APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences.

After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11)the capital sentencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the “catch-all” statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Antonio Dewayne Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, Bledsoe contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and, as a result, his nolo contendere plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant challenges the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Specifically, he avers that the District Attorney General abused his discretion and failed to consider all relevant factors. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the District Attorney General's further consideration of all applicable factors, discussion of the evidence supporting those factors, and an explanation of the weight accorded to each.

The defendant, Jeffery Hayes, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and one count of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Edward Jones pleaded guilty to solicitation of first degree murder, for which he received an eight-year incarcerative sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court's failure to grant his request for alternative sentencing, he brings the instant appeal challenging his manner of service. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Debra Ann Williams ("Mother") and George Jay Williams, IV ("Father") were divorced in 1998. Mother was designated the custodial parent of the parties' two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Modification and Contempt seeking, in part, a change in custody or visitation, and relief from the requirement that Father carry life insurance or, in the alternative, that Mother also be required to maintain life insurance. Mother filed a counter claim requesting, in part, increased child support and the right to claim the tax exemption for both children. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "that there has been no change in circumstances which would justify the modification of the final judgment" as requested by Father and dismissing Father's petition for modification. The Trial Court, however, increased child support in accordance with the guidelines and held that for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines, Father was not entitled to a reduction in his annual earnings for state income taxes he may pay. Father appeals raising issues regarding custody, visitation, life insurance, child support, and attorney's fees. We reverse as to the award to Mother of the tax exemption for one child, and affirm as to all other issues.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Tims, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Robertson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal document. This Court finds that justice does not require waiver.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

In Tennessee, a determination of child support is statutory. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1994).¹ Accordingly, I would approach resolution of this appeal by resort to the applicable statutes.

The petitioner, Kelvin Lee Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntaryguilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jonathan Harris, was convicted by jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, and five years for the theft of property conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant’s statements and journal; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Eugene Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Alfonzo Silvestre Arze (“Father”) and MaryAnne Bracken Arze (“Mother”) were divorced in 2000.  The divorce was based upon stipulated grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the parties submitted a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) to the Trial Court for approval. The terms of the MDA were agreed upon through mediation. At the time of the divorce, Father was employed as a physician with gross earnings of approximately $150,000. Mother was unemployed. Due to the significant disparity in income, Father agreed to pay Mother $2,000 in child support even though he was not obligated legally to do so since he was the primary residential parent for the parties’ four children. When the oldest child turned eighteen, Father reduced his child support payments by twenty-five percent, $500. After Mother challenged Father’s unilateral reduction in child support,  the Trial Court entered an order which required Father to pay child support in an amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”). We conclude that because Father was not legally obligated under the Guidelines to pay any child support, the payment of $2,000 was purely a contractual obligation which was not governed by the Guidelines. We also conclude that Father was within his contractual rights when he reduced the child support payments by $500 when the oldest child became emancipated.

This case involves a question of whether an insurance policy covers the injuries sustained by the plaintiff under the facts of this case. The original suit filed by plaintiff against Justin Harkins, Andrew Keon, and James Keon was settled out of court, leaving Great River Insurance Company, an unnamed defendant. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for declaratory and partial summary judgment on whether the plaintiff was a covered insured under the policy, the parties agreed to send the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator returned an award in favor of the plaintiff, and the trial court confirmed the award but reduced the amount, accounting for the insurance policy’s limit. The trial court also awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment interest but stated that the total award to the plaintiff could not exceed the limit in the insurance policy. Great River Insurance Company appealed to this Court, and the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The petitioner, Kenya Davis, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff sued for damages incurred to correct condition of roadway caused by defendants' motor vehicle which destroyed a section of guardrail. Defendants appeal from Judgment awarding damages to plaintiff on grounds damages were not proved. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Jerry L. Sandridge, was convicted by a jury of two counts 1 of aggravated robbery.  On direct appeal, this Court modified one of the convictions to aggravated assault and remanded for re-sentencing. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents the single issue of whether the trial court properly classified him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare his case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant was an independent candidate for election to the United States Senate in the November 5, 2002, election in which he was defeated by the present incumbent Lamar Alexander. He seeks to have the election declared void on the basis that Alexander used his own money and accepted campaign contribution in support of his candidacy. He alleges that such self financing arrangements and campaign contributions financing violate the qualifications clauses and the equal protection and due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions. Named as defendants were Lamar Alexander, Attorney General Paul Summers and the Lamar Alexander for Senate Committee. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss, which motions were granted by the trial judge. We affirm the actions of the trial court.

The Appellant, Raymond Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and carjacking. Following a sentencing hearing, Bailey was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-eight years for especially aggravated kidnapping and twelve years for carjacking.  On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of undisclosed evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of his drug possession at the time of his arrest; (4) whether Bailey’s sentences violate Blakely v. Washington; and (5) whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. After review of the record, we conclude that issues (1), (2), (4), and (5) are without merit. With regard to issue (3), we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence but conclude that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Maxwell, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twenty-four years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served at one hundred percent, and to eleven years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions cannot stand under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), because the victims’ detention was incidental to the aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence during the jury instructions; and (3) his sentences are improper in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.