APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, David Eugene Dunlap, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm after having been convicted
of a crime of violence, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to
sell or deliver, and that the trial court erred by declining to sentence him under the amended
Drug-Free Zone statute. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, Geoffrey Ian Paschel, guilty of aggravated
kidnapping, domestic assault, and interference with emergency communications. He was
sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by twice denying a mistrial following improperly
admitted evidence; (2) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and placed too much
weight on the testimony of his ex-wife in sentencing; and (3) the cumulative impact of the
errors warrants a new trial. Upon review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Charles Jonathan Murphy, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years at 100 % in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him by misapplying an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing
Strickland (“Mother”) filed a motion to modify the permanent parenting plan governing
the custody and visitation of two children from her prior marriage to Stephen Rushing
(“Father”). The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“Trial Court”) granted the motion
and modified the permanent parenting plan to designate Mother the primary residential
parent and grant her 265 co-parenting days and Father 100 co-parenting days. Father has
appealed. Upon our review of the final order, we conclude that the Trial Court
erroneously considered Mother’s gender in determining that a material change in
circumstance had occurred affecting the children’s best interest and that its finding that
the best interest factors did not favor one parent over the other demonstrates that Mother
failed to carry her burden of proof. We accordingly reverse the Trial Court’s
modification of the permanent parenting plan. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on
appeal is denied.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not
filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Pro se Petitioner, Bruce Parks, Jr., appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s claim that the State failed to give notice
of enhancement factors or its intent to seek consecutive sentencing is not cognizable in a
Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct
an illegal sentence.

The Defendant, Desmond Anderson, was convicted of three offenses in 2013, and the trial
court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years consisting of
concurrent sentences of varying lengths. The trial court awarded pretrial jail credit on
Count 1 but did not do so in Counts 2 or 3. The Defendant later filed a motion pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 seeking to have appropriate pretrial jail credit
awarded on all concurrent sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion,
concluding that the request was an administrative matter for the Tennessee Department of
Correction. The Defendant appealed, and the State concedes error. We agree. We
respectfully vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for entry of corrected
judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to award appropriate pretrial jail credit on all concurrent
sentences.

After a car accident, a plaintiff sued a defendant, but never served him with process.  Almost two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as time-barred.  The plaintiff opposed the dismissal and moved for an enlargement of time to serve the defendant.  The court denied the requested enlargement and dismissed the case.  We affirm.

Following the denial of her application for a beer permit, Amanda B. Wolfe (“Ms. Wolfe”)
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (the “trial
court”) against Surgoinsville Beer Board (the “Beer Board”) and the Town of Surgoinsville
(collectively, “the City”), seeking a trial de novo. Ms. Wolfe contended that the Beer Board
incorrectly reviewed her application for a beer permit under a newly amended ordinance.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Ms. Wolfe’s favor, ordering the issuance of her
beer permit and finding that the amended ordinance lacked a rational basis. Having
reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Paul Watson, pled guilty to possessing more than one-half gram
of cocaine with intent to sell within a drug-free zone and received a fifteen-year sentence
to be served at one hundred percent. More than ten years later, he filed a motion to be
resentenced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). The trial court
held a hearing, granted the Defendant’s motion, and resentenced him to fifteen years with
eight years to be served at one hundred percent and the remainder to be served at a thirtyfive
percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and that, in any event,
the Defendant’s sentence is not illegal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the
parties’ briefs, we agree with the Defendant, reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial
court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Raffell M. Griffin, Jr., was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to sell or deliver more than twenty-six grams of cocaine in a drug-free
zone, a Class B felony, and first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-
417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-12-103
(2018) (conspiracy), 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder). The jury found that the Defendant committed a criminal gang offense,
enhancing by one level the felony classification of the convictions. See id. § 40-35-121
(2019) (subsequently amended) (gang enhancement). The trial court imposed a twentyfive
year sentence for the conspiracy conviction, to be served consecutively with a life
sentence for the murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder; (2)
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing
Investigator Philip Jinks to testify as an expert in gang investigations; (4) the trial court
failed to conduct an adequate investigation of alleged juror misconduct; and (5) the trial
court failed to apply mitigating factors in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This appeal arises from a will contest by the decedent’s children. Counsel for the contestants and counsel for the executrix engaged in settlement negotiations on behalf of their clients. The executrix submitted a motion to enforce the settlement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the Probate Court granted the motion and entered an order of voluntary dismissal of the contestants’ claims with prejudice. The contestants appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Roger Scott Herbison, entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted
sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted aggravated sexual exploitation
of a minor in exchange for an effective four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and the
Defendant’s placement on the sex offender registry. As a part of his plea, the Defendant
sought to reserve a certified question of law, concerning whether probable cause existed
for issuance of a search warrant, which was the subject of an unsuccessful suppression
motion. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review, we
are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the Defendant’s claim, and we dismiss his
appeal.

The petitioner, Rodney Earl Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Roger Jay Hollowell, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order
revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve in confinement the
balance of his sentence for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession of .5 grams or more
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, McArthur Bobo, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction
relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Johnathan Issac Gradell Allen, Defendant, pleaded guilty to arson and was sentenced to four-and-one-half years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not sentencing him to an alternative sentence and by imposing an excessive sentence. Defendant also claims that the State’s negligent handling of certain sentencing documents caused an unreasonable delay in his transfer from the jail to prison thereby delaying the date of his parole hearing. After a thorough review of the record, applicable law, and the briefs, we affirm.

The petitioner, Justin L. Kiser, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged his five convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping,
alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Donte Jenkins, a.k.a. Antonio Donte Gordon Jenkins, of second degree murder and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; (2) failing to declare a mistrial after a State’s witness testified that the Defendant had an outstanding warrant; (3) allowing portions of a witness’s testimony from the juvenile transfer hearing to be read into evidence; (4) allowing evidence that had not been presented during trial into the jury room during deliberations; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. We respectfully conclude that the jury should not have been instructed on criminal responsibility and that the error was not harmless. For this reason, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and remand for a new trial. Finally, although we also affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for reckless endangerment, we remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that this sentence is not currently aligned consecutively to any other sentence.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Deshaun “Bushwick” Tate, of first degree
premeditated murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal, his motion for new trial, and his motion to suppress
witness identification. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Kellum Williams, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) sufficiently emphasize at trial the theory that the victim died in Montgomery County rather than in Robertson County, as testified to by the State’s experts; (2) seek an independent expert “to test samples from the crime scene”; (3) raise as a defense that venue of the trial should have been in Robertson County instead of Montgomery County; and (4) more extensively question witnesses to demonstrate Petitioner’s “non-participation in the events leading to [the victim’s] death.” Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence as barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution
after finding the plaintiff could not establish that the defendants had initiated the issuance
of a criminal warrant without probable cause and with malice. Discerning no error, we
affirm the trial court.