APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Humberto Lopez, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and resulting effective sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not advised by trial counsel or the trial court about the immigration consequences of his pleas. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Louis Dancy, charging him with the second degree murder of Charles Williams. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a sentence of eighteen years and six months as a Range I, violent offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving the jury a sequential instruction, which charged the jury that it must first acquit Defendant of the greater offense before considering any lesser offense. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, BarrySmelley, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court should be reversed for failing to make findings on his specific claims and that counsel’s uniateral decision to release a witness from a subpoena violated his rights to compulsory process and to present a defense. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Andre Jon Simmons, II, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Madison County to possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of ten years, suspended to probation. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), Simmons attempted to reserve the following certified question of law: “Whether the cocaine and oxycodone should have been suppressed by the Circuit Court for an illegal stop and search of Andre Jon Simmons.” Because the certified question fails to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider it. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed.

The appellant, Larry E. Rathbone, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of attempted rape of a child. He received a total effective sentence of fifty-six years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification and division of marital property. Wife appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of certain expert testimony and the grant of Husband’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to vacate the award of alimony. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
 

This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties had one child; they divorced in 2005. Initially, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent. The father filed a petition for modification, seeking to be designated as primary residential parent. The modification petition cited, inter alia, the mother’s attempts to frustrate the father’s visitation and alleged physical assaults by the mother. The trial court entered an order temporarily designating the father as primary residential parent and requiring that the mother’s visitation be supervised. The mother’s attorney was to supervise her client’s visitation, but was disqualified after it was alleged that the attorney failed to supervise the visitation. After a three-day hearing, the trial court granted the father’s petition to modify and held the mother in contempt for the unsupervised parenting time. The mother now appeals, representing herself. The trial court declined to approve the mother’s proposed statement of the evidence because a court reporter was present at the trial, citing the provision in Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure indicating that an appellant is to have a transcript prepared where a stenographic report is available. The mother proceeded with the appeal with neither a transcript nor a statement of the evidence. We vacate the finding of criminal contempt because the record does not show that the mother was advised of her right to appointed counsel on the contempt. We also vacate the award of attorney fees and expenses insofar as it relates to the vacated contempt finding, and affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s ruling.

This appeal arises out of a change of custody petition filed by the father of a minor child. The Juvenile Court magistrate found a material change of circumstances but retained the mother as primary residential parent. Father filed a request for rehearing before the Juvenile Court judge. Before the rehearing could be held, the guardian ad litem filed a motion requesting that the magistrate review the parenting plan and stay its prior order based on the mother’s drug use, domestic abuse, and marital problems. Thereafter, the magistrate entered an order staying its prior order and naming father the primary residential parent. The Juvenile Court judge held a trial de novo and entered an order finding that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest for the father to be designated the primary residential parent. The mother was ordered to pay the father’s attorney fees and a portion of the guardian ad litem’s fees. The mother appeals. We affirm the court’s decision to designate the father as the primary residential parent, its award of attorney fees to the father, and the award of fees to the guardian ad litem. We remand for determination of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.
 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights, persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, and abandonment by failure to maintain a suitable home. The trial court also found that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.
 

In 1994, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stephen L. Beasley, of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on appeal. State v. Stephen Lujan Beasley, No. 03C01-9509-CR-00268, 1996 WL 591203, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 10, 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 27, 1998). After a somewhat lengthy procedural history, the Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to “instruct trial jury and argue murder in perpetration of felony reckless.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he has been subjected to multiple punishments for the same crime, arguing that the jury violated his constitutional rights when it applied the felonymurder aggravating circumstance to his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. He does not contest his sentence for life in prison but contests the jury’s decision that he not have the possibility of parole. The Petitioner states that because he was convicted of premeditated murder, the jury improperly applied the felony murder aggravator as a basis for imposing his “without parole” sentence. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The plaintiff from a case that was dismissed in 2002 by agreed order filed a motion nine years after the dismissal to “extend the judgment” from that case and for injunctive relief. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the motion.

The defendant, Derek Coleman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter, employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault, all Class C felonies. He was subsequently sentenced to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, six years for the firearm conviction, and five years for the aggravated assault. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient and affirm the convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Charlton Garner, of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he petitioned the Shelby County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present a witness suggested by petitioner and failure to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Zona Mayo (“Plaintiff”) sued Donna L. Shine, M.D., Fort Sanders Obstetrical and Gynecological Group, P.C., and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) alleging medical malpractice in connection with Plaintiff’s birth. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding that neither Dr. Shine nor the Hospital were legally responsible for any harm suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals raising issues regarding alleged jury misconduct and alleged errors with regard to admission of evidence, among other things. We find and hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial due to errors in the admission of specific evidence and the improper limitation of Plaintiff’s cross-examination of Dr. Shine, among other things. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court for a new trial in compliance with this Opinion.

Joseph Wells (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve thirty days of periodic confinement followed by two years of probation. The Defendant has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, erred in denying full probation, and erred in relying on hearsay statements in imposing sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of second-offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving with an expired license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after seven months’ incarceration, on the second-offense DUI, and to a concurrent six months on the charge of driving on an expired license, for a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant claims that: the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to enter evidence pertaining to his tumultuous relationship with a woman; the trial court erred by denying his motion to recuse; the trial court erred by denying his motion to investigate juror dissatisfaction with the verdict; and the sentences imposed were excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wife appeals the final decree of divorce, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to make findings as to what property constituted separate property and what constituted marital property; Wife also appeals the amount of alimony awarded to her. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property and, accordingly, vacate the division of marital property and remand the case for the court to classify the parties’ property and debt and to modify the division of marital property if necessary. We affirm the trial court’s holding that an award of alimony to Wife is appropriate, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony.
 

Mother challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She asserts that the Departmentof Children’sServicesfailed to makereasonable efforts to find a suitable relative placement. We find no merit in Mother’s arguments and affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury found appellant, JimmyEsters, guilty of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range I, standard offender, to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to appellant; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is a reconsideration case. The employee settled his claim for one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in 2007. In 2008, his employer merged with a second company to form a new corporate entity. The employee continued to be employed by the new entity in the same location, working under the same collective bargaining agreement that he had been under prior to his injury. The trial court found that he had lost his employment for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(B) and awarded additional permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that a loss of employment occurred. In the alternative, Employer argues that the evidence preponderates against an award of additional benefits. We affirm the judgment.
 

Plaintiff, was general contractor for the renovation of a private club, and employed defendant to install flooring at the club. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages incurred when plaintiff was sued by the club which obtained judgment for damages against plaintiff for the defective floor, as well as for attorney's fees for defending the action and other expenses. Defendant moved to dismiss the action, relying on the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-202. The Trial Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the action, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This action originated in Sessions Court, when the plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant had confiscated an automobile of plaintiff's over a disputed debt for repairs on another vehicle. The Circuit Judge refused to award either party damages, but ordered plaintiff's vehicle to be returned to him. Plaintiff appealed to Circuit Court, which inter alia held that plaintiff was entitled to damages of $663.88. Defendant was awarded $663.88 under its counter-complaint. The Court said the two awards offset each other and dismissed all claims and taxed costs equally. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted Defendant, Ricky Dean Harvey, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on a related charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. A fourth count of the indictment was resolved in a bench trial wherein the trial court found Defendant violated the implied consent law. The DUI charge was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eleven years for the cocaine conviction, concurrent with the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver; (2) the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle and the resulting arrest of Defendant violated Defendant’s constitutional rights and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; and (4) Defendant “[l]acked the [m]ental [c]apacity for the [a]rrest and [t]rial [h]eld in this [m]atter.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jake L. Monroe, alias, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance within a drug-free school zone, a class B felony. The Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment.

This appeal involves a suit to restrain a surviving wife from inheriting from her deceased husband. Husband’s daughter filed a complaint against wife, alleging that wife intentionally killed husband, thereby forfeiting any right to inherit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-1-106. When wife was convicted of first degree murder, Daughter filed a motion for summary judgment and attached the judgment of conviction. The court granted the motion, finding that no genuine issues of fact remained because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded litigation of whether wife killed husband. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.