APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Scott County jury found the Appellant Hubert Glenn Sexton guilty of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of Stanley and Terry Goodman. Following penalty phase, the jury found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, and that this aggravator outweighed any mitigating factors. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6). The jury imposed sentences of death. Appellant Sexton seeks review by this court of both his convictions for first degree murder and his sentences of death. He raises the following issues for our review: (I.) Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for change of venue; (II.) Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly admonish the jury before and during trial; (III.) Whether the trial court erred in failing to adequately voir dire the jury regarding extrajudicial information; (IV.) Whether the trial court erred in failing to excuse certain jurors for cause; (V.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting allegations of child sexual abuse; (VI.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the Appellant’s
willingness and later refusal to take a polygraph examination; (VII.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the Appellant’s wife; (VIII.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that was similar to the murder weapon; (IX.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an unrelated speeding arrest; (X.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Appellant alleges was unlawfully obtained from his vehicle; (XI.) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence relating to the preparation of Appellant’s IRS tax forms; (XII.) Whether individual and cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct
denied him a fair trial; (XIII.) Whether the convicting evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (XIV.) Whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (XV.) Whether Tennessee’s death penalty scheme is constitutional; and (XVI.) Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellants, Dar Es Salaam Cole and Thomas Lopez, were convicted by a Shelby County Jury of facilitation of the sale of 300 grams or more of cocaine and unlawful possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the above convictions and sentenced Cole and Lopez to nineteen years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, Lopez argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. In addition to these issues, Cole argues that (3) the traffic stop was racially motivated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause; (4) the jury was “impermissibly influenced” by (a) the presence of the prosecutor and defense counsel in the jury room during deliberations, and (b) comments by the trial court while instructing the jury; and (5) the trial court failed to discharge the jury when there was no probability for agreement and failed to charge “a deadlock (Kersey) instruction.” Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Brandon Stacy Lambert, was convicted of numerous drug related offenses, aggravated burglary, theft, and burglary. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of seventeen years. The appellant was granted probation and was ordered to complete the drug court program. After the appellant was dismissed from the drug court program, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant concedes a "technical violation" of the conditions of probation but requests that he once again be granted probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lindsi Allison Connors ("Mother") and Jeremy Phillip Lawson ("Father") are the parents of a daughter (the "Child") who currently is eight years old. Several parenting plans have been entered over the years. Mother eventually moved with the Child to Florida, and thereafter, Father filed a petition claiming there had been a material change in circumstances such that it was in the Child's best interest for him to be designated the primary residential parent. Father also sought to have Mother held in contempt of court. Following a hearing, the trial court found Mother in contempt but refused to mete out any punishment for the contemptuous conduct. The trial court made no mention in its final judgment as to the petition for a change in custody. The trial court then abdicated jurisdiction and instructed the parties to take up any future matters with the Florida courts. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Edward L. Hood, Jr., was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of incest, a Class C felony. He received consecutive sentences of twenty-three years and twenty-five years for the rape of a child convictions, and concurrent five-year sentences for each of the incest convictions, for an effective sentence of forty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hood argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) his right to a fair trial was violated when trial counsel announced that Hood was pleading guilty at the start of trial; (3) the trial court erred in preventing the victim’s sister from testifying for the defense at trial; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Property developer applied to the Town of Smyrna for a rezoning request for a planned development. The request was initially approved by the Planning Commission, but the Town Council later voted to deny the request. The developer appealed by writ of certiorari to the Rutherford County Chancery Court, which affirmed the decision. On appeal, the developer asserts that the Town Council’s action was arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

The defendant, James Porter McFarland, presents for our review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, second offense. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based upon his allegation that police subjected him to an unconstitutional investigative stop. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to suppress.

This is an action to enforce a promissory note. The plaintiff/appellee, a realty company, entered into an exclusive listing agreement with John Sporup for the sale of real property. The listing agreement provided for an eight percent commission in cash on the sale of the property. The realty company secured a buyer, the sale closed, and it received a portion of the commission owed. As an accommodation to the client, however, the realty company agreed to defer the unpaid portion of the commission. Mr. Sporup and his wife, co-owners of the corporation selling the property, signed a promissory note in their individual capacities providing for payment of the deferred commission in monthly installments with a balloon payment due at the end of three years. After the buyer defaulted, the Sporups declined to honor the terms of the promissory note, maintaining that payment of the remaining commission was conditioned on their receipt of the buyer's payments. The realty company filed this action to recover the unpaid commission, pre-judgment interest, and attorney's fees under the terms of the promissory note. The Sporups counterclaimed. The trial court awarded the realty company a judgment in the amount of $85,327.82 after a bench trial. Because the Sporups have not established a breach of fiduciary duty entitling them to an offsetting award of damages, we affirm.

The Defendant, Brian L. Tune, was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. Following the Loudon County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to suppress the breath alcohol test results, the defendant pled guilty to DUI, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months and 29 days in the county jail suspended to a community based alternative sentence. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the breath alcohol test results. However, we conclude the certified question is not dispositive. We also note that the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and provides no reason to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The son of a woman who died at the age of ninety-four filed a petition for probate in solemn form of his mother's lost will. After examining a photocopy of the alleged will and hearing proof from six witnesses, the trial court granted the petition. One of the granddaughters of the decedent appealed, and she has presented a number of arguments to suggest that the trial court erred. We have considered her arguments on appeal, but in the absence of a trial transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must assume that the trial court's decision is fully supported by the record. We accordingly affirm.

The trial court reduced a divorced husband's alimony obligation because of a decline in his income from existing and expected future reductions in his overtime hours at the Post Office. The wife argues on appeal that her medical condition continues to prevent her from working, so her need remains the same as it was before, and that a reduction in alimony is therefore unjustified, even if the husband's ability to pay declines. She also argues that the trial court erred in taking future reductions in husband's overtime hours into consideration, which she characterizes as speculative. We find that under the circumstances of this case the reduction in alimony ordered by the trial court did not constitute an abuse of its discretion, and we therefore affirm its judgment.

The Petitioner, Bobby Ervin, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The former attorney for the plaintiff, who is seeking to recover a contingency fee pursuant to an attorney's lien she filed after her services were terminated, filed this appeal challenging the trial court's finding that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement and the involuntary dismissal of the underlying personal injury action. The action was dismissed because the pro se plaintiff did not comply with orders of the court. The plaintiff's former attorney claims she has the independent right to enforce a settlement she negotiated, but which her client rejected, in order to recover a fee. The pro se plaintiff also seeks to set aside the involuntary dismissal of his case. Finding no merit to the arguments asserted on appeal, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Linda F. Cathey, of one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-104, -105(4) (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years' probation and ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $27,000. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, by imposing the maximum sentence of six years, and by ordering restitution without properly considering her ability to pay. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Marshall County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Ricky Lane McKnight, for violation of the Habitual Motor Offender Act and driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of three and one-half years. On appeal, the dDefendant argues that the trial court's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Defendant, Jerry Len Angus, was indicted in a seventeen-count indictment by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of official misconduct in violation of Tenn. Code Ann._ 39-16-402, nine counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-527, four counts of statutory rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13- 506, and one count of rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-503. Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of official misconduct, one count of attempt to commit sexual battery, a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of sexual battery, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of attempt to commit statutory rape, a lesser-included offense of statutory rape. The jury did not consider eight counts of the indictment as the trial court granted judgments of acquittal at the close of the State's proof, and defendant was acquitted by the jury of the remaining two counts. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, and following a hearing, the trial court vacated his conviction for official misconduct in Count 1 of the indictment for insufficiency of the evidence. The court granted a mistrial as to defendant's conviction for attempted sexual battery in Count 4, his conviction for official misconduct in Count 8, and his conviction for sexual battery in Count 11. In an amended order, the trial court also vacated defendant's conviction for official misconduct in Count 3 of the indictment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court's polling of the jury was improper and that he is entitled to a new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court's decision to allow Mother to relocate to California with the parties' minor child. Mother and Father lived separately in California when their only child was born. Mother moved with the minor child to Tennessee in April 2008; Father also moved to Tennessee to be near the child. A year later, Father filed a Petition to Register a Foreign Decree and Modify and Enforce Visitation in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. In June 2009, Mother notified Father she intended to return to California with their child and sought court permission to do so. When the juvenile court referee denied the relocation, Mother sought a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. Following a full hearing, the juvenile court judge granted Mother's request to relocate finding that Father, who did not have substantially equal parenting time, failed to carry his burden under the parental relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-108(d)(1). We affirm the trial court's findings that Father did not prove that Mother's move is not for a reasonable purpose, poses a specific or serious threat of harm to the child, or is vindictive. We also affirm the trial court's decision denying Mother's request for attorney's fees and deny her request for attorney's fees on appeal.

Defendant, Duantez Cornell Jenkins, was indicted for possession, within a school zone, and with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. In the same indictment, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr. (Archibald), was indicted for the same offense, in addition to two other charges. All charges were the result of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized which forms the basis of the charges against him. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissed the charges against defendant. The State appeals. Based upon the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Mary Cathleena Blindt, for three counts of prescription fraud, two counts of forgery, and one count each of theft, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, and failure to appear. Following guilty pleas and a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing, ordered consecutive sentencing, and imposed the maximum sentence within the range for three of the defendant's convictions. The defendant also correctly notes an error on the judgment forms. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments in part and remand the case for correction of an error on one of the judgment forms.

The defendant, Steven Cornell Gray, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but upon our review of the case, we affirm this conviction.

The pro se petitioner, Henry Johnson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. He was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated burglary and was sentenced to life imprisonment on August 19, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: the indictment against him was defective; the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or appointment of counsel; and he was subject to double jeopardy as a result of the indictment. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Matthew R. Hakoda, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court. The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child's primary residential parent and setting the mother's child support obligation. Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother's child support obligation. In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky. Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support. In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother's objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's request for modification of child support. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support.