APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving while license suspended, revoked, or cancelled, third offense, a Class B misdemeanor. On appeal to this court, he argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial and in admitting expert testimony on breath alcohol testing devices. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the defendant's convictions resulted from jury verdicts, rather than guilty pleas.

The Defendant pled guilty to theft over $1,000.00, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced her to two years incarceration as a Range I standard offender. The trial court suspended the Defendant’s sentence and placed her on seven years probation. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve one hundred weekends at the Shelby County Correctional Center, perform five hundred hours of community service, and pay $8,400.00 in restitution. The Defendant now appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion, and (2) that the trial court erred in denying her full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey E. Dunlap, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Daniel Thomason appeals from the aggravated robbery conviction he received at a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Thomason is serving an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crime. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence that he accomplished the robbery “by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon.” Because the record before us is does not contain all of the relevant evidence presented at trial, we are precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and therefore affirm.

I concur fully in the lead opinion with respect to the attempted murder convictions of both defendants. I also concur fully with Judge Woodall’s opinion in all other respects save for the issue concerning the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery to the aggravated robbery indictment and the attempted aggravated robbery indictment. For the reasons stated below I would find this failure to instruct with respect to these lesser-included offenses constituted reversible error. A reading of the recent cases of State v. Bowles, ___ S.W.3d ___(Tenn. 2001); and State v. Ely & Bowers, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001); leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses.  This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. See Bowles ___ S.W.3d at ____. As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense.1 Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that although defendant Richmond raised
on appeal the lesser-included offense issue, defendant Johnson did not. Nevertheless, pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) and the case of State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274 (Tenn. 2000); I would find as to Johnson that the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery constitutes plain error. As such I would therefore grant relief on this issue to both defendants.