APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

The Petitioner, Ricky Hunt, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, along with two amended petitions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the corroboration requirement regarding accomplice testimony and for failing to help him file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel failed to advise him that his sentence was required to be served at 100%. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Timothy Dion Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, for which he is serving a twenty-two-year sentence as a
Range I offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2018). On appeal, he contends that: (1)
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in various
evidentiary rulings, (3) he is entitled to a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of
multiple trial errors, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

After three days of a Dickson County jury trial, the Defendant, Mendy Powell Neal, who was charged with the first degree premeditated and felony murder of her husband and the aggravated arson of their home, entered a North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in exchange for the dismissal of the felony murder and aggravated arson counts of the presentment and an agreed range of three to four years, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, determined that she was not a suitable candidate for probation or other alternative sentencing, and sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following the denial of what the Defendant styled as a “Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court treated as a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence, the Defendant filed an untimely appeal to this court in which she argues that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentence. Based on our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived for the Defendant’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s original sentencing determinations. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to reduce or modify the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its divorce decree, the trial court “adopted” Wife’s proposed parenting plans without signing or attaching the plans. More than a year after the resolution of Husband’s subsequent motion to alter or amend, the trial court eventually signed the parenting plans pursuant to a motion to enter by Husband. Because we determine that Husband’s argument that the trial court’s order only became final when the plans were signed is without merit, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed. Wife is awarded her appellate attorney’s fees.

This Tennessee Public Participation Act appeal involves three parties and multiple issues. The plaintiff/appellee, Lisa Garramone (“Ms. Garramone”), while serving as a commissioner for the City of Nolensville, Tennessee, filed a complaint for, inter alia, false light invasion of privacy against four defendants, including appellants Jason Patrick (“Mr. Patrick”) and Dr. Joe Curtsinger (“Dr. Curtsinger”). Ms. Garramone alleged that the defendants acted in concert to spread defamatory information about her during her 2022 re-election campaign. Each defendant responded by filing a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (“the TPPA”). Mr. Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment; Dr. Curtsinger did not. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Garramone filed a notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice” of all of her claims under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), to which the defendants objected. While the TPPA petitions were pending, this court ruled on the interplay between the TPPA and Rule 41.01(1) in Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade I”), No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). Consequently, the trial court ordered the parties to reargue the TPPA petitions considering this court’s rulings in Flade I. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Ms. Garramone’s voluntary dismissal mooted Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition but that it was ineffective against Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition because of his pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court further held that Mr. Patrick established that the TPPA applied because Ms. Garramone’s claims were based on, related to, or in response to his exercise of the right to free speech. But the court held that Ms. Garramone failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for her tort claims as required by the TPPA. Thus, the court granted Mr. Patrick’s petition, dismissed Ms. Garramone’s claims against him, and ordered Mr. Patrick to submit his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Patrick sought $74,346.50 in attorney’s fees and $920.09 in costs, but the court awarded him only $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $66.91 in costs based on its determination that the TPPA’s fee-shifting provision—Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107—should be construed narrowly because it runs contra to the American Rule. Thus, the court found that Mr. Patrick was entitled to only those fees “reasonably incurred in obtaining the dismissal of the action,” which did not include, inter alia, services rendered to prepare a defense against Ms. Garramone’s tort claims. The court reasoned that “more than $46,600.00 of his total fees and $853.18 of his costs” were incurred after Ms. Garramone filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit with prejudice, which the trial court stated disposed of the case “for all practical purposes.”  Mr. Patrick appeals the amount of the award for his attorney’s fees and costs; he also seeks his attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Dr. Curtsinger appeals the denial of his TPPA petition as moot. For her part, Ms. Garramone contends the trial court erred by not denying Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition as moot when she filed her notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice.” After these consolidated appeals were filed and argued, our Supreme Court rendered two decisions pertaining to the TPPA, Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2024), and Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade II”), ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024). Based on the reasoning in Flade II, we hold that Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition did not curtail Ms. Garramone’s “free and unrestricted” right to voluntarily dismiss her claims against him; thus, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition as moot. We further find that Ms. Garramone’s characterization of her dismissal as “with prejudice” did not place it outside the ambit of Rule 41.01(1)’s summary-judgment exception. As for Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs, we rely upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charles and Flade II to find that the trial court erred by categorically excluding all fees and costs he incurred in preparing a defense to Ms. Garramone’s claims. Accordingly, we vacate the award of Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration of the reasonable amount to which he is entitled under § 20-17-106 and to enter judgment accordingly. We also find that Mr. Patrick is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to § 20-17-107, as explained in Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. 

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In an earlier appeal, we determined that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign judgment, but we vacated the enforcement decision to determine the outstanding amount owed under the judgment. In this appeal, the judgment debtor faults the trial court for not considering his equitable estoppel defense on remand. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Antonio M. Starnes, guilty of first degree premeditated murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus seventeen years and six months. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in issuing a flight instruction; and (3) the trial court failed to properly poll the jury. We remand for entry of judgments reflecting the trial court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Monzell Banks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the Department of Children’s Services withdrew noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground for termination, we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest.

The Defendant, Steven Alexander Greene, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, a Class
A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary,
a Class B felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-
210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-
14-404 (2018) (subsequently amended) (especially aggravated burglary), 39-16-503
(2018) (tampering with evidence). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to
determine the length of the sentences, and the court imposed an effective sentence of
twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying
the mitigating factors before applying the enhancement factors when imposing the
Defendant’s sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2018, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jermaine Nelson Buford, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, evading arrest, vandalism of property less than $1,000, and simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Buford, No. M2019-00402-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 414558, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 3, 2020). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s failure to seek the suppression of evidence from the Petitioner’s cell phone. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property and was placed on judicial diversion for five years and ordered to pay $167,000 in restitution to the victim. The Defendant failed to pay the entire amount of restitution, and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s sentence and ordered him to serve a five-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that his failure to pay the entirety of the restitution prior to the expiration of his sentence was willful. After review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s revocation order.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the child by failure to engage in more than token visitation and further ruled that it was in the child’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee’s independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of workers’ compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee’s duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the workers’ compensation exclusivity question.

Petitioner, Jashun Antravious Garrett, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and one count of theft under $1,000 and was sentenced to an effective eight years of incarceration. More than one year after the trial court entered judgments on Petitioner’s convictions, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal with this court. Based on Petitioner’s untimely notice of appeal, his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Cedric Jones, appeals the Criminal Court for Johnson County’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that the
sentence and fines imposed against him were excessive, the trial judge and jurors should
have been disqualified, his prosecution was a violation of double jeopardy, the indictment
against him was defective, and the judgments were facially void. The State contends that
the grounds raised are not cognizable under habeas corpus and that the indictment vested
the trial court with jurisdiction to render its judgment. Based on our review, we affirm the
habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of Kelsie M. (“Mother”) to Nash M. (“the Child”), finding by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of severe child abuse and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment due to an insufficient record and remanded for preparation of the transcripts of the proceedings. On remand, the Trial Court entered orders providing for the payment of the transcripts and reinstated its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed again, and transcripts of the proceedings have been presented in the record. Based upon our thorough review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

The legal father of two children and the putative father of one of the children both appeal a juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights, but we reverse the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the putative father’s rights on the ground of failure to manifest willingness and ability.

In 2021, the Petitioner, Christopher Matthew Taylor, pled guilty to the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a term of six years and placed him on probation. After his suspended sentence was revoked, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in April 2023, alleging that his original plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court granted Appellees’ respective motions averring that Appellant’s lawsuit failed to state a claim against them. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2022, the Petitioner, Jaslene Washington, pleaded guilty in the Marion County General Sessions Court to assault and resisting arrest and received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised probation conditioned upon the payment of fines and costs. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging multiple claims including ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that counsel was ineffective in providing erroneous information regarding the expungement of her convictions and that the Petitioner relied upon this erroneous information in deciding to enter the guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Tommy Gene Couch, Sr., appeals from his guilty-pled conviction for aggravated assault. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the Defendant’s sentence. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and imposed a three-year sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing as an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.