APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Michael W. Hunter, was indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to 10 years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals his conviction and assigns the following errors: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a garbage bag found in Defendant’s vehicle after the robbery; and 2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by improperly arguing facts not in evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1995, the Defendant, Marcus Deangelo Lee a/k/a Marcus Deangelo Jones, pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon with intent to commit a crime, and sale of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in the county workhouse. Between 2006 and present, the Petitioner has filed several pleadings challenging his convictions, including a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, a postconviction petition, a motion for delayed appeal, and a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. All of these motions were denied or dismissed, and this Court affirmed their denial or dismissal. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a “Motion For Clarification and Correction of Clerical Error in Judgment . . . [,]” alleging that the 1995 handwritten judgments were obscured and illegible. The trial court reviewed the judgments, found them legible and without error, and denied the Defendant’s motion. It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals. Finding that the Defendant has no right of appeal from the denial of a Motion to Correct a Clerical Error, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

This case involves the denial of a handgun carry permit by the Department of Safety to an individual who had previously been convicted of a felony and sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction. The applicant appealed to the General Sessions Court, which reversed the decision of the Department of Safety. The Department of Safety then appealed to Circuit Court, which affirmed the General Sessions Court and held that the applicant was entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit because his full civil rights had been restored upon the issuance of a Certificate of Restoration of Voting Rights. We hold that the applicant is not entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit pursuant to Tennessee law because the applicant’s right to seek and hold public office has not been restored by a court of competent jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded.
 

The Petitioner, Taurus Merriweather, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that counsel provided the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors. Plaintiffs live in a home next door to the defendant neighbor. The defendant neighbor embarked on a campaign of harassment that included, among other things, blasting an air horn in the wee hours on intermittent nights. The air horn blasts occurred on over forty nights. The plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the noisome neighbor, seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Summonses were issued on two occasions, but no return of summons was filed with the trial court. The defendant neighbor wrote a pro se letter to the trial court, acknowledging receipt of a notice of hearing, but no other papers, and stating that he would not appear at the hearing. After the hearing, the trial court issued an injunction and awarded a default judgment for compensatory damages to the plaintiffs. The defendant neighbor then filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment, based on failure to serve process. This motion was granted. Pursuant to the defendant neighbor’s motion, the trial court then dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the defendant neighbor’s pro se letter constituted an appearance and that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and dismissing the complaint. We affirm.

The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside a second order of voluntary nonsuit in this medical malpractice action. We affirm.

Gary Allen Carlton (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a bench trial of one count of impersonating a licenced professional and one count of violating the Home Improvement Contractors Licensing Act. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of two years, with 120 days to be served and the remainder on probation. The Defendant has appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ray Jerome Odom, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to felony murder and aggravated assault. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 18 years confinement, to be served at 100 percent. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Alan Ray Hall, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction of first degree murder, contending that the trial court erroneously advised him during the plea proceedings that he was potentially eligible for release after service of twenty- five years of his life sentence. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the issue was previously determined, that the judgment was not void, and that the sentence had not expired. The petitioner appeals this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Randy Boxley, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the identification evidence was faulty, and without this, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey O. Short a.k.a. Jeffery O’Neal Short a.k.a. Jeffrey Oneal Short, pleaded guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of burglary of a business, a Class D felony. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Short to serve the sentences consecutively. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joseph Alfonso Sigala (“the Defendant”) pleaded guiltyto two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft between $1,000 and $10,000, but the plea left open the issue of sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective five-and-a-half-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the Defendant’s social networking web page as an exhibit; (2) denying judicial diversion; (3) improperly applying the statutory enhancing and mitigating factors; (4) finding that the Defendant lacked credibility; and (5) denying the Defendant probation. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rhonda Medley (“the petitioner” or “the defendant”) was convicted by a jury of five counts of rape of a child. Her convictions were affirmed on appeal. She filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, she asserts that her trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to advise her properly regarding her right to testify at trial and by failing to call certain witnesses. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jerome Sidney Barrett, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for a 1975 homicide. See T.C.A. § 39-2403 (1975) (amended 1979, 1985) (renumbered at § 39-2-211) (repealed 1989). He was sentenced to forty-four years, to be served consecutively to a life sentence for a previous conviction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the prosecution due to excessive pre-indictment delay; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the Defendant stated he “had killed before”; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask a defense witness whether he was arrested, suspended, and had resigned from the police force in 1978; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the forensic pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy to testify as an expert in DNA analysis; (7) the trial court erred in permitting impeachment of a defense witness with evidence of a misdemeanor conviction; (8) the trial court erred in imposing a forty-four year sentence; and (9) the trial court erred in ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s life sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, we are asked to address the question of whether the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law of 1987, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-39-401 through 406, or the Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., negate the provisions of ordinances passed by Appellees, the Town of Middleton, Tennessee and the Town of Whiteville, Tennessee, which granted Appellant, the City of Bolivar and its municipal utility, the right to franchise in the Appellee towns. We conclude that: (1) Appellants may be liable for both franchise fees under the ordinances, and for payments in lieu of taxes under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law because franchise fees are not in the nature of taxes on the valuation of property and are “operating expenses” for the privilege of doing business; (2) although the ordinances initially granted Bolivar’s utility exemption from payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees, by resolution, Bolivar waived its exemption and is now obligated to make payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law; (3) to the extent that the Whiteville ordinance conflicts with Bolivar’s statutory right to charge consumers for the actual costs of its services (which would include the franchise fee expenses), it is void; (4) the trial court’s award of pendente lite payments to Appellees was not reversible error in light of our holding that Appellees were (and are) entitled to the franchise fees. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

David M. Jones (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder, with no agreement as to sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ incarceration, consecutive to a prior conviction. The Defendant has appealed the length of his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Larsen, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The transcript from the guilty plea hearing indicates that Larsen attempted to reserve a certified question of law on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Although the judgment form references an attachment setting out Larsen’s certified question of law, no such attachment appears in the appellate record. Moreover, the record contains no corrective order filed prior to the filing of the notice of appeal in this case. Because Larsen failed to properly reserve a certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the settlement of a lawsuit. Teresa Larkin died in 2003, with her life insurance proceeds and her estate passing to her husband, Dale Larkin (“Larkin”). Teresa Larkin’s minor daughter, Tia Gentry (“Gentry”), sued Larkin, her stepfather, alleging that he caused the death of her mother and that, as a result, he should not receive any life insurance proceeds or inheritance because of the “Slayer’s Statute.” Gentry and Larkin settled the lawsuit and split the life insurance proceeds and the estate of Teresa Larkin. Later, Larkin was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin. Gentry filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), seeking to overturn the agreement based upon fraud in the inducement as Larkin had represented that he did not kill Teresa Larkin. Larkin filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court held that the issues in this lawsuit already had been, or could have been, litigated, and, as inequitable as the result might seem in light of Larkin’s conviction for first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin, Gentry’s lawsuit must be dismissed. Gentry appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, James W. Gann, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and setting fire to personal property, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eight years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Billy McFarland, pled guilty to one count of failure to timely report as a violent sexual offender, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-204(b), -208. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anthony Laren Tweedy, II (“the Defendant”) was convicted of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, the Defendant requests that this Court, under a plain error review, dismiss his conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine. He also asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant does not appeal his conviction for possession of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine. We also reduce his conviction from felony to misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and affirm as modified. However, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Jerry Rommell Gray, guilty of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of imprisonment for life plus fifteen years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the State to present fingerprint evidence in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The appellant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to take additional fingerprints of the appellant during trial. Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding accomplice testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dwayne Jabbar Seales,appeals from the summary dismissal of his March 30, 2011 petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. On December 19, 2002, the Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault and domestic assault, and following his 2011 arrest on an unrelated charge, immigration removal proceedings have been initiated against the Petitioner based upon his 2002 guilty plea convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that due process requires tolling of the post-conviction limitations period because of trial counsel’s failure to inform him of the deportation consequences of his plea. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

On February 23, 2012, M. Shane Mills (“Defendant”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on January 24, 2012. On June 12, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Defendant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Defendant did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Defendant, James W. Rembert, entered an open plea to offenses alleged in two separate indictments: a four-count indictment for burglary, theft, vandalism, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and an additional indictment for aggravated perjury.On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was error because the trial court “erroneously presumed” that the Defendant was on bond for offenses in the four-count indictment when the offense of aggravated perjury was committed. Because no error of law requiring a reversal of the judgment is apparent on the record, and the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.