APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

These parties were divorced in Arkansas on April 17, 1996. A Property Settlement Agreement was incorporated in the judgment which awarded custody of two children to Mother.

The child of these parties, who were never married to each other, was born March 11, 1996. The paternity issue was determined in June, 1996 by the Juvenile Court, which also directed the payment of child support. The appellant questioned his liability for support because the child was conceived without his consent. He did not prevail.

Robert Lee Dickinson, Jr., appeals the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee at Chattanooga, insisting that the Juvenile Court erred in its determination of Mr. Dickinson’s Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from child support payments based upon evidence that he is not the father of the child he has been supporting. The Juvenile Court ruled that Mr. Dickinson’s motion was barred by res judicata; therefore, Mr. Dickinson is still obligated to pay current and past due child support payments.

Defendant Todd Frederick Brooks (Father) appeals, and Plaintiff Linda Faye Carter (Mother) cross-appeals, the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded the parties joint custody of their three minor children, designated the Father as the primary custodial parent, ordered the Father to pay child support to the Mother, and distributed the parties’ property. We affirm the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, with one modification, but we reverse the court’s custody decision and we remand for the court to recalculate the Father’s child support obligation pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines.
 

This is a medical malpractice case brought by an inmate at a state correctional facility. The
plaintiff brought the lawsuit against various prison officials and the prison doctor alleging federal
constitutional violations as well as medical malpractice. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and remand for further
discovery. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remainder of the claims.

This case concerns a dispute over the division of marital property, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Donald F. McCormick (Husband), appeals from the Final Decree of Divorce that, inter alia, awarded Appellee, Margaret Ann McCormick (Wife), proceeds from a 1 Husband’s W-2 form from the Frigidaire Company reveals that his wages for 1996 were $94,063.26. 2 In 1996, Wife’s gross annual earnings were approximately $9,000.00. 2 401K account, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney’s fees.

This is an appeal from the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Through the entire procedure, including an appeal to the Chancery Court for Knox County, the appellant has been denied unemployment compensation benefits because he had been guilty of misconduct arising out of the scope and course of him employment and  T.C.A . § 50 -7-303( a ) ( 2 ) bars him from recovery of unemployment compensation benefits. We reverse the judgment of the Chancery Court and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order awarding unemployment benefits as provided by law.

The Tennessee Civil Service Commission upheld the termination of a veteran supervisory employee for sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming a state employee, and failure to maintain a satisfactory and harmonious working relationship with fellow employees. The Chancery Court of Davidson County affirmed the Commission’s order. On appeal the employee asserts that he was denied progressive discipline prior to termination, and that he was denied due process of law. On the strength of the proof, he also claims that his conduct does not fit the definition of “conduct unbecoming” or support a conclusion that he failed to maintain a harmonious working relationship, and that his conduct was constitutionally protected. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the Tennessee Board of Paroles to revoke the parole of a person accused of committing child sexual abuse. The Board revoked the parole based solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements made by his alleged victim. The parolee filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision-making process. After the trial court denied the petition, the parolee appealed to this court. We have determined that the Board’s hearing officer acted arbitrarily and illegally by applying an incorrect standard to determine whether good cause existed for not allowing the parolee to confront or to cross-examine his only accuser.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the parolee’s petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the Board either to conduct a proper parole revocation hearing forthwith or to return the parolee to parole status.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Petitioners-Appellants, Robert 1 Sandra Lynn Todd Bryant, wife of Respondent and mother of the minor children involved, joined the Petitioners in the petition to terminate the Respondent’s parental rights. In the petition, she consents to the termination of her parental rights. 2 Respondent’s wife subsequently left the couple’s home in Colorado to pursue job training in Florida. Upon completion of the two month job training course in Florida, she moved to Utah while Respondent continued his military career in Colorado. 2 Leland Bryant and Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant,1 appeal the trial court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Appellee, James Ashley Bryant, with respect to his minor children, Megan Rae Bryant, born December 13, 1991, and Devon Michael Bryant, born December 30, 1993.

In this case Appellant challenges the action of the trial court in denying his application for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, holding him to be in criminal contempt of court and denying his application for modification of alimony.
 

This appeal involves a parent’s efforts to avoid paying child support for her two children. Approximately two years after the Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded custody of the parties’ two children to their father, the children’s mother, with the assistance of a lawyer furnished by the IV-D contractor for Davidson County, filed a petition to eliminate her child support obligation because she was unemployed and her only income was Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the mother’s petition on the ground that she was voluntarily unemployed. The mother asserts on this appeal that the trial court’s order conflicts with the child support guidelines because she will be required to use her SSI payments to pay her child support. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the mother is voluntarily unemployed and that the trial court’s order is consistent with the child support guidelines. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

The manager of an exterminating company brought criminal charges against the owner of a competing company for the alleged theft of a piece of equipment. The general sessions court determined that probable cause existed, but the grand jury declined to indict. The defendant in the criminal case subsequently filed suit for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment to the civil defendant. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce action to modify child support and alimony. The mother sought to increase child support, and the father sought to terminate periodic alimony payments. The trial court granted the mother’s request for an increase in child support, with a portion of the child support to be placed in an educational trust, and denied the father’s petition for modification of alimony. Both parties appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify.