APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael Holman, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and sentence of twenty years. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See State v. Michael Andrae Holman, M2002-01471-CCA-R3-CD, Marshall County (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2003). The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to interview and subpoena witnesses adequately; (2) to obtain phone records and motel documents; (3) to contact witnesses who could provide the petitioner with an alibi defense; (4) to cross-examine the informant and co-defendant thoroughly; (5) to argue sufficiently that the petitioner could not have been in constructive possession of the drugs found; and (6) to prepare adequately for trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Skinner, was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because there is no proof connecting him to the crimes other than uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive life sentences.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Christa A. Avenell,¹ sometimes referred to herein as “the plaintiff,” brought this action against James Allen Gibson (“the creditor”), seeking to recover funds taken out of the Avenells’ two joint accounts by their bank in response to a levy of execution. The trial court held that the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (2000) changed the law with respect to bank accounts held by individuals as tenants by the entirety; that Mrs. Avenell failed to prove she was entitled to the levied upon funds; and that the creditor was entitled to retain the funds paid into court by the Avenells’ bank. The plaintiff and her husband appeal. We reverse.

I agree with the majority opinion’s analysis until it undertakes consideration of the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a). As quoted in the majority opinion, the amendment states:

Any balance so created, including, without limitation, any balance held by spouses, shall be subject to assignment by, or the claim of any creditor of, either depositor, as if such depositor were the sole owner of the funds; provided that is such creditor realizes its claim by any means other than enforcement of an assignment, pledge, or the grant of a security interest made by any one (1) of such depositors, any other depositor not indebted to the creditor may, by commencing a separate action against the creditor, establish such rights as that depositor may have in the funds.

The defendant, Annette Reynolds, was convicted of facilitation of possession of cocaine for resale, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. She also claims that the trial court made several errors: by denying discovery regarding the identity of the confidential informant whose information led to the search warrant for her residence; by denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search; by admitting the presentence report at sentencing; and by sentencing her as a career offender. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Deborah Kay Parker Hoxit Ohme ("Wife") a divorce from Frederick Herman Ohme, IV ("Husband"), divided the parties' marital property and debts, and awarded Wife transitional alimony of $500 per month. In addition, the court approved Wife's parenting plan, in which she was designated as the primary residential parent of the parties' child, and ordered Husband to pay child support of $854 per month. Husband appeals the granting of the divorce to Wife, the division of debt, the award of alimony, and the trial court's decree regarding responsibility for transporting the parties' child to and from visitation. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father's parental rights with regard to his nine-year-old daughter. After determining that the child had been sexually abused by her father, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Grundy County seeking to terminate the father's parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father had committed severe child abuse and that his daughter's interests would be best served by terminating his parental rights. The father asserts on this appeal that the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he had committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the father committed severe child abuse and that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter's best interests.

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Upon entering guilty pleas, the two Defendants were convicted of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder respectively, and received sentences of fifteen and ten years’ incarceration.  The Defendants filed petitions for post-conviction relief, and after a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief to both Defendants. The Defendants now appeal to this Court raising the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

City of Memphis challenges judgment of trial court finding the city liable, under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, for negligence of a police officer that proximately caused injuries to a criminal suspect who was being placed under arrest. City contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the statement of police officer taken during a police department internal investigation; in finding that the officer’s actions were negligent instead of intentional; and in failing to apply properly the correct standard of care. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of A.R.G., DOB 12-26-2000. Only Mother, C.S., appeals. Grounds for termination were substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to remedy conditions in her life permitting the child's return in the near future. We affirm the action of the trial court.

On appeal, the petitioner avers that the post-conviction court erred in: (1) failing to rule on post-conviction counsel's motion to withdraw prior to ruling on the post-conviction petition; (2) dismissing the petition summarily; and (3) dismissing the post-conviction petition in an untimely manner. Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and that the delay in the disposition of the petition did not prejudice the petitioner. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Charles Sawyer, was arrested by the police for aggravated sexual battery. Following his arrest, Sawyer made an oral statement to the police after an officer read to Sawyer an affidavit supporting the arrest warrant but before the officer advised Sawyer of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Sawyer filed a motion to suppress his oral statement. Based upon the nature of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention, we conclude the statement resulted from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation and therefore should be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case wherein J.R.R., who is neither the biological father of the twins nor the husband of the mother of the twins, resists the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated his parental rights, and we affirm the judgment.

Allstate Insurance Company paid a fire loss to the landlord then brought an action against the tenant asserting subrogation rights. The trial court held the tenant to be blameless as to the fire but found him liable under the terms of the lease, which provided that the tenant would be "responsible for all damages to the apartment, intentional or non intentional". Since we find the tenant to be an additional insured under the Allstate policy, no subrogation rights exist, and we reverse the trial court.

Plaintiff sued her employer for misrepresentation relating to health insurance coverage and sought to recover amounts incurred by her husband for medical bills. The trial court found for plaintiff awarding her treble and punitive damages. We reverse the trial court's finding of treble and punitive damages and affirm the trial court's award of a refund to plaintiff for amounts contributed as premiums.

Ronald Joseph Reece pleaded guilty to statutory rape for which he received a two-year probationary sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to grant judicial diversion, he now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence imposed by the lower court.

The defendant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences, based on the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Blakely v. Washington. Our courts have previously held that neither Apprendi nor Blakely affect the trial court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences. Furthermore, upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s extensive record, consisting of twenty prior convictions. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Robbie O. Allen, entered Alford pleas in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to two counts of felony failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant on each count to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Glenda Emmit ("the plaintiff") brought a petition seeking to annul her marriage to Richard Emmit. She alleged that, unbeknownst to her, her prior marriage to James Randall Medley had not been dissolved at the time of her attempted marriage to Mr. Emmit. She claims that this prior marriage prevented her from contracting a valid marriage with Mr. Emmit. The trial court held that the co-administrators of Mr. Medley's estate (collectively "the co-administrators") were indispensable parties and ordered the plaintiff to amend her complaint to add them. Following a bench trial, the court below entered a judgment denying the plaintiff's petition for annulment on the ground that she had "unclean hands" and was therefore estopped from averring either that her marriage to Mr. Emmit was invalid or that her marriage to Mr. Medley was not dissolved. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Edward Overby, was convicted by a jury in the Bradley County Criminal Court of second degree murder, theft over $1,000, theft under $500, aggravated assault, and possession of marijuana. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the petitioner challenges this ruling and additionally contends that he should have been evaluated for competency prior to the commencement of the post-conviction hearing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner, Paul Tobias Davis, has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his "Petition for Pretrial Jail Credit And/or Petition for a Writ of Certiorari." In that petition, the petitioner challenges the calculation of his sentencing credits during his incarceration in the Davidson County Jail from July 8, 2001, until April 17, 2002. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Hopkins Plemons, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to nineteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he acted in self-defense when he killed the victim; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Denise Wassom ("Plaintiff") loaned her car to her ex-boyfriend who then had a single-car accident while making a beer run. Plaintiff's vehicle was a total loss. Fearing that her ex-boyfriend might be arrested for DUI, Plaintiff reported to the police that her car had been stolen. Plaintiff's vehicle was insured through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Plaintiff also reported to State Farm that her car had been stolen. Approximately two weeks into State Farm's investigation, an adjustor for State Farm interviewed the witnesses whom Plaintiff claimed to have been with at the time her vehicle was stolen. Immediately after these interviews, Plaintiff "came clean" and told State Farm the truth. State Farm denied Plaintiff's claim and Plaintiff filed suit claiming State Farm was in breach of contract. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Plaintiff had made material misrepresentations with the intent to deceive. The Trial Court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Kendrick Naylor, was convicted by a jury of criminal attempt to commit assault, felony evading arrest, and theft of property over $10,000. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four (4) years as a Range II multiple offender for the evading arrest conviction and six (6) months for the attempt to commit assault conviction, to run concurrently to the sentence for evading arrest.  The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight (8) years for the theft of property conviction, to be served consecutively to the four-year sentence for evading arrest, for a total effective sentence of twelve (12) years. After a motion for new trial was denied by the trial court, a timely notice of appeal was filed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and the appellant’s sentence because we determine that the appellant’s history of criminal convictions more than justifies the sentence imposed.

Convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, the defendant, Jeremy Sheron Hall, a/k/a Rodney Lee Jones, appeals and challenges the trial court's failure to suppress evidence, the admission of hearsay evidence, the imposition of a $100,000 fine, and the length of the sentence imposed. We affirm the criminal court's judgment.