APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s suppression of the results of a mandatory blood draw from the Defendant, Chad E. Henry, conducted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(d)(5) (Supp. 2014) (also referred to herein as the mandatory blood draw provision for individuals with a prior conviction for driving under the influence) of the implied consent statute. Henry was arrested and a mandatory blood draw was conducted without a warrant after his car struck the rear of another car. Henry was subsequently indicted by the Chester County Circuit Court for one count of driving under the influence (DUI), one count of third offense DUI, one count of violating the financial responsibility law, and one count of aggravated assault. Following his indictment, Henry moved to suppress the results from the mandatory blood draw, asserting that the warrantless blood test violated his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the blood draw was illegal because the officers failed to advise Henry, pursuant to Code section 55-10-406(c) (Supp. 2014), that his refusal to submit to the test would result in the suspension of his driver’s license. The State filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of the evidence, which the trial court granted, and this court granted the State’s application for a Rule 9 appeal. In this appeal, the State argues (1) Henry’s implied consent to blood testing, by virtue of Tennessee’s implied consent statute, operates as an exception to the warrant requirement, (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as outlined in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016), applies in this case because the officers acted pursuant to the binding authority of State v. Humphreys, 70 S.W.3d 752 (Tenn. 2001), and the implied consent statute when they required Henry to submit to a warrantless blood test, and (3) motorists with prior DUI convictions, like Henry, have a reduced expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment when arrested for a subsequent DUI. Because nonexception to the warrant requirement justifies the warrantless blood draw in this case and because the good-faith exception does not apply, we affirm the trial court’s suppression of the evidence.

The Appellant, Paul Buchanan, was convicted of aggravated robbery, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of convicted felon in possession of handgun. The trial court merged the convicted felon in possession of handgun and one of the felon in possession of a firearm convictions into the remaining felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentenced the Appellant to thirty years for aggravated robbery and to ten years for convicted felon in possession of a firearm, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit. Because the order appealed is not final, this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal dismissed.

In this post-divorce action, Wife filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and Other Relief, including a request to recover her attorney’s fees, alleging Husband violated five provisions in the marital dissolution agreement (MDA). Husband denied the allegations and filed a separate petition to decrease his child support obligation, which Wife opposed. Before trial, but after protracted proceedings, Husband complied with three provisions in the MDA, leaving two to be decided by the court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Husband in civil contempt for violating the remaining MDA provisions, denied Husband’s petition to decrease child support, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. Specifically, the court found that Husband violated the MDA by refusing to transfer to Wife one-half of the “non-retirement” account at T. Rowe Price and by concealing and withholding two paychecks he earned during the marriage that the parties agreed to divide equally. The trial court found that Husband did not offer sufficient proof of his current income to support a reduction in his child support obligation. The trial court also determined that Wife was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to the enforcement provision in the MDA and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) as the attorney’s fees pertained to the child support decree. Husband appealed. We have determined that the MDA provision concerning the “non-retirement” account was not sufficiently clear, specific, and unambiguous to sustain a finding of contempt; therefore, we reverse this finding of contempt. However, we affirm the finding of contempt for concealing and withholding two paychecks. We also affirm the trial court in all other respects, including the award of attorney’s fees incurred by Wife in the trial court and the denial of Husband’s petition to reduce child support. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal, we find she is entitled to recover her fees and remand this issue for the trial court to determine the amount she is entitled to recover. 

This is Father’s second appeal of the termination of his parental rights to the two children he had with his former wife (“Mother”). Father and Mother separated in 2008 when she moved from Alaska to Tennessee with the children, and they were granted a divorce in 2009. Father has not seen nor spoken with the children since 2008, and has not provided any financial support since November 2009. The petition to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and her husband in 2012. In Father’s first appeal, we remanded the case in order to obtain a sufficient record for this court to review on appeal. In re Ian B., No. M2015-01079-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 2865875 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016). On remand, the trial court found that the petitioners had proven grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and support and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. Having determined that the record in this second appeal is sufficient for this court to conduct a proper review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The defendant, Anthony L. Moore, moved the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, to correct a clerical error with regard to the reflection of pretrial jail credits on the judgment for his 2000 Madison County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jimmy Williams, of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to fifteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal results from a post-divorce criminal contempt conviction the plaintiff mother received for failing to adhere to a parenting plan that prohibits both parents from making disparaging remarks about the other parent. The trial court held that the plaintiff received sufficient notice under Rule 42(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and that she was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for two separate instances of disparaging remarks made about the father in the presence of their children. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Pro se petitioner, Anthony D. Washington, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Johnson County Criminal Court. In this appeal, the Petitioner makes several claims, all of which are rooted in the duplicitous nature of his indictment. The State asserts that the Petitioner failed to show that his judgment was void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a successful petition for a writ of certiorari involving land use. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after finding that the location approved for the proposed power station violated an applicable zoning ordinance. After the trial court’s decision, the City of Mount Pleasant amended its ordinance to clarify that the zoning ordinance did not apply to public utilities. The City of Mount Pleasant Planning Commission thereafter approved the construction of the power station under the amended ordinance. The petitioners filed no writ of certiorari of the approval under the amended ordinance and therefore ask that this appeal be dismissed as moot. Because this case no longer serves to offer any meaningful relief to the parties and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine are present, we dismiss this appeal as moot. 

Kwaku Aryel Okraku, the Petitioner, was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect and one count of reckless homicide. He received an effective sentence of sixty years. Trial counsel did not file a timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal, and after filing a petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner was granted a delayed direct appeal. On direct appeal, this court merged the aggravated child neglect convictions but otherwise affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. The Petitioner then renewed his petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he “neglected to use the strongest piece of impeachment evidence available to him—evidence that could have discredited the State’s theory that the cocaine ingested by the victim belonged to [the Petitioner].” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The circuit court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion, dismissing Appellant’s petition on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129 and Appellant did not have a sufficient excuse for filing the petition outside the 30 day statutory time period. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a post-divorce matter. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the case appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Richard W. Shelton, the Defendant, was charged with one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. A Marshall County jury found the Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years with release eligibility after service of forty-five percent of the sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found him guilty of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

David C. Jayne (“Jayne”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against him for breach of contract for failure to pay Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair (“Bass Annie”) for repairs made to his boat. Jayne entered into a contract with Bass Annie for the repair of his damaged boat. Before the agreed-upon repairs were completed, Jayne went to Bass Annie to check on the boat. After inspecting the boat, Jayne instructed Bass Annie to stop the repairs and return the boat to him. An argument ensued, and Jayne alleges he was assaulted by a Bass Annie employee. Both parties filed claims in the general sessions court which were subsequently appealed to circuit court. Following a de novo trial in the circuit court, the trial court dismissed Jayne’s claims and awarded Bass Annie damages for breach of contract for the work completed on the boat. Jayne appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the decision of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (the “Commissioner”) to impose a civil fine and revoke the license of insurance agent Charles E. Cunningham (“Cunningham”), after concluding that Cunningham committed six (6) violations of applicable statutes in connection with his insurance practice.  Cunningham filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the Commissioner. The trial court found that the record supported the Commissioner’s decision and choice of penalty. Cunningham appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Defendant, Billy Joe Hodge, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell; possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of his home and person. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion, and Defendant entered guilty pleas to all four counts. The possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and the possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver were “merged” by the trial court, but the merger was not done in compliance with State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360 (Tenn. 2015). Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of his home by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search of Defendant’s home. However, we conclude that there was probable cause for the issuance of a subsequent search warrant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Marcus Jermaine Brooks, of aggravated assault by strangulation, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted Wife a divorce; divided marital assets and liabilities; and awarded Husband five years of rehabilitative alimony. Husband appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Husband’s appellate brief, we do not reach Husband’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.  

The Defendant, Kevin Lynn Morris, was convicted by a Chester County jury of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or less, vandalism, and evading arrest. His sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the majority’s observation that “[g]iven the deficiencies in Husband[’s] brief,” we do not have the “[]ability to reach the substantive issues.” If we cannot reach the substantive issues — and I agree we cannot — I can only conclude that Husband’s appeal is “devoid of merit or . . . has no reasonable chance of success.” Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Goss et al., No E2010-01710-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1326234 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 7, 2011) (Susano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, by definition, this is a frivolous appeal. I would remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine “just damages” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000).

Petitioner, Brooke Whitaker, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide a reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed.