APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an airplane which had been purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Department, but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer appealed and the Chancery Court reversed, finding that, because (1) taxpayer provided the seller with a certificate of resale, (2) taxpayer immediately leased the airplane such that it transferred possession and control of the plane to the user, and (3) taxpayer was a validly organized business which observed all corporate formalities, the sale-for-resale exemption pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(34)(A) applied to the transaction. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant was indicted for rape of a child, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant, Robert Charles Taylor, was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, Career Offender, to thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section  24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the “total amount of such bills” does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of  medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After sustaining a workrelated injury to his back, the employee filed a complaint seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Marion County. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the employee to be totally and permanently disabled. The employer appealed, contending that the employee’s continuing employment as a pastor precluded a finding of total and permanent disability. An Appeals Panel reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was totally and permanently disabled and modified the award to seventy-two percent (72%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Conaway v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., No. M2006-01177-WCR3-WC, 2007 WL 2141537 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 26, 2007). The employee, who had resigned as a pastor before the Appeals Panel decision was issued, filed a motion for modification pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231(2) (2008). Following a second evidentiary hearing, the trial court again found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled. The employer appeals contending that the employee failed to present sufficient proof that he sustained an increase of incapacity solely as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. The trial court agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim, but reverse its dismissal of the trespass claim because the evidence shows that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road.

Appellant, Alfred C. Whitehead, pled guilty to possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. As part of the guilty plea, Appellant reserved the following certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the initial seizure occurred after police officers entered the residence based on consent. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Anthony H. Dean, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.

The Petitioner, De’Andre Kendall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority view that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of tampering with evidence. The evidence did not establish the defendant’s guilt of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Curtis Lee Majors, on one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor.1 The jury also convicted the defendant of evidence tampering as charged in Count 2 of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial court refused to apply one of the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant at his sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Martin, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims on appeal that State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (Gomez II) established a previously unrecognized constitutional right to have a jury, rather than the trial judge, determine the existence of facts necessary to enhance his sentence. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of the motion to reopen pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

The petitioner, Ronald Donnell Moore, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In seeking post-conviction relief on appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective: (1) in failing to seek proper jury instruction on the burden of proof; (2) in failing to request jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first degree murder, in particular, the offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) in failing to object to the presence of a mannequin in the courtroom. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Quinton Sanders, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of murder in the perpetration of a felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to exclude evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation; (2) whether the trial court properly found that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise of peremptory challenges had not been established; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to grant a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant’s store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat. The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and dismiss the case.

The petitioner, Evelyn Holly, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she argues that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the effects of her mental condition and medication which precluded her from meaningful participation in her own defense. Additionally, the petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to hire an expert to contradict the testimony of the medical examiner and failed to call a witness who would have exonerated her. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The Defendant, William Lee Smith, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to four counts of reckless aggravated assault and one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant agreed to serve two years of his sentence on supervised probation; the manner of service of the remaining four years of his sentence was left to the determination of the trial court which ordered it served in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that he should have been granted full probation or some other alternative sentence for the four-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Shawn Nicholas Ferguson, pleaded guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana, one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. After merging the conviction of possession with intent to sell marijuana with the conviction of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, the trial court imposed a fully incarcerative, Range I sentence of one year and one month. The trial court imposed a concurrent 11-month and 29-day sentence for the conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Bedford County- Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Chad Hughes, pled guilty to one count of criminal responsibility for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court ordered the Petitioner to serve eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals that denial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph A. Hale, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to seventeen years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was justified in using deadly force and because he committed the killing in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation; and (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, precluding it from considering voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the termination of parental rights. The mother has a history of criminal activity and past incarcerations, including one for facilitation of murder, and is currently incarcerated. Between incarcerations, the mother lived with her boyfriend, the father of the two youngest of the mother’s five children. The mother’s boyfriend is incarcerated for raping and sexually abusing the mother’s two oldest daughters. With both the mother and her boyfriend incarcerated, the mother’s sister obtained custody of the children and filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding several grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals, arguing that the termination order did not satisfy the statutory requirements, that the trial court erred in finding that grounds for termination exist, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the children. We find that the trial court’s order, while less than optimal, satisfies the requirements of the statute as to one ground for termination. As to that ground, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding, as well as the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Devon Wiggins, of two counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each conviction to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to prior sentences. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay a five-thousand-dollar fine for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 17-432 (2005) violates due process and resulted in his receiving an excessive sentence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the sale of a counterfeit substance; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser included offense; (6) the trial court erred by not recusing itself; (7) the prosecutor’s closing statement was improper; and (8) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a reversal of his convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based on persistence of conditions. We affirm.

This appeal involves the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Act. The plaintiffs owned a body shop that was insured under a garage owner’s policy. The policy limited its uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles that were owned by the plaintiffs and listed on the policy. While driving to an auto parts store in a customer’s car, one of the plaintiffs was hit by an uninsured motorist and sustained physical injuries. The plaintiffs then submitted claims to the insurance company that issued the garage owner’s policy, and also to his customer’s insurance company, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies. After the claims were denied, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company that issued the plaintiffs the garage owner’s policy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no coverage because the policy did not cover the plaintiffs while operating a non-owned vehicle. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. As a permissive operator, the injured plaintiff was covered under his customer’s uninsured motorist policy. The customer’s insurance company settled with the plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of their rights against the insurance company that issued them the garage owner’s policy, and then intervened as a third party plaintiff. The intervening plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer under the garage owner’s policy, arguing that the Uninsured Motorist Act prohibits such a limitation. We affirm, finding that the statute does not prohibit the limitation.