APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after falling down a staircase while working on the construction of a home. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against the general contractorand the subcontractorresponsible for the construction ofthe custom staircase. The matter was tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding Plaintiff fifty percent at fault, the subcontractor thirty-five percent at fault, and the general contractor fifteen percent at fault. After his motion for new trial was denied, Plaintiff filed this appeal. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the subcontractor’s employees used marijuana while working on the construction of the staircase, and erred by excluding evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations of one of the subcontractor’s employees. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding notice, negligence, and foreseeability. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of alleged marijuana use or the evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations. Similarly, we find that the jury instructions on notice, negligence, and foreseeability were proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the  defendant, Jonathan Ray Swanner, of three counts of rape of a child, see T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2006), and one count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. § 39-13-504(a)(4). The trial court imposed sentences of 24 years’ incarceration for each rape of a child conviction and 11 years’ incarceration for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently at 100 percent. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not testify about the victim’s prior allegation of molestation resulted in a denial of the defendant’s right to testify; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use leading questions in its direct examination of the victim; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the victim; that the State violated the rules of discovery by not disclosing the victim’s statement prior to trial; and that the trial court erred by not giving a limiting jury instruction regarding prior inconsistent statements. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tennessee corporation located in Montgomery County filed a breach of contract action against a Tennessee corporation located in Sullivan Countyto collect moneyallegedlyowing for services rendered in North Carolina. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint because it concluded the proper venue was Sullivan County, where the defendant resides. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The plaintiff’s action is transitory and therefore governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-101. We conclude the cause of action arose in North Carolina and, pursuant to the statute, venue is proper in Tennessee where the defendant resides.
 

The defendant, Eric Ricardo Middleton, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; and tampering with the evidence, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the doctor who performed the autopsies on the victims to testify as an expert; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction that Mary Thompson, the co-defendant, was an accomplice as a matter of law; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jessie Lee Palmer, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Dyer County to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received four years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Palmer reserved certified questions of law addressing whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop and search of a taxicab in which Palmer was a passenger. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he has standing to challenge the search; (2) whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the car; (3) whether the taxicab driver’s consent to search was obtained as a result of an illegal stop; and (4) whether the evidence seized from the taxicab should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Lee McKinney, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his eight-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. Because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Respondent father asserts the petition for dependency and neglect filed by the Department of Children’s Services in juvenile court should be dismissed for insufficient service of process, and that Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(23) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Upon de novo appeal, the circuit court affirmed the finding of dependency and neglect and dismissed the Constitutional challenge. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Appellant, Jacob Haliburton, of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. He received a five and two year sentence, ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective seven year sentence. In this appeal, the Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury with instructions regarding duress and necessity; (3) whether the sentence imposed was excessive; and (4) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The state appeals from the post-conviction court’s judgment granting the petitioner a new sentencing hearing. A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner on two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court - Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court - sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent on all counts. The petitioner’s habeas corpus petition alleged that a release eligibility of thirty-five percent was illegal for his aggravated kidnapping convictions. The habeas court - Division Five of the Davidson County Criminal Court - agreed, and it vacated his sentences for aggravated kidnapping. The habeas court remanded the case to Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court - for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501. On remand, the trial court corrected the judgment forms to reflect the 100% release eligibility required by statute for the aggravated kidnapping convictions but did not conduct a hearing. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the corrected judgments were void and that the entry of corrected judgments violated double jeopardy. The post-conviction court - Division Eight of the Shelby County Criminal Court - granted relief, vacating the corrected judgments and remanding the case to Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new sentencing hearing. The state appeals the post-conviction court’s order, arguing that the only possible remedy for the petitioner was the entry of corrected judgments. Following our review, we reverse the postconviction court’s order granting relief and dismiss the post-conviction petition.

In this post-conviction appeal, we must determine whether Petitioner Henry Zillon Felts was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and attempted first degree murder. The post-conviction court vacated Petitioner’s convictions after concluding that trial counsel’s representation was ineffective because he: (1) pursued self-defense exclusively, rather than pursuing self-defense along with the alternative strategy of convincing the jury to convict Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and (2) failed to keep a promise to the jury made during opening statements that Petitioner would testify at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the courts below erred by concluding that trial counsel performed deficiently. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for reinstatement of Petitioner’s convictions.
 

This is an appeal from an order granting a partial summary judgment in an action to modify a final decree of divorce. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties but rather orders the remaining issues set for trial, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

Appellant appealed a non-final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendants, Eryk N. Carrasco and Luis Prieto, pled guilty as Range I offenders to possession with intent to deliver less than 0.5 gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), (c)(2)(A) (2010). Each defendant was sentenced to serve four years. The Defendants’ plea agreements reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to their arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kimberly Mangrum, was indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and four counts of criminal conspiracy, related to the commission of each of those offenses. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and felony murder. Her conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder was merged into her felony murder conviction, and she was sentenced to life imprisonment for her first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and asserts that the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment following what, Defendant contends, was the State’s misuse of the grand jury proceedings. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea to aggravated assault; and (2) that his plea was not voluntary as constitutionally required. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

While touring a model home in a new residential home development, the plaintiff fell when she failed to see a four-inch step as she walked from the foyer into the sunken living room. This premises liabilityaction followed. The defendant constructed, owned, and managed the model home in which the plaintiff fell. Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon two findings: that the defendant did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm upon the finding that the plaintiff cannot establish that a duty was owed to her by the defendant.
 

Appellant, Antonio Durrell Hubbard a/k/a Antonio Bradford, was indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, driving with a suspended license, and speeding. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the results of an inventory search. The motion to suppress was denied. After a trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver and driving on a suspended license. The speeding charge was dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant received an effective sentence of one year. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we determine the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Derrick Rice (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the trial court erred in denying extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of a witness and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Memphis Police Department terminated the employment of Petitioner Police Officer for conduct unbecoming an officer following a physical altercation with a parking lot attendant. On appeal pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the chancery court affirmed. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by refusing to admit additional evidence of disparate treatment in violation of his equal protection rights. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner filed pro se a writ of error coram nobis regarding two convictions for aggravated assault. The trial court summarily denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Alvin Young, of aggravated kidnapping and domestic assault. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, James David Moats, stands convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fourth or greater offense, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we conclude that under the facts of this case the police officer seized the defendant when she pulled up behind the defendant’s parked vehicle and activated her blue emergency lights. We further conclude that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure. As such, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dib Driver, was found guilty by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; six counts of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony; two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony; two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure,a Class D felony; attempted sexual battery,a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of attempted assault, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2010) (attempt), 39-13-101 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010) (assault), 39-13-505 (2010) (sexual battery), 39-13-527 (2010) (sexual battery by an authority figure), 39-13-529 (2010) (solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to serve ten years for solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, five years for two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, four years for six counts of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, three years for two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, eleven months and twenty-nine days for attempted sexual battery, and thirty days for two counts of attempted assault. The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences yielding an effective fifteen-year sentence for these offenses. After the convictions, the Defendant pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, pertaining to a count of the indictment that was severed from the counts charging sexual offenses. See id., § 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping). The court imposed a twelve-year sentence consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence for the other convictions, for a final effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his two motions for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

The defendant, Robert Lee Adams, fled justice while the jury was deliberating numerous charges against him stemming from his participation in a drug-related shooting in 2007. The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced in absentia to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty years. The defendant’s trial counsel filed a timely motion for new trial. In response, the State moved to dismiss the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the defendant had abandoned his right to proceed by absconding from the court’s jurisdiction. After a hearing held while the defendant was still in absentia, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trialpursuantto the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and allowed the defendant’s trialcounsel to withdraw soon thereafter. Weeks later, the defendant was returned to custody, filed a pro se notice of appeal, and was appointed new counsel. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by dismissing his motion for a new trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his trial counsel’s motion for a continuance; and (4) the trial court applied improper enhancement factors when it sentenced him for his conspiracy and aggravated robbery convictions. The State argues that we must dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that he was a fugitive from justice but that, nonetheless, we have jurisdiction to review his appeal now that he has been returned to custody. The absence of a motion for new trial, however, limits our appellate review to considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and his sentencing. After thorough review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s convictions and thatthe trial court committed no error in sentencing the defendant for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. While we conclude that the trial court may have erroneously applied one of the several enhancement factors it used when it sentenced the defendant for aggravated robbery, in light of the applicable sentencing principles, remaining enhancement factors, and the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was appropriate. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal concerns a note executed by Robert Denton (“Husband”) and Susan L. Denton (“Wife”) and payable to Husband’s sister, Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz (“Lender”). When Lender sought recovery of the note, Wife denied liability and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations for recovery of the note had passed. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case as it related to Wife. Lender filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to amend the complaint, which were denied. Lender appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.