APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Terrance G. Motley, of attempted first degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court sentenced him to forty-four years in prison. We affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court improperly refused to appoint him another attorney after he waived his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

Father sought to become the primary residential parent due to the failure of Mother to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Randall C. Trent ("Plaintiff") was incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail for several months before being transferred to the Tennessee Department of Correction. Plaintiff claims that while incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail, he was denied proper medical care and retaliated against for complaining about the lack of proper medical care. Plaintiff initially brought numerous claims against various defendants. This appeal involves the dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. _ 1983, 42 U.S.C. _ 1985, and 42 U.S.C._ 12101, also known as the Americans with Disabilities Act. These various federal claims were dismissed by the trial court after finding that the applicable one-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the complaint was filed. On appeal, plaintiff claims that the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to save his untimely claims. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Pope, pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, with an agreed effective sentence length of seven years and with the trial court to determine manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial [*2] court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Jermaine Harris, of one count of aggravated arson. The trial court sentenced him to 19 years' incarceration to be served at 100 percent as a violent offender. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification, and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on the basis of factors not determined by the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Kilven Neal, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that we dismiss the appeal based on the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of appeal, or, in the alternative, affirm the lower court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that there was no timely notice of appeal filed and that the petitioner's claims do not warrant that we waive the timely notice of appeal requirement in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Harold Gause, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He entered a plea of guilty to reckless driving on April 30, 2003, in exchange for a sentence of seventeen days, which he had already served. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 15, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: it was improper for the post-conviction court to summarily dismiss the petition; his allegations established a colorable claim for relief; the State failed to adequately answer the allegations contained in his petition; and this court should take judicial notice of the petitioner's complaint filed with the Board of Professional Responsibility regarding the representation of trial counsel. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal from the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment to Defendants. We dismiss the appeal for the failure to appeal a final judgment.

The defendant, Guy Henry White, entered into an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. See T.C.A. _ 40-3-103 (2006). The trial court sentenced him to five years to be served as 90 days' incarceration with the remainder on supervised probation. The defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and its imposition of a five-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, William Earl Robinson, a.k.a. Edward Baxter, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years, which was suspended to probation upon acceptance of the plea. After his probationary sentence was revoked, the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly advise the petitioner of his potential range of punishment for the charged offenses prior to his acceptance of the plea. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is an appeal of a criminal contempt hearing in which the appellant father was found to be in contempt for non-payment of child support pursuant to court order. Upon review of the record, we vacate.

Irespectfully dissent from the conclusion that the incorrect release eligibility date (RED) was not a material part of the plea agreement. I do not believe the record justifies such a conclusion without an evidentiary hearing. I also do not believe that the habeas court should be the forum to determine whether the Petitioner should be entitled to withdraw his plea. Once the habeas court determines that an illegal sentence has been imposed and vacates the judgment of conviction, what then occurs in the original case should be left to the convicting court to decide.

The Petitioner, Darrell W. Lunsford, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that his sentence was illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Joseph R. Wiggins, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, he contends that the five-year sentence he received for a simple rape conviction in 1983, is illegal because of a defective indictment. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the State's motion is meritorious because the petitioner's challenged sentence has long expired and he is no longer "restrained of his liberty" pursuant to that conviction. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the dismissal.

The mother of a minor child appeals her conviction of eighteen counts of criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. She contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for criminal contempt. We agree and reverse the finding of the trial court.

The Nashville Metropolitan Council approved a Planned Unit Development (PUD) for a large residential subdivision to be constructed by Habitat for Humanity. The Metropolitan Planning Commission subsequently approved a site plan for the first phase of the subdivision, over the objections of neighboring landowners, who then challenged the approval by filing a petition for writ certiorari in the Chancery Court. The petitioners also mounted a challenge against the entire project based on the ground that the PUD had become"inactive" because construction had not yet begun, even though six years had passed since it was initially approved. The Planning Commission rejected the challenge, finding that the project was still "active" and, therefore, that the PUD did not have to go through the process of approval for a second time. The neighbors then filed a second petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court consolidated the two petitions and heard arguments that the procedures the Planning Commission followed in reaching its decisions violated the petitioners' constitutional rights. The court dismissed both petitions, ruling that the Planning Commission had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently, and that the petitioners' constitutional rights were not violated. We affirm.

The petitioner, Joseph C. Caldwell, Jr., pled guilty to robbery and aggravated burglary, both Class C felonies, and received a negotiated sentence of six years for each charge, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner's post-conviction petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves an inmate's efforts to obtain judicial review of a prison disciplinary board decision. After the trial court determined that the inmate's petition for writ of certiorari was time barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-9-102 (2000), the inmate filed both a notice of appeal and a letter requesting "another chance." Because the trial court ordered the letter sent to the appellee for a response but has not yet ruled on the relief sought in the letter, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Petitioners filed a Statutory Writ of Certiorari, seeking the review of respondents' action in granting the right to develop a landfill to Smith Mountain Solutions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _68-211-704. Petitioners did not timely verify their petitions and the Trial Judge dismissed the action on the ground he did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. Wife appeals from the trial court's decision denying her alimony in futuro and attorney's fees. After reviewing the record, we discern no error and affirm.

Lessee sued Lessor for specific performance and damages, alleging breach of contract after Lessor did not permit Lessee to exercise the option to purchase the property. Lessor moved to dismiss, claiming that Lessee failed to properly and timely exercise the option to purchase the property. Lessor filed a counterclaim, alleging breach of contract and damages. After a bench trial, the trial court held that Lessee properly and timely exercised the option to purchase the property. Lessor appeals. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property before the expiration of the Lease. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The parties own adjoining properties with a common party wall. The building belonging to Noel Montepeque and Celia M. Martinez (collectively "Party A") is one story, whereas the building of Joseph Adevai ("Party B") is two stories and overlooks Party A's roof. The party wall contains four windows on the second level of Party B's building. The bottom sills of two of these windows are below the roof line, thus creating open spaces between the party wall and Party A's roof. While Party A was in the process of having a new rubberized roof installed by a contractor, a dispute arose between the parties concerning the manner in which the new roof would be secured to the party wall. Actions allegedly taken by Mr. Adevai to remove the flashing covering the party wall windows eventually resulted in water damage to the existing roof and interior portions of Party A's building. Party A sued Mr. Adevai for compensatory damages and requested that Mr. Adevai be enjoined from committing further damage to the party wall. Mr. Adevai filed a counterclaim, alleging harassment and intimidation by Party A. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and awarded Party A damages for negligence, totaling $28,350.00. We affirm.

Plaintiffs filed suit against their employer, alleging common law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress due to their exposure to carbon monoxide in the workplace. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiffs' tort claims were barred by Tennessee's workers' compensation law. The trial court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs' injuries did not "arise out of" their employment. The employer's application for an extraordinary appeal was granted. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the employer.

This proceeding began in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court when the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition seeking to have Joseph A. (the "Child") declared dependent and neglected based on allegations of abuse committed by Douglas A. ("Father"). Katheryn B. ("Mother") was allowed to intervene. A guardian ad litem was appointed on the Child's behalf. The Juvenile Court found the Child to be dependent and neglected, and Father appealed that finding to the circuit court. While this case was pending in the circuit court, DCS voluntarily dismissed the original petition. Thereafter, the guardian ad litem filed a motion seeking payment of attorney fees and costs. The circuit court granted this motion and entered a judgment against DCS for the guardian ad litem's fees and expenses. DCS appeals. We vacate the order taxing the guardian ad litem fees and costs against DCS and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Phil Fuller, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court following the revocation of his probationary sentence. While on supervised probation, a violation warrant was issued alleging multiple violations of the defendant's probationary agreement. The defendant subsequently waived his right to a hearing and pled guilty to the violations. Afterwards, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered that the balance of the original effective sentence of three years and three months be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court's revocation but argues that the court erred in ordered him to serve the sentence in confinement rather than in fashioning a sentence involving split confinement. However, after review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.