APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of the alleged wrongful seizure of Plaintiff’s personal property, mainly cars and trailers, which were removed from Plaintiff’s residence by order of the City of Clarksville Building and Codes Director. Instead of appealing the decision of the Building and Codes Director pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-9-101 and -102, Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Clarksville (“the City”) and three city officials alleging that the removal and retention of his personal property constituted conversion and inverse condemnation. He also asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all claims. The court ruled that the City had immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) because Plaintiff failed to allege a policy, practice, or custom which caused his harm. Additionally and alternatively, the court dismissed the claims of inverse condemnation, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the § 1983 civil rights violations because the complaint failed to allege essential elements of each claim. The court also found the claims were time-barred. As for the defendants who were sued in their individual capacities, the court dismissed the claims because the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and because Plaintiff failed to provide a summons for service of process on each of the defendants. This appeal followed. Plaintiff raises twelve issues for us to consider on appeal. Since Plaintiff did not raise several of these issues in the trial court, they are deemed waived. As for the remaining issues, we find them unavailing for the reasons explained below. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects. 

The Defendant, Christopher Lynn Taylor, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order of total incarceration after his second violation of his six-year probationary sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that he was a danger to society and by denying his request for drug treatment in the Community Corrections Program. Following our review, we discern no error. Thus, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Mellon, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present a viable defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jennifer Hodges, pleaded nolo contendere to six counts of statutory rape, a Class D felony, and one count of solicitation of a minor, a Class E felony. Defendant was sentenced to four years for each count of aggravated statutory rape and two years for solicitation. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently for an effective four-year sentence. The effective sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for four years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not granting her request for judicial diversion and that the trial court erred by sentencing her to the maximum sentences for her convictions.

A White County jury convicted Defendant, Lester Arnold Clouse, of aggravated assault, assault, and resisting arrest. The trial court merged the resisting arrest conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced Defendant to an effective fifteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender, to be served consecutively to other outstanding sentences. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed his sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Lester Arnold Clouse, No. M2013-02633-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7332181, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2014). Following a sentencing hearing on remand, the trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender to be served consecutively to his sentences for other convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that he qualified as a persistent offender, the length of his sentence, and the imposition of partial consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant’s sentences for aggravated assault and assault, and we reduce Defendant’s sentence for resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, to six months. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment on the resisting arrest conviction to reflect that the conviction is merged into Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction in accordance with the trial court’s prior findings.

The Appellant, Jason William Kirk, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to theft of property valued $10,000 or more and evading arrest and resulting effective fifteen-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Nearly thirty-five years from the date Petitioner, David C. Duncan, burglarized the home of, raped, and then killed a victim in Sumner County, he appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review of the record, not only is the petition untimely filed, it also fails to allege any newly discovered evidence that may have affected the outcome of Petitioner's trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, John Lowery, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Eleven years after Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. In his petition, Petitioner asserted that two witnesses recanted their identification of Petitioner as the shooter, and a previously unknown witness said that Petitioner was not at the scene of the crime. On appeal, this court reversed the court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the State filed a response, asserting that the statute of limitations had run. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, finding the two witnesses who recanted not credible and that the testimony of the newly discovered witness did not meet the test that it “might have” changed the outcome of the trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Lee Palmer, appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault for which he was sentenced to six years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was monumentally sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Timothy Reynolds, pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty plea he was sentenced to six years with one year to serve and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. After Defendant’s probation was partially revoked on two separate occasions, a third probation violation resulted in the complete revocation of probation. Defendant appeals the revocation of probation. We affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation.

Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his conviction for attempted first degree murder is illegal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident. Christopher Lea Williams (“Williams”) and John Buraczynski (“Buraczynski”) both worked for Progression Electric, LLC (“Progression”). In January 2015, Buraczynski was driving his vehicle with passenger Williams as part of a carpool arrangement when they were involved in an accident. Williams subsequently claimed he was entitled to and received workers’ compensation benefits. Williams then sued Buraczynski, personally, in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Buraczynski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams’ exclusive remedy was in workers’ compensation. The Trial Court granted Buraczynski’s motion. Williams appealed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Petty, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to move for a mistrial based on juror misconduct; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence found in the Petitioner’s car; and (3) failing to include certain issues in his motion for new trial.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The January 12, 2017 order to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this post-dissolution case did not adjudicate a pending motion to modify child support or the pending issue concerning whether the appellant “wrongfully” received benefits from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the parties’ minor child based upon the step-father’s disability. As such, it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below and is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Barbara Rains (“Employee”) filed this action in the Circuit Court for Hardin County, alleging that she sustained a back injury in the course of her work as a cashier for Wal-Mart (“Employer”). The issues were bifurcated, with compensability to be tried first and any remaining issues to be heard later. After the hearing about compensability, the trial court found that Employee had failed to sustain her burden of proof and dismissed the complaint. Employee has appealed, alleging various errors by the trial court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because Employee failed to present any expert medical evidence to support her claim, we conclude that the trial court’s finding regarding compensability was correct. All other issues raised by Employee are pretermitted. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Jeffrey Scott Beck (“Employee”) filed a workers’ compensation complaint claiming he suffered a back injury six months earlier during the course and scope of his employment with the City of Brownsville (“Employer”). Employer denied that the alleged injury arose out of his employment and maintained that Employee failed to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The trial court determined that Employee’s notice was untimely and that Employee’s excuse for not providing timely notice was unreasonable. The trial court also concluded that Employee failed to establish causation. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Paul Avery Reno, pleaded guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-113-506 (2014). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant agreed to a six-year sentence as a Range III offender, with the method and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) denying alternative sentencing, and (3) ordering the Defendant to register as a sex offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, John H. Brichetto, Jr., and his wife were convicted of Class B felony theft of property. The Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. As part of an agreement for a reduced sentence for his wife, the Petitioner executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, his right to file for post-conviction relief, and his right to collaterally attack his conviction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Finding that the waiver was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Anna Chick, appeals her Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of failure to appear, see T.C.A. 39-16-609, arguing that Code section 39-16-609 is unconstitutional; that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her; that the State failed to establish that the offense was committed before the finding of the indictment; and that the six-year sentence imposed in this case constitutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Bough, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing because it determined the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have led to a different result at the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Whitney Kristina Harris, was convicted upon her guilty pleas of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and accessory after the fact to first degree murder, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (tampering with evidence), 39-11-411 (2014) (accessory after the fact). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender as a term of the plea agreement and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. The manner of service of her sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the accessory after the fact judgment.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). See State v. Micah Alexander Cates, No. E2014-01322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5679825, at *1-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that a new trial was necessary because the warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the evidence obtained from the blood draw should have been suppressed. Upon further review, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the relevant evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the mother and stepfather sought termination of the biological father’s parental rights to his child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination on the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to remit child support. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joletta Summers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel mentioned during opening statement an inculpatory statement that was never introduced into evidence; failed to adequately argue for severance of her case from her codefendant’s; failed to object to the State’s improper closing argument; failed to file a timely motion for new trial; and failed to argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to specify the predicate felony in the jury instructions for the employment of a firearm charge. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.