APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Tennessee Attorney General issued several civil investigative demands (“CIDs”) to several oil companies as part of an investigation into false claims and violations of the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-215-101--204. Compliance was incomplete, but the Attorney General filed suit in 2015 in circuit court. Portions of the suit were dismissed, and the Attorney General took a nonsuit. The Attorney General then filed suit in the chancery court to enforce the CIDs. The oil companies sought a protective order, which the court granted. The Attorney General appealed. We reverse.

Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that her parental rights to her daughter should be terminated on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions. Having concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decisions regarding grounds as well as its determination that termination is in the best interest of the child, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Willie Morgan, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his “Petition for Reduction of Sentence.” The trial court found that the petition was untimely under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Audrey Downs, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A company that loaned $100,000 to two individuals filed a complaint to collect the amount due. One defendant filed for bankruptcy, and his debt to the company was discharged. The other defendant asserted that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The company argued that the remaining defendant was equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations because he had misled the company to delay filing suit by promising to pay the debt without the need for litigation. The trial court agreed with the company and ruled that the statute of limitations did not bar the company’s claim. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on appeal. 

The defendants moved to disqualify the chancellor after the denial of their motion for summary judgment. As grounds for disqualification, the defendants submitted that the chancellor had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in denying their motion for summary judgment and in not promptly entering an order on a motion to compel. After the chancellor’s denial of the motion to disqualify, this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. Because the motion identified no justifiable basis for the chancellor’s disqualification, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the mother appeals the trial court’s permanent parenting plan order, which designated the father as primary residential parent of the parties’ child and awarded him 280 days of annual residential co-parenting time. Having determined that the order appealed from does not adjudicate all of the claims between the parties and is therefore not a final order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is an FELA case arising out of an accident that occurred at the railroad’s intermodal facility in which a railroad employee was crushed by a container box being lifted off of a holster truck. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the employee, determining she was zero percent at fault for the accident, despite allegations that she had failed to set the holster truck brakes. The railroad moved for a new trial, raising several evidentiary issues and asserting that the jury’s failure to find the employee contributorily negligent was against the clear weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court’s order on jury verdict, as remitted.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court entered judgment against Appellant for breach of contract, and Appellant appeals. Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence, we cannot review the trial court’s holdings. Affirmed and remanded.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change custody to Father. Here, the trial court’s findings of fact and the evidence in the record support the trial court’s determination that naming Father the primary residential parent of the children is in their best interests. As such, we affirm.

The defendant, Matthew Edward Ford, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his misdemeanor sentences in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s discussion and decision regarding the inapplicability of the doctrine of exoneration. I am also of the opinion that if the statute of limitations had been timely raised as an affirmative defense, it would have barred Wife’s cause of action. However, I believe that our Fryer decision and Rules 8.03 and 12.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, mandate the conclusion that the trial court erred in ambushing Wife by applying an affirmative defense that was never pled nor tried. To the extent that the majority opinion could be read as holding that the trial court’s error was harmless because the statute of limitations had run, I disagree with that reasoning, because I believe it is circular in nature. The conclusion that the error was harmless can, however be supported by other reasoning of the majority. For example, I agree with the majority that the error was harmless, but I would support this conclusion simply on the trial court’s determination that the release executed by the parties was valid and enforceable and supports the conclusion that the property securing the debt should be deeded back to Wife. I write separately to emphasize my view that Fryer was correctly decided, that it is squarely on point and applicable to this case, and that this opinion should not be read as representing an exception to the general principle stated therein, namely that a trial court commits reversible error by sua sponte applying a statute of limitations defense at the end of trial that was never pled, raised by the parties, or tried by implied consent.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the Appellant, Rader Bonding Company (“Rader”), remained obligated as surety for the $7,500 bond set for the Defendant, Saul Aldaba-Arriaga, for a charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), second offense, and his $2,500 bond for a charge of driving on a revoked license when the State later obtained an indictment that increased the severity of the Defendant’s misdemeanor charge of DUI second offense to a felony charge of DUI fourth offense and included additional charges. After the Defendant failed to appear in court on the indicted charges, the trial court initiated forfeiture proceedings and entered a final judgment of forfeiture against the Defendant and Rader following a hearing. We conclude that based on the specific and unique circumstances of this case, Rader’s obligation under the bonding agreement for the $7,500 bond on the Defendant’s DUI second offense charge in general sessions court did not extend to the indicted charge of DUI fourth offense and that as a result, the trial court erred in entering a judgment of final forfeiture against Rader on the $7,500 bond. We further conclude that Rader’s obligation for the $2,500 bond on the Defendant’s charge of driving on a revoked license in general sessions court continued when the Defendant was indicted for the same offense and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rader’s request for exoneration. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion.

Father appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights to his son is in the child’s best interest. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the grounds for termination found by the trial court and the trial court’s best interest finding, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Ingram, of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Shelby County workhouse. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an Order of Protection initially issued in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County, Tennessee based on the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant, her mother, assaulted her “by hitting her with her car.” In the appeal to the Circuit Court, that court ordered that all provisions in the order of protection in the General Sessions Court remain in effect until further order of the Circuit Court. Following numerous filings and motions, one of which sought a psychological mental health assessment of the plaintiff, the Circuit Court denied all pending motions and dismissed the order of protection. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for permission to appeal concerns whether portions of a trial court order and a transcript, both of which reference Plaintiff Jane Doe’s medical history, should be placed under seal. Pursuant to an October 2, 2018 order of remand from this court in Appeal No. M2018-01611-COA-R10-CV1, the trial court determined that portions of the documents should be redacted but that certain portions of the transcript and order which include references to Jane Doe’s medical history should not be placed under seal. The trial court subsequently granted Jane Doe and John Doe permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, because the application and answer fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits of the appeal in order to save the parties additional time and expense.

The defendant, Ricky Dee May, pled guilty to the manufacture of marijuana and felony possession of drug paraphernalia and received an effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each offense. After our review, we affirm the trial court’s sentence pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in denying Rader Bonding Company’s motion for exoneration and in denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment of forfeiture.

The petitioner, Brandon Washington, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel upon the entry of his guilty plea which he argues was entered involuntarily and unknowingly. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and conclude the petitioner has waived any challenge to the entrance of his plea.

The petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Within the context of his post-conviction claims, the petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State asking the victim to compare her pain level as a result of the petitioner’s assault to the pain she experienced at other points in her life. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Humphreys County grand jury charged the defendant, Lance Loveless, with theft of property between $1000.00 and $10,000.00. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted theft of property between $1000.00 and $10,000.00. On appeal, the defendant contends: the State failed to prove attempt, so the proof was insufficient to support the guilty verdict, and the trial court erred when denying his request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A claim was filed against an estate by the former employer of the decedent. The clerk of court did not send notice to the representative of the estate as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-313(a). The estate did not file an exception to the claim until after the time for filing exceptions had run. The trial court accordingly ruled that the exception was time barred. The estate appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns the proper method of invoking a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a proceeding to modify a permanent parenting plan. About one year after the parties’ divorce, Travis Freeman (father) filed a petition to modify the court-ordered custody arrangement and attached a proposed permanent parenting plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a) (2017). Wendy Freeman (mother) opposed the requested modification. The trial court subsequently entered two orders gradually expanding father’s co-parenting time. Later, father filed another motion seeking greater expansion of his co-parenting time and/or designation as the primary residential parent. Father did not attach a new proposed parenting plan to this motion. Ultimately, the trial court ordered a new permanent parenting plan that retained mother as the primary residential parent but granted father additional co-parenting time. Mother appeals. She argues that father did not properly invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction because father did not attach a new proposed parenting plan to his most recent motion to modify the custody arrangement. We agree with mother that father was statutorily required to submit a new proposed parenting plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a); nevertheless, we hold that father’s petition to modify the parenting plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm

This appeal concerns a debt owed to the plaintiff by her deceased husband. The trial court awarded the plaintiff certain secured real property that she argues does not provide her the full value of her claim against the decedent. We affirm.