APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree fully with the majority’s analysis in this case. I concur separately only to add a comment as to the portion of the opinion on the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff is a business owner who was informed by the City of Milan that his business license would not be renewed because the City had determined that he was a “transient merchant” within the meaning of the City’s municipal code. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking an injunction preventing the City from prohibiting the operation of his business. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that Plaintiff was a transient merchant. The trial court agreed and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Kevin Abston, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2000, an affidavit of complaint was issued charging “John Doe” with an aggravated rape that had occurred in 1994. The affidavit, which included a detailed DNA profile of “John Doe,” led to the issuance of an arrest warrant. In 2008, police officers discovered that fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime matched those of the defendant. Later, police determined that the DNA profile was that of the defendant,and a superseding indictmentwas issued in his name. The defendant was tried and convicted of attempted aggravated rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Court  of Criminal  Appeals affirmed, holding that the “John Doe” warrant with the DNA profile was adequate to identify the defendant and commence prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. Because the issue is one of first impression in this state, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that a criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile. Furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant’s proper name provides the requisite notice of the charge. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted appellant, Benjamin Murrell, of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to open Fred F. Crumley, Sr.’s estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed a claim. Administrator argued that the statute of limitations barred recovery on any claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare. The trial court agreed with Administrator and dismissed the claim. The Bureau of TennCare appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Purchaser of condominium at delinquent tax sale sought excess funds remaining after taxes and court costs had been paid. Purchaser prepared a Quitclaim Deed that transferred Taxpayer’s title and redemption rights in property to Purchaser. Purchaser next prepared a Deed of Correction that corrected the spelling of Taxpayer’s name, but that also included a clause purporting to transfer to Purchaser Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds. Purchaser then prepared an Assignment of Excess Funds Payout that also purported to transfer Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds to Purchaser. Trial court awarded excess funds to Taxpayer rather than to Purchaser after finding there was no meeting of the minds and that Purchaser failed to carry his burden of proving he provided consideration for Taxpayer’s conveyance of the excess funds to him. Purchaser appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We conclude there was no consideration for the Assignment of Excess Funds Payoutand that the Deed of Correction is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person for a document titled Deed of Correction to transfer a right to receive $14,000 of excess funds to a purchaser of property.

This appeal involves an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses by the respondent prison disciplinary board. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions for the disciplinary offenses. The trial court found that the inmate’s petition was not timely filed, and therefore that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm.

The petitioner, Denny McAbee, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael R. Malone, pled guilty to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior three-year sentence for which he was on community corrections at the time he committed the present offense. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Avery, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and attempted second degree murder and was sentenced to an effective term of forty-nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After reviewing the record, we must conclude that the petitioner failed to establish his claim. Accordingly, the denial of relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Joshua M. Faulk, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and reinstatement of his original ten-year sentence for aggravated burglary, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his sentence based on new charges of theft and vandalism. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves claims against a decedent’s estate. After claims were filed against the decedent’s estate, the co-executors filed exceptions to the claim and attached a letter previously sent to the claimant discussing their objections to the claims. The probate court held that the co-executors had excepted to the claims only on the basis of timeliness, and that objections in the attached letter would not be considered additional exceptions. The co-executors argued that the claims were void and unenforceable irrespective of whether exceptions were filed; the probate court did not expressly rule on this contention. The claims against the estate were found to be timely filed, so the claims were reduced to judgments against the estate without a hearing on their merits. The co-executors appeal. We affirm in part and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 on the issue of whether the claims against the estate are unenforceable or void on their face.

The defendant, Howard Lavelle Tate, was convicted of two counts of the sale of over 0.5 grams of a schedule II controlled substances, both Class B felonies, possession of over 26 grams of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant received an effective sentence of forty-seven years. The defendant challenges his convictions, asserting that the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence seized from his home without a search warrant; (2) admitting evidence that was improperly preserved with no established chain of custody; (3) allowing the State to present inconsistent evidence regarding the substance sold; (4) allowing the State to add an additional count to the indictment; and (5) ordering consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress and the evidence seized as the result of the unlawful search should have been excluded from consideration by the jury. Therefore, the convictions that resulted therefrom, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, and possession of schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell are reversed and remanded. The defendant’s convictions on two counts of sale of over 0.5 grams of schedule II controlled substance and sentences are affirmed.

Plaintiff's action for retaliatory discharge resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and an award of $120,000.00. Defendant appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court upholding the jury verdict.

Plaintiff received serious injuries in an automobile accident, when she turned left in front of the oncoming vehicle operated by defendant. The suit resulted in a jury trial wherein the jury returned a verdict for defendant, which was approved by the Trial Judge. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Judge's Judgment.

A White County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mack Broussard, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (2) failing to redact the portion of the appellant’s statement to police in which he said he was on probation at the time of the crime; and (3) allowing a State witness to give a speculative opinion about the appellant’s motive for the killing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the biological father, David R. (“Father”), of the minor child, Leland C.L. The child was taken into custody on June 14, 2010, at two months of age, due to the biological mother’s drug use and the fact that he tested positive for opiates and hydrocodone at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights naming the father as a respondent on January 7, 2011. Following a bench trial, the Court granted the Petition upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father had abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, and also that the father was in substantial noncompliance with his permanency plans. The Court further found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Stewart County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s agreeing to transfer his case from juvenile to circuit court. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

In this action the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the statute of limitation had run on plaintiff's cause of action. The Trial Court overruled the Motion on the grounds that the tolling provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c) was applicable to GTLA actions and granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. On appeal, we hold that the tolling provision does not apply because the statute did not expressly extend it to GTLA actions.

Sarah Hurst (“Hurst”) sued Colman S. Hochman (“Hochman”) and Hochman Family Partners, L.P. (“the Partnership”) alleging that Hochman had committed a battery upon her, and seeking damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress among other things. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree that, inter alia, awarded Hurst damages of $2,500 against Hochman for battery; denied Hurst’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, and punitive damages; and dismissed Hurst’s claims against the Partnership. Hurst appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying her claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and in dismissing her claims against the Partnership. We affirm.

On September 10, 2009, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Aaron Benard Barnett, of one count of aggravated burglary and one count of vandalism, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his jury convictions and his sentence, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Aaron Benard Barnett, No. W2009-02582-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1224208 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 30, 2011), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court. We, therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Newt Carter (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that “newly discovered evidence” existed in the case. After the close of the Petitioner’s proof in an evidentiary hearing, upon motion by the State, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to account for the Petitioner’s learning disabilities and (2) failed to call Benjamin Jackson as a witness. Based upon the record before us, we are compelled to vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this action to the Madison County Circuit Court for conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and for the post-conviction court to make factual findings and conclusions at the close of all the proof based on all of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing.

This is a grandparent visitation case, in which Mother appeals the trial court’s award of specific visitation to Appellee grandparents under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6306. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that she opposed visitation, that she had failed to rebut the presumption of substantial harm under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306(b)(4),and that grandparent visitation was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.