, owners and operators of a franchise pursuant to an agreement with Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers Restaurant (“Wendy's') in Cleveland, Tennessee, interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to timely secure a franchise agreement with Wendy's to build a new restaurant in Cleveland. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants improperly used a non-compete agreement, entered into in 1998 by the defendants and a brother of one of the plaintiffs, to object to Wendy's grant of the new franchise. Following a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to establish the claim of intentional interference with business relationships. The court did enter a judgment, however, in favor of the plaintiffs for nominal damages in the amount of $500. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mickey Edwards (“the Defendant”) was convicted of four counts of aggravated burglary, four counts of theft of property, one count of identity theft, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest, the denial of his motion to sever the counts in the indictment, the denial of his motion to exclude evidence of his prior convictions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Devon Elliott Cruze, alias, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion and order that he serve his two-year sentence in split confinement following his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of theft of property and one count of burglary of an automobile. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-402. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the applicable factors for judicial diversion and by denying judicial diversion. The Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for non-violent property offenses be served in split confinement in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not properly set forth the factors to be considered when denying judicial diversion and that this case should be remanded for a sentencing hearing where the trial court is instructed to consider and weigh the applicable factors on the record. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to a period of continuous confinement for a non-violent property offense. Therefore, the Defendant’s sentence is vacated and, on remand, the trial court should impose a sentence in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122.

Three non-profit corporations filed suit alleging that they were wrongfully denied low income housing tax credits. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot, and we concur.

The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth Ray Griffin, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Robert Edward Williams III, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately communicate with him and because trial counsel “coerced” the Petitioner to enter guilty pleas, rendering his pleas unknowing and involuntary.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, vandalism less than $500, and theft of a motor vehicle valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Defendant to be shackled and handcuffed during the trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Defendant, Ricky Hopson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of ten years which was suspended and ordered to be served on probation. On appeal Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he acted in self-defense at the time of the offense. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Decornick Moore, pleaded guilty to attempt to commit second degree murder and received a ten-year sentence. More than ten years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence should have been served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal to address two issues: (1) Whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 to -408 (2012 & Supp. 2014), applies to Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2009), claims against governmental entities; and (2) If the GTLA does not apply, whether a constitutional or statutory right to trial by jury applies to TPPA claims brought in circuit court. As to the first issue, we hold that the GTLA does not apply to TPPA claims because the TPPA is an independent and specific body of law, which removes governmental immunity and thus controls the adjudication of TPPA claims against governmental entities. As to the second question, we hold that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for TPPA claims and that there is no statutory right to trial by jury for TPPA claims filed in circuit court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein, and this matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

A Hickman County jury found the Defendant, John Henry Pruitt, guilty of two counts of first
degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of aggravated assault. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for both the first degree murder convictions. The trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years for his attempted first degree murder conviction and concurrent six-year sentences for each of the three aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his sentence of life without the possibility of parole. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Verchant Joshua Williams, was convicted of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder, one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and one count of abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony.  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions for tampering with evidence and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the two convictions should merge.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Varquez K. Sails, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.  The trial court merged the homicide convictions, dismissed the count pertaining to the weapons offense, and imposed a life sentence.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (first degree felony murder) (2014).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an identification of him from a photograph lineup, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that an eyewitness to the crime misidentified defense counsel as the defense investigator on a separate occasion, (4) the trial court erred in prohibiting cross-examination regarding a witness’s gang affiliation, (5) the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the software used to generate the photograph lineup, (6) the trial court erred in excluding an expert witness’s opinion testimony regarding whether the photograph lineup was impermissibly suggestive, (7) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that the Defendant had been incarcerated previously, (8) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (9) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marcus Deon Jarnigan, challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery, simple possession of a controlled substance, and being a felon in possession of a handgun by filing a motion in the trial court seeking to correct his allegedly illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion, concluding that the judgments were facially valid. On appeal, he raises for the first time the applicability of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as a basis for relief. Following our review, we discern that appellant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of an agreement that, inter alia, provides for a lease for the use of Open Lake in Lauderdale County by Lauderdale Haywood Angling Club. Following summary judgment proceedings, the trial court determined that the parties' agreement had terminated on two grounds. After declaring that all rights under the agreement had ended, it later required one of the parties to post a bond in order to continue using certain duck blinds for the remainder of the 2013-2014 duck hunting season. Although we conclude that one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court in declaring that the agreement was terminated was in error, we affirm the entry of summary judgment on the other ground. We also affirm the propriety and amount of the bond ordered by the trial court.