APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and possession of drug paraphernalia. After the denial of a motion to suppress, he was convicted by a jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years, to be served consecutively to two other sentences. This court dismissed the notice of appeal because it was filed before the trial court issued a final order from which to appeal. See State v. Gregory O. Cherry, No. W2006-00015-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2155740, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2007). The defendant then filed a “Petition for Delayed Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court denied, and this appeal followed. On appeal, he challenges: (1) the denial of the motion to suppress his statement and the evidence obtained by a warrantless search of his vehicle; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the priority of two liens, a mechanic’s lien and a bank’s deed of trust.
We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
bank. We have further determined that the mechanic’s lien is entitled to priority and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment on that issue.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and/or deliver, possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Kenneth L. Davis, No W2008-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 160927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request to amend his petition a third time and when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the post-conviction court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Before receiving medical treatment for that condition, he accepted an offer from his employer to resign in exchange for a lump sum payment of his retirement benefits. The offer was unrelated to the work injury. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) limited the employee’s award of benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in light of his voluntary retirement. On the date scheduled for trial, the trial court declined to hear evidence or permit an offer of proof concerning the voluntariness of his retirement and the extent of his vocational disability. Judgment was entered awarding permanent partial disability of one and one-half times the medical impairment. The employee has appealed. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a determination on the merits of the case.

This appeal concerns a car dealership’s protest of Hyundai’s proposal to enter into a
franchise agreement with another dealership in the same market area. During the pendency
of a contested case proceeding, the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission issued a license
to the second dealership, which began doing business. Denied relief at the administrative
level, the protesting dealership filed a petition in chancery court. The chancellor found that
the motor vehicle commission had erred in dismissing the contested case proceeding of the
protesting dealership, but dismissed the petition based upon the conclusion that the matter
was now moot. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion and affirm.

The Defendant, Nicole Starcher, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and three counts of passing a worthless check, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -121. Following a sentencing hearing, at which the trial court denied judicial diversion, the Defendant was sentenced to three years enhanced probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her application for judicial diversion. Because the trial court failed to adequately state upon the record the basis for its denial of the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion, we vacate the Defendant’s sentences and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing and correction of the judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Xavier Bell, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range I, standard offender, to serve nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted recordings of the Defendant’s jail telephone conversations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Mike Dwayne Rahming, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summarily dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner pled guilty to Class D felony burglary and received a two-year probated sentence in 2007. In 2011, he filed the instant petition for relief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal,hecontends that the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal resulted in a violation of his due process rights. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the statute of limitation applies, we find no error in the post-conviction court’s dismissal.

Douglas Emory Carlton (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for burglary. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement made to police officers. He also alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

In 2005, the Petitioner, Tony Chandler, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft under $500, two counts of aggravated robbery, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and burglary. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of sixteen years. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and for a writ of error coram nobis. The State filed a motion to dismiss because the petition was untimely filed. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition without a hearing. Following our review of the record and the law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to serve twenty-five years in prison. He appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and contending that the victim’s identification of him to the sexual assault nurse should have been excluded as hearsay. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the identification was properly admitted into evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The order from which the appellant, Jerry Burkes, seeks to appeal was entered on Monday, October 24, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Monday, November 28, 2011, the 35th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Joseph May (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner contends that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. This appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The order from which the appellant, Randy Bernard Braswell, Sr., seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, April 18, 2012. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Friday, June 29, 2012, the 72nd day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Leon Flannel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of murder in the perpetration of a theft and one count of premeditated murder; the convictions were merged, and the petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for life. After the denial of his direct appeal, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner urges that, because he expressed his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel prior to trial, his trial counsel should have withdrawn. The trial court found no deficiency in the petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance and no resulting prejudice. After a thorough review of the petitioner’s claim, we affirm.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for the failure to visit or support. On appeal, Mother asserts the trial court erred by determining that her failure to visit or support her children was willful. We affirm.

The petitioner, Gerraldo White, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing an attorney to represent him, without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised, and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the State’s brief opposing his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has asserted no colorable claim to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Darryl Thompson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of forty years. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly advise him of the consequences of pleading outside his range. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Robin Paul Cagle (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery, alleging that his guilty plea was constitutionally infirm and that it was entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Shaun Danielle Stafford, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction of selling more than .5 grams of methamphetamine and resulting sentence of fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, she contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jason Peter Meeks, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, and leaving the scene of an accident, all misdemeanor offenses. The Defendant appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, contending that he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to record his trial. We disagree with the Defendant’s claim and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Byndum, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for two violations of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordering him to serve his six-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order appointing a conservator for the adult son of divorced parents. The father contends that the evidence does not support the determinations that the son lacks the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator is warranted; Mother contends that the father does not have standing to appeal. We affirm the court in all respects.

The parties married twice and divorced twice. Under the terms of their second divorce decree, the wife was awarded the marital home, the husband and wife were made jointly responsible for the mortgage on the home, and the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $1,200 per month. About five years after their second divorce became final, the husband filed a petition to terminate or to modify his alimony obligation. He alleged among other things that his income had declined and that his wife no longer needed his support, as demonstrated by her conveyance of the marital home without consideration to the party’s son, and her relationship with her new boyfriend. For her part, the wife petitioned the trial court to increase the husband’s alimony obligation, alleging that her need had actually increased because her physical ailments had worsened and that the monthly cost of medications to treat them had soared. The trial court denied both petitions. We affirm

The appellant, Glenda Nash Clemmons, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to failure to appear in case numbers 8109 and 8721. In case number 8109, the trial court sentenced her to two years to be served as sixty days in jail and one year, ten months in community corrections. In case number 8271, the trial court sentenced her to three years to be served in community corrections and consecutively to the two-year sentence in case number 8109. Subsequently, the trial court revoked her community corrections sentences and ordered her to serve her effective five-year sentence in confinement. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her community corrections sentences and ordering her to serve her original sentences in confinement. She also contends that she did not receive all the jail credits to which she was entitled. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.