APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a divorce. Harold Dean McDaniel (“Husband”) sued Kimberly Ruth McDaniel (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a long and contentious legal battle, including an earlier appeal to this Court and subsequent remand for a new trial, the Trial Court entered its supplemental final decree of divorce. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not adequately compute child support, and, therefore remand for its proper computation. We also modify the allocation of guardian ad litem fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, in part, and vacated, in part.

This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm.

Robin M.G. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor children, Daniel E.S. and Jacob A.G. (“the Children”). At separate times, the Children 1 were removed to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and were placed in foster care. DCS took custody of Daniel after he pleaded “true” to disorderly conduct and was adjudicated unruly. A year later, DCS petitioned the court to declare both Children dependent and neglected in Mother’s care and took Jacob into immediate protective custody. After the Children were adjudicated as being dependent and neglected, DCS implemented a permanency plan for each and worked with Mother for two years in a failed effort to reunify the family. DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained compensable injuries to both shoulders. His employer conceded the compensability of the right shoulder injury, but denied the left shoulder claim. An examination was done by a physician through the Medical Impairment Registry(“MIR”) regarding the right shoulder claim. The trial court found that the presumption of correctness of the MIR impairment opinion had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence as to the right shoulder injury. The trial court also concluded that the left shoulder injury was compensable and awarded benefits accordingly. The trial court also denied employer’s claim that it was entitled to an offset pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) for benefits paid under its accident and sickness policy. We hold and find that the trial court erred by failing to apply the offset sought by the employer, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a case alleging negligence by defendant, Mountain States Health Alliance, which resulted in injury to a patient, Ruby Williams. Ms. Williams fell off a table while she was undergoing myocardial perfusion imaging, also known as a nuclear stress test. Mountain States Health Alliance asserted that Ms. Williams’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence, and asked for summary judgment because Ms. Williams had not complied with the filing requirements of the medical malpractice statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the case involved a medical malpractice claim rather than an ordinary negligence claim. Ms. Williams’s Estate appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Juan A. Hill (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his judgment of conviction is void because it (1) is based on a defective indictment and (2) fails to reflect pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The father in this termination of parental rights case, who was incarcerated at all times material to this case at Riverbend Maximum Security Prison and is indigent, appeals the termination of his rights contending he was denied due process because he was not informed of his rights as required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), he did not sign a waiver of his rights, and he was not provided a court-appointed attorney. The father, who did not file a responsive pleading to the petition, contends, inter alia, that the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), which mandates that he be informed that he has the right to participate and contest the allegations and, if he wished to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney would be provided to assist in contesting the petition. The record does not contain a signed waiver by the father nor does it reflect that the juvenile court made the requisite determination that he was informed of his rights and, after being informed, voluntarily waived his right to a court-appointed attorney to assist in contesting the petition, or that, if he did not participate after being informed of his rights, the court may proceed with such action without the parent’s participation as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f)(5). We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the juvenile court as it pertains to the father’s parental rights and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f) and, if the father wishes to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney be provided and the case set for a new trial once his attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to prepare.
 

This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute over whether the parties’ MDA required the payment of alimony in futuro or alimony in solido. The Wife remarried shortly after the parties’ divorce, and the Husband filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, claiming that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, which automatically terminates upon remarriage. The trial court concluded that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, and therefore, the court granted the Husband’s motion to terminate his alimony obligation. Wife appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Sterling Lamar Cooper, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance more than 0.5 grams, a Class B felony, and his concurrent sentences of ten years and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convictions should be vacated and the charges dismissed because (1) his sentences were illegal, (2) the trial court committed judicial misconduct, (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgement of the trial court.

Appellant, Elder Mark Anthony Thornton,was convicted in Davidson County General Sessions Court of eighty counts of criminal contempt after violating an order of protection. He appealed those convictions to the Davidson County Criminal Court and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of criminal contempt for 180 separate violations of the order of protection. Appellant was pro se at trial. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten calendar days per incident consecutively, for a total of 1800 days of incarceration. Appellant, still proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the original and the supplemented record, we determine that ten of the convictions and sentences are proper and, thus, are affirmed. However, the balance of the convictions, 170 in total, which were not listed in the charging notice can not stand, as proper notice was not given to Appellant. As such, those convictions are reversed, and the resulting sentences are vacated.

Plaintiff filed this action against the instructor of a motorcycle safety course and his employer for injuries she sustained when she drove off of the designated course site and collided with a parked pickup truck.The trial court found that the plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred because she signed a valid written waiver/release from liability document prior to starting the course. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s gross negligence claims, finding there was nothing in the record which would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant exercised a conscious neglect of duty or a callous indifference to consequences. We affirm.

Dwight Miller (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Defendant sought post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We now address two issues in the delayed appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prior testimony of an unavailable witness to be read into the record. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on either of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

I respectfully dissent. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that in Miller I this court reversed the conviction solely “because of the manner in which the trial court admonished Blackwell [the unavailable witness] in front of the jury, [Blackwell’s] explanation that her improved memory resulted from the threat of jail, and her testimony that she had been assaulted after she spoke with the TBI together with her attribution of the assault to her involvement in the case.”

Former administrator of decedent’s estate appeals order denying his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, which sought relief from an order requiring him to reimburse the estate for fees incurred by the successor administrator. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court named Mother the primary residential parent and entered a permanent parenting plan limiting Father’s parenting time to one hundred and eight (108) days a year. Father appeals. We affirm.
 

The Defendant, Anthony S. Harding, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of six counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of attempted aggravated statutory rape. The trial court later dismissed the attempt conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve four years on each count of aggravated statutory rape, with all of these counts to run consecutively, resulting in an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was insufficient for failing to provide specific dates for the offenses; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony from an alibi witness; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, the Defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated statutory rape are affirmed. We remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect dismissal of Count Seven, the attempt conviction.

The defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, was convicted of burglary, reckless aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, and resisting arrest and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s enhancement of his sentences by the use of prior convictions that were listed in his presentence report but not included in the State’s notice of enhanced punishment. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael A. Virga, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated arson convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Upon the parties’ divorce, Mother was named the children’s primary residential parent. Years later, Mother petitioned to increase Father’s child support, and Father filed a countercomplaint seeking to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the entryof the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court further found that certain best interest factors weighed in favor of,and against, both parties; however, it determined that the children’s best interests would be served by Mother remaining the primary residential parent. Father appeals and, discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Jeffrey Leo Rochelle, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder and was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a witness testified regarding the defendant’s anger management issues. After a careful review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I agree with the majority opinion in this case, I write separately to say that I view the question of whether to affirm the trial court’s decision to be a much closer question than is indicated by the majority opinion. I concur only because of the high standard of appellate review of the trial court’s decision.
 

The petitioner, Willie A. Cole, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and tampering with evidence conviction. He was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to a term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and to six years for the tampering with evidence. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because the evidence established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised.
 

This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised.