APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An inmate presently in custody in the Whiteville Correctional Facility sued the warden and the CEO and Chairman of Corrections Corporation of America in a pleading styled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He seeks release from that facility contending that the State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) released him when it surrendered him to a facility outside the borders of the State of Wisconsin for incarceration. The trial court dismissed the cause of action and we affirm.
 

The appellant entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine, Class C felonies, and was sentenced to four years confinement in the Department of Correction. The appellant argues, in this direct appeal, that the trial court erred in ordering total confinement. The record supports denial of an alternative sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of fourteen felonies, consisting of various rape, robbery, and burglary charges arising from complaints of five victims. He received an effective sentence of ninety-nine years. Appealing these convictions, he alleged, inter alia, that the trial court should have severed the offenses, rather than allowing all five to be tried in a single trial; that blood, saliva, and hair samples should have been suppressed; that he should not have been shackled during the trial, and that his sentence was improper. Of these assignments, we find error in the trial court’s allowing the complaints of all five victims to be tried in a single trial, and in the court’s not following the required procedures before shackling the defendant during the trial. The errors were harmless and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Claude Willis and Defendant Lola Mae (Wright) Willis regarding the terms of their divorce. The trial court granted an absolute divorce to Ms. Wright,¹ divided the parties’ marital property, allocated the parties’ marital debt, and awarded Ms. Wright alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, Mr. Willis argues that the trial court’s division of marital property and allocation of marital debt are inequitable, and that, assuming an award of alimony is appropriate in the case at bar, the court should have awarded Ms. Wright rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. Additionally, Ms. Wright requests on appeal that her award of attorney’s fees be designated as alimony. We affirm the ruling of the trial court; however, we modify the court’s ruling to reflect that attorney’s fees are awarded to Ms. Wright as alimony.

This appeal involves the question of whether the Appellants, Walter and Gordon Farris, complied with the statute of limitations when filing their complaint for legal malpractice and conversion. The Appellees, William S. Todd and Thomas S. Dossett, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellants moved to amend their complaint to include declaratory judgment relief for determination of the ownership rights of the parties in a particular art work. The Circuit Court for Sullivan County granted the motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the motion to amend. We affirm in part and vacate in part the Circuit Court’s judgment.
 

A jury found the defendant guilty of selling 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.  He received a 15 year sentence as a Range II offender, consecutive to a prior felony. The defendant asserts error in allowing the state’s expert witness to testify to the aggregate weight of cocaine sold, when the witness did not test every particle of the submitted evidence. The defendant further asserts error in the trial court’s admitting a video tape of the sale and in the trial court’s sentencing. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Carlos C. Beasley, referred herein as “the defendant,” appeals as of right from a conviction for especially aggravated robbery by a Shelby County jury. The same jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, from which the defendant does not appeal. The Shelby County Criminal Court imposed a sentence of twenty-five (25) years for especially aggravated robbery in the Department of Correction. The defendant presents two appellate issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that every element of especially aggravated robbery has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2) whether the record shows that the trial court in its capacity as thirteenth (13th) juror failed to independently weigh the evidence upon consideration of the motion for a new trial.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a final decree of divorce entered in the Shelby County
Circuit Court. The Husband appeals the trial court’s order claiming error in several aspects of the
decision, including the determination as to his alimony obligation.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an appeal as of right from a trial court’s judgment in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-201–2041 lies in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Because we hold that jurisdiction over an appeal as of right in a statutory disciplinary proceeding lies in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the intermediate appellate court’s order transferring the case to the Supreme Court, and we transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for its review on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Transfer Order of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Transferred to Court of Appeals
 

The appellant, Donald E. Griffin, brought suit seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck from the rear in Maury County by a car driven by Richard Vaughn. After obtaining a judgment against Vaughn in the amount of $225,000, Griffin learned that Vaughn had only $50,000 of liability insurance coverage. Griffin then requested that his uninsured motorist carrier, the appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), pay the remainder of the judgment up to its policy limit of $100,000. When Shelter refused the claim, Griffin brought this action against Shelter in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancellor granted summary judgment to Shelter, finding that Griffin had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance policy and with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a). The Court of Appeals agreed that Griffin had failed to comply with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Shelter. This Court thereafter granted Griffin’s application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed DROWOTA, J.,