APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Wyatt Barish, was convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of second degree murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -210, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of first degree felony murder because he did not have the requisite mental state to commit the predicate crimes of theft, burglary, and robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Blunkall, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for rape of a child. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel (1) failed to file suppression motions concerning multiple items of evidence, including the text message communications between the Petitioner and the victim, certain phone records, the Petitioner’s banking records and the automated teller machine (“ATM”) surveillance video showing the Petitioner’s withdrawing money, the traffic stop, and the Petitioner’s statement to the police; (2) failed to rebut the medical testimony from the State’s expert; and (3) failed to pursue a preliminary hearing, adequately investigate the victim’s background, or vigorously cross examine and impeach the victim. The Petitioner further contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to provide the defense with favorable evidence—the victim’s juvenile record—and by certain statements made during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Marlo Davis, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder and reckless homicide convictions. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a health care liability action in which the plaintiff asserted claims of professional negligence, negligent supervision, and medical battery against a physician’s assistant, a dermatologist, and their employer. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.02, motion for dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02, and motion for sanctions under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122(d). We agree with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to obtain a competent expert witness to testify on the applicable standard of care as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115 and violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122 by filing a non-compliant certificate of good faith. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s action and award of sanctions.

Jerald Jefferson, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. His petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the post-conviction court after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 to allow cross-examination of the victim about an alleged consensual sexual encounter between the victim and Petitioner. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sadegh Babanzadeh, was convicted of one count each of tampering with evidence and filing a false report. The trial court sentenced him to a five-year sentence for tampering with evidence and a three-year sentence for filing a false report, to run concurrently, with a year to be served in the Department of Correction, and the remainder of the sentences to be served on probation. The Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Delmontae Godwin, was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery and sentenced to an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to a sentence from another conviction. Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by sentencing him to the maximum sentence for each conviction. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce action involving the interpretation of certain provisions of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and allegations of contempt of court for failure to comply with the MDA. The Blount County General Sessions Court (“trial court”) conducted a bench trial, took the matter under advisement, and directed the parties to each prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court subsequently adopted verbatim the wife’s proposed findings and conclusions with what we determine to be insufficient explanation regarding the trial court’s decision-making process. The husband has appealed. Because we are unable to ascertain whether the trial court’s final order is an independent judgment of the court, we vacate the order and remand for sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law that reflect the trial court’s independent analysis and judgment. 

In this legal malpractice lawsuit, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant after the plaintiffs’ counsel failed to respond to the defendant’s motion and appear at the hearing. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the judgment, arguing their attorney’s failure to respond was due to excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had a meritorious defense.

This appeal involves a suspended attorney’s attempt to file a petition pro se in a case in which he was not a party. The trial court denied the petition sua sponte, concluding that the suspended attorney was not a party to the original action, he did not file a petition to intervene, and he was using the pro se petition as a subterfuge to circumvent his suspension from the practice of law. The suspended attorney appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Aaron Hatfield, appeals the denial of his bid for judicial diversion of the three-year sentence imposed for his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to judicial diversion. We remand the case for entry of an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion under the same terms and conditions of the previously imposed sentence of probation.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment denying judicial diversion. The trial court considered and weighed on the record the factors governing judicial diversion for a qualified defendant set forth in State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) and State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Therefore, we review the trial court’s decision under an “abuse of discretion standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 329 (Tenn. 2014). Although the trial court could have been more artful in its oral findings, the trial court’s findings, as set forth in the majority opinion, are in my opinion sufficient to determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion and that the trial court’s decision was reasonable.

Austin Daugherty petitioned the trial court for an order of protection against his former wife, Sally Daugherty, on behalf of their minor child, Chloe. Mr. Daugherty alleged that Ms. Daugherty engaged in domestic violence. The order granting the petition and the amended order were entered against Ms. Daugherty by apparent default. She appeals arguing that she did not receive notice of the petition and any subsequent proceedings. We vacate the order of protection and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Jerome Maurice Teats, filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of one count of aggravated robbery and four convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Petitioner alleged that based upon the advice of trial counsel, he rejected plea offers and decided to go to trial. The Petitioner further alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to include a suppression issue in the application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove that either trial counsel or appellate counsel were ineffective. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Martin Hughes, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 2014, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to several offenses and received an effective five-year sentence. He was later convicted of two new offenses and received concurrent sentences of ten and fifteen years, served consecutively to his five-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his five-year sentence has expired and that he is being held illegally because the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) incorrectly calculated this sentence and erred in denying him a parole hearing. We affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Following an appeal in which this Court affirmed the judgment of the chancery court, the unsuccessful appellants moved the chancery court for relief from the judgment under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The chancery court granted the motion by reducing the amount of the original judgment. The matter is now before us again on the grant of Rule 60 relief. Because the Rule 60 motion was untimely, we reverse the grant of relief.    

Petitioner, Anmichael Leonard, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, identity theft, and fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twentyfour years in confinement. A panel of this court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Anmichael Leonard, No. 2015-01313-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1446440 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Leterpa Mosley, along with two co-defendants, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Charles McClain, No. W2013-00328-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4754531, (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept. 24, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and, after appointment of counsel, filed amended petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of his due process rights. Additionally, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him and a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming newly discovered evidence in the form of an exculpatory letter written by a trial witness. After hearings, the post-conviction court denied the petitions. After review, we affirm.

In 2009, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Deandre Blake, of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and remanded the case for the entry of a modified judgment. State v. Deandre Blake, No. W2010-00468-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 4433651, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 23, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb 15, 2015) (designated not for citation). The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions but did file a timely post-conviction petition, which was denied. This court affirmed. Deandre Blake v. State, W2015-01423-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 4060696, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 27, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that his counsel was ineffective, and the habeas court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to comply with the habeas corpus statute by failing to attach his judgments and failing to raise a colorable claim. The Petitioner filed a motion to alter the order dismissing his petition, attaching the judgments and asking the habeas court to consider previous post-conviction testimony. The habeas court denied his motion. On appeal to this court, the Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the habeas
court’s judgment.

A mother placed the children that are the subject of this appeal with a child placement agency because she was unable to provide a stable home for them. Ten months later, the agency filed a petition to have the children declared dependent and neglected; the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children and in due course declared the children to be dependent and neglected and continued custody with the agency. The guardian ad litem initiated this proceeding to have the mother’s parental rights terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial non-compliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions; the agency later filed a separate petition on most of the same grounds also seeking termination of mother’s rights. Following a trial, the court terminated the mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions; the court also found that termination of mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals, denying that grounds existed to terminate her rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest; the guardian ad litem and agency appeal the failure of the court to sustain the ground of abandonment by failure to support. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the determination that the evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions; we vacate the holding that termination of mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest and remand the case for further consideration.  

A professional corporation through which a lawyer practiced law brought suit against a former client seeking to recover the “res” transferred to the corporation under an assignment of chose-in-action executed by the client as a means of paying fees owed to the corporation for its representation of the client in a legal malpractice action. The client counterclaimed for breach of contract. A jury found in favor of the client and awarded her compensatory and punitive damages. We find in favor of the client on all issues raised by the corporation. As to the client’s issues, we find that the trial court erred in failing to require the corporation to file a bond with regard to the injunction restraining the client from using certain funds during the pendency of the litigation and in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of piercing the corporate veil.       

I concur in all aspects of the opinion, save one. The majority concludes that the Chancery Court of Lincoln County erred in denying the motion of Nancy J. Strong to hold Larry E. Parrish personally liable for the obligations of Larry E. Parrish, P.C. The majority vacates the trial court’s decision and “remands for a hearing” on that issue. Because I would affirm the denial of the motion, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion.  

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3) mental incompetence. The court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the three statutory grounds for termination. We further conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. So we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

In this unlawful detainer action, the defendant appeals the dismissal of his appeal by the Loudon County Circuit Court (“circuit court”) from an order to disburse funds entered by the Loudon County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jason D. Kubelick, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery. By agreement, the Defendant’s sentence was four years with six years on the sex offender registry with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.