APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to enforce a plea bargain agreement. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in theCircuit Court for Davidson County after the Department of Correction refused to release him in accordance with his understanding of the agreement. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief pursuant to a common-law writ of certiorari can be granted.1

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint.

The petitioner, who is serving a sentence for a federal court conviction, has filed two petitions attacking prior state convictions which were used to enhance the sentence for the federal conviction. These two petitions, called petitions for the writ of coram nobis or for habeas corpus, were dismissed by the trial court without a hearing on the basis that they were actually petitions for post-conviction relief and barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with the trial court.

The plaintiff brought suit against a manufacturer of windows and doors for allegedly supplying defective products which allowed substantial leaks into her dwelling and caused rotting because of excessive moisture. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant supplied defective doors and windows. Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Finding that the plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant of its allegedly defective product within the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the award of damages to the plaintiff and dismiss her complaint.

This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest
children. As grounds for termination the trial court found abandonment for failure to
provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume
custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children.
We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff, Alton F. Dixon, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Nike, Inc. Nike is a manufacturer of sporting goods, footwear, and apparel, and Dixon was an at-will employee of Nike. Nike encourages its employees to actively participate in improving their work environment and in implementing ideas for new products on the market 2 through a program called “I Got It.” The program invites Nike’s employees to submit ideas that “eliminate waste, improve the way we work, increase productivity, prevent accidents, save time, money, or energy.” Employees can also submit ideas for new products or inventions. In a weekly bulletin for employees, Nike stated, “If what you are suggesting is an idea for a new product or invention, to protect you and NIKE, a letter of understanding will be sent for your signature stating, in essence, that NIKE will not use your product idea until a written contract is negotiated and signed.”

This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile
Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Trent W. (“Father”) to his minor children
Klowii W. and Mariah W. (collectively, “the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile
Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. The Juvenile
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven the grounds of
abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the
permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody. The Juvenile Court also found by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals,
arguing that DCS failed to prove either grounds or best interest. We find that all four
grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by the requisite clear and convincing
evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal.