APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, the appellant’s oral motion for recusal made during trial was denied. She then filed a written motion for recusal that apparently has yet to be resolved by the trial court. Because no order denying the motion has been entered, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Roderick Redmond, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13- 504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of thirty years for rape of a child and ten years for aggravated sexual battery, for an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Alexander Hayes, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-602 (2018). The
Defendant was sentenced to ninety days’ probation. On appeal, he contends that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jaylon Hatch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2019) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the conviction offenses because they are based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
of resisting arrest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a) (“It is an offense for a person to
intentionally prevent or obstruct anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement
officer, or anyone acting in a law enforcement officer’s presence and at the officer’s
direction, from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the
defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or another.”). The gravamen
of the Defendant’s challenge is not the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish his
use of “force.” Instead, the Defendant asks us to focus on when the “force” occurred or
the Defendant’s pre- and post-arrest conduct. Because the State did not offer any evidence
of the Defendant’s use of force before his arrest, the Defendant argues, and I agree, that the
evidence supporting the resisting arrest conviction is insufficient as a matter of law.

The defendant, Joshua L. Hutcherson, pleaded guilty to four counts of vehicular assault, two counts of driving on a revoked license with a prior DUI, one count of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in failing to apply an appropriate mitigating factor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. Tamara R. (“Mother”) is the mother of minor child Tayla R. (“the Child”). Jesse R. (“Legal Father”) is the Child’s legal father, having married Mother on the day that the Child was born. The Child was removed into state custody based on Mother’s drug use while pregnant and environmental concerns in the home. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the Child’s foster parents Autumn M. (“Foster Mother”) and Drannon M. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively), filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Chancery Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights to the Child. The Chancery Court terminated Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Aside from a few token visits with the Child, Mother and Legal Father essentially did nothing on their case, declining to cooperate with DCS or even allow DCS inside their residence, an RV camper. Neither Mother nor Legal Father paid any child support whatsoever for the Child. We affirm.

The defendant, William Paul Climer, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault. On September 8, 2023, the defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. Per the terms of his plea agreement, the defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge and the second count of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of six years’ incarceration and imposed a fine of $2500. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing a fine without making the appropriate findings. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing; however, the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings concerning the imposition of the $2500 fine, and therefore, we remand the matter to the trial court to determine if a fine is appropriate and make such findings as necessary.

The Defendant, William Swafford, was convicted by a Hamblen County jury of especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial
court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the Defendant’s late wife.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm.

For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied.  Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power).  This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.”  Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354.  Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse.

Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. 

Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 1999 especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to his life sentence for first degree murder. The post-conviction court found that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to Petitioner’s case, and therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the petition was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Thor Lucas Coleman, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault by strangulation, aggravated assault by violating a restraining order, possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to a forty-five-year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Defendant, Roger Trino Spencer, Jr., was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault by displaying a deadly weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court also imposed an effective $15,000 fine and ordered Defendant to pay $971 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; the State’s improper comments during opening statement and closing argument entitle him to plain error relief; the trial court erred by failing to consider a validated risk and needs assessment in imposing his sentence; and the trial court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay in imposing fines and ordering restitution. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part.

In this contract dispute, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shortly after the City of Memphis (“the City”) made public announcements regarding untested sexual assault kits, three women filed a class action complaint alleging that the announcements caused them severe emotional distress. More than a year after the announcements, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff. The three original plaintiffs’ claims were either voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations. The City sought summary judgment against the only remaining plaintiff on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and this Court granted the City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. Concluding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the new plaintiff’s claims, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.

Ms. Ward hired Kedalo Construction LLC (“Kedalo”) to renovate her store. She claimed that the work was not completed or was not done properly. After Kedalo attempted to remedy the situation, Ms. Ward was still not satisfied. Kedalo then said she was not their problem anymore. Ms. Ward created a website and Facebook page criticizing the company.  Kedalo sued for defamation. Ms. Ward responded with a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After many filings and a deposition, the trial court dismissed the petition. Ms. Ward appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Joshua Anthony Williams, alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was to receive a four-year sentence as a Range II offender to be served on probation following one year of confinement, and the trial court was to determine whether to grant judicial diversion and whether to require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, extending the diversionary period to six years, and placed the Defendant on the sexual offender registry during the diversionary period. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in placing him on the sexual offender registry. We conclude that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that the Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for extraordinary relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Desmond Lanier Hatchett, was convicted by a Knox County jury of evading
arrest with risk of death or injury, driving while his license was revoked, reckless driving,
violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the window tint law. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in imposing a six-year sentence for evading arrest with risk of
death or injury. Upon review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.