APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns whether certain exclusions in a coverage document are permissible. Dennis Michael Harris (“Harris”), then a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mickey Deanne Haynes (“Haynes”). Harris and his wife, Judy A. Harris, (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) sued Haynes and the alleged owner of the vehicle, Richard H. Furrow, in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Plaintiffs also raised claims against Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, Tennessee Risk Management Trust (“TRMT”), for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. TRMT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the relevant coverage document (“the Coverage Document”), Harris was excluded from uninsured coverage as he was an employee of Anderson County who had received workers compensation. The Trial Court granted TRMT’s motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Anderson County was self-insured through TRMT, and, therefore, the uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes do not apply. The Coverage Document excluded employees such as Harris from uninsured coverage. We affirm.

The defendant, Derrick Lamar Cole, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s ordering that his sentences be served consecutively, rather than concurrently, upon the revocation of his probation, a position with which the State concurs. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred; therefore, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences and remand for entry of an order that the sentences be served concurrently.

The employee, a truck driver for McMinn County, suffered injuries in a job-related accident. Later, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that he had been permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injuries. The employer acknowledged that the employee’s shoulder and leg injuries were compensable but argued that his spinal injuries were not work related. Because a physician who performed two spinal surgeries on the employee was not listed on the employer’s panel of medical providers, the employer denied responsibility for the associated medical costs. While ordering that all of the employee’s injuries were compensable and granting permanent total disability benefits, the trial court did not require the employer to pay the medical costs incident to the second surgery. In this appeal, the employer maintains that the trial court erred by holding that the employee was entitled to recover either benefits or the cost of medical treatment for his spinal injuries. In response, the employee argues that the trial court erred by failing to award payment of the medical costs incident to the second surgery. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment is affirmed, but modified to require the employer to pay the medical costs incident to the second surgery. The cause is remanded for an assessment of the medical expenses related to the second surgery.

This appeal involves disestablishment of paternity. The putative father allegedly signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and the child’s birth certificate when the child at issue was born. The mother did not tell him at the time that she had had sexual relations with another man during the time period in which the child was conceived. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, obtained an order against the putative father, establishing parentage and setting child support. After a private DNA test showed that the putative father was not the biological father of the child, he filed a petition in juvenile court to disestablish paternity and set aside under Tenn. R. Civ P. 60. The juvenile court denied the petition, holding that the putative father did not offer proof of fraud in the procurement of his signature on the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The putative father now appeals. On appeal, we find no voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in the record, and no evidence regarding the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and so cannot consider it in the appeal. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the putative father’s petition to set aside the order establishing parentage and child support under Rule 60.02, and remand for further proceedings.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge from presiding over post-divorce contempt proceedings initiated by Susan W. Phillips (“Former Wife”) against Samuel B. Phillips (“Former Husband”). Having reviewed Former Husband’s Petition for Recusal Appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, and upon consideration of Former Wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we deny Former Wife’s motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Former Husband’s motion to recuse.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linda J.M.A. (“Mother”) to the minor child Alicia K.A. (“the Child”) . After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Guardianship finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(8), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm.

The Defendant, Dustin A. Hubman, pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days for the Class C misdemeanor. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentences in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Patrick Timothy Lowe, pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense, subject to reserving a certified question of law. The trial court imposed the agreed-upon suspended sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand this case for entry of judgment forms reflecting the dispositions of Count I of the indictment, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more, and Count III of the indictment, reckless driving.

Defendant, Kewan Callicutt, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to serve 12 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police because he was under the influence of a drug or intoxicant when he waived his Miranda rights; 2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and 3) his sentence is excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action sounding in negligence and breach of contract was dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Defendant negligently performed professional services concerning the provision and maintenance of web defense software and that Defendant breached its contractual duty to protect the computer system of Copper Basin Federal Credit Union from computer incursion. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to allow the case to proceed, and, therefore, dismissal was in error. The decision below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

A Monroe County jury found the Defendant, Phillip Trevor Lenoir, guilty of aggravated child neglect. Thereafter, the trial court judge recused herself and a successor judge was appointed. The successor judge sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals claiming: (1) the successor judge failed to engage in the proper analysis as the thirteenth juror; (2) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion for a continuance; (3) the State was statutorily required to make an election between aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (5) the trial court failed to require the jury to announce the fines imposed; (6) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on “third-party culpability;” and (7) the trial court erred when it did not allow the Defendant to offer “reliable hearsay” in his defense. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that because the successor judge was unable to properly approve the verdict as “thirteenth juror,” a new trial must be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial.

A Maury County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Raina Fisher, of three counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; one count of theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and one count of attempted theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seven years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the breach of an oral contract. Defendants approached Plaintiff about utilizing fill dirt on Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff agreed. Defendants subsequently executed a plan to control the sediment as they excavated the property. Over the course of the next three years, the City of Knoxville sent Plaintiff two notices of violation, one of which carried a fine, for improper sediment control, illegal dumping and discharge, and failure to obtain a city permit. Defendants paid the fine, applied for a city permit as required, and attempted to stabilize the property. Two years later, Plaintiff received two more notices of violation, one of which carried a fine. Plaintiff paid the fine and hired an engineer to properly stabilize the property after Defendants refused to respond to his request for assistance. Plaintiff then filed suit for breach of contract, seeking reimbursement for his payment of the second fine and for the cost of professionally stabilizing the property. Defendants denied liability and asserted that a contract had never been formed. The trial court found that a contract existed, that Defendants breached the contract, and that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $29,249.02. Defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A nurse whose employment at the University of Tennessee Regional Memorial Medical Center was terminated by the hospital brought a complaint against the State, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and negligent deprivation of her property right to her position as a career state employee. The Claims Commission, William O. Shults, Commissioner, dismissed the claims, concluding that the Commission was without subject matter jurisdiction. The nurse appealed. We affirm.

A jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Woods, of one count of facilitation of intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class D felony, and one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of six years for the facilitation conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession conviction. The physical evidence in the case was seized pursuant to a search warrant issued for the home of the defendant’s girlfriend and the defendant’s teenage daughter. The defendant’s original appeal was dismissed due to an untimely notice of appeal. State v. Woods, No. W2010-01301-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 134243, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2012). The defendant then brought a postconviction petition, and the post-conviction court granted the defendant this delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113(a)(1). The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s refusal to admit an audio recording or transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence, and the legality of the search warrant. Because the search warrant failed to adequately establish the credibility of the confidential informant and because the defendant had standing to challenge the warrant, we reverse the defendant’s convictions.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Russell Jensen, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the trial court summarily dismissed. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Broderick Devonte Fayne, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, both Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of three years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction and to six years at 100% for the employing a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction, for a total effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor’s introduction of his defense counsel as employees of the public defender’s office; (3) whether the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s accomplice to testify regarding his understanding of the charges against him; (4) whether his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s arguing alternate theories of his guilt; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions defining possession and constructive possession. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Richard Madkins (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed his petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner presents three claims: (1) that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it sentenced him to twenty-five years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction; (2) that the trial court did not have authority to sentence the Petitioner as a Range I offender because the State waived Range I sentencing when it filed a notice of intent to seek Range III punishment; and (3) that the Petitioner’s sentence violates principles of double jeopardy. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner, Jerome Sidney Barrett, was convicted of first degree murder stemming from a murder that occurred in Davidson County in 1975 and received a life sentence. State v. Jerome Sidney Barrett, No. M2010-00444-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2914119, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul 18, 2012), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012). He was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *32. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he argued that the DNA evidence used at this trial was not independently evaluated and that the forensic pathologist, Dr. Bruce Levy, who testified at his trial regarding the DNA evidence, was not a credible witness because he was arrested for drug crimes in Mississippi more than a year after Petitioner’s trial. The lower court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition as untimely.

The State appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress filed by the Defendant, Joshua Shane Hayes. The State contests the trial court’s finding that the "Exclusionary Rule Reform Act," which took effect July 1, 2011, did not apply retroactively to the search wherein officers seized drugs from the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petitions for writs of error coram nobis. Having determined that the petitions were properly dismissed, this Court hereby affirms the orders of the trial court.

The Defendants, Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey, were both indicted for manufacturing twenty or more, but less than 100, marijuana plants, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(g)(3), -425(a)(1). The Defendants both filed motions to suppress the evidence recovered during a search of Defendant Whitaker’s trailer home. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions and dismissed the indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ suppression motions. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Oscar Thomas (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his plea was constitutionally invalid due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a contested easement action regarding wooded mountain property in Monroe County. The Plaintiffs/Appellants, James and Edna Eberle, filed a complaint requesting that the Defendant/Appellee, Lisa Parrott Elliott, be enjoined from crossing the Eberles’ property from her adjoining thirty-acre tract without benefit of an easement. Following a bench trial, the Monroe County Chancery Court dismissed the Eberles’ complaint for injunctive relief and ruled that an easement exists for ingress and egress over the Eberles’ property, appurtenant to and serving Ms. Elliott’s property. The Eberles have appealed. At issue is whether the trial court erred by finding the existence of an easement, either express, prescriptive, or implied. The Eberles also assert that the trial court erred by failing to limit the easement to a use no greater than the use previously made over the servient property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that an easement exists for ingress and egress and the court’s dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief.