APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one. I believe the Defendant should have been granted judicial diversion, given the circumstances of this case, the Defendant’s excellent background, and the circumstances existing in Knox County relative to official misconduct and the granting of diversion.

In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s determination that she was not entitled to an award of alimony. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony and affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Quamine Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder by a Shelby County jury. See State v. Quamine Jones, No. W2007-01111-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4963516, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Nov. 21, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, challenging the denial of post-conviction  relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Stanley Rooks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the identification by the victim was not reliable. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Kevin Clark, appeals his Overton County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder, aggravated arson, abuse of a corpse, reckless endangerment, and two counts of aggravated assault.  In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the videotaped deposition of a State’s witness in lieu of live testimony, that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of forensic testing conducted on the defendant’s shoes and clothing, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of first degree murder.  Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over the finality of a judgment and notice in a child support matter. Tamara J. Harness (“Plaintiff”) and Gerald Scott Harness (“Defendant”) have a history of litigation related to their divorce. On November 18, 2009, Defendant simultaneously filed separate petitions to modify his spousal support and child support obligations. The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) confirmed the findings and recommendations of the magistrate with respect to child support on April 29, 2011 . After a hearing, the Trial Court set aside its April 29, 2011 modification of Defendant’s child support. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in addressing for a second time his petition to modify child support when that issue allegedly had been resolved by the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as confirmed by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court’s order of confirmation was interlocutory rather than final, and that the Trial Court did not err in revisiting the child support issue. We affirm the Trial Court.

This appeal involves a dispute between an insurer and its insured following a fire loss at a commercial building. The case was resolved by a series of motions for partial summary judgment. The issues on appeal involve the amount of damages owed by the insurer for the insured’s lost business income during the period of restoration of the building following the fire. The insurer relies upon two separate provisions of the insurance policy to argue that its obligation to pay for lost business income was limited to either six or, at most, twelve months. The trial court denied the insurer’s motions for partial summary judgment and granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the insured, holding that the insurer’s obligation to pay was not limited to either a six-month or a twelve-month period. The insurer appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

Over nine years of litigation in both state and federal courts has stemmed from a 2004 incident (“the Incident”) wherein Alexander A. Stratienko, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) pushed Van Stephen Monroe, Jr., M.D. while in a staff break room at Erlanger Hospital (“the Hospital”) in Hamilton County, Tennessee. In this appeal, Plaintiff raises issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, in not allowing another amendment to the complaint and additional discovery, in excluding claims at trial relative to an administrative hearing, and in holding that Plaintiff failed to prove at trial intentional interference with business relations. We find no error in the Trial Court’s judgments and, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Gatewood, of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-five years for the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to decide whether, for the purpose of determining proximate cause, an assault on an inmate by another inmate is always reasonably foreseeable because penal institutions house dangerous individuals. The plaintiff sued for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of negligence on the part of the staff of the Anderson County Detention Facility in classifying and housing the plaintiff and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The County denied any negligence on its part. The trial court found that while the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of the plaintiff, it had a duty and breached that duty in failing to timely release him. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $170,000 in damages, excluding medical bills, and assessed 55% of the fault to the County and 45% to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, making an additional finding that proximate cause existed sufficient to link the plaintiff’s injuries to the County’s breach of its duty to timely release him. We reverse the Court of Appeals and trial court in part and hold that Anderson County is not liable for failing to release the plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries Mr. King suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. The award of damages is vacated, with the exception of the statutorily mandated payment of the plaintiff’s medical bills, and the case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for dismissal.

Appellant, Cleo Henderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, violent offender to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant has presented several issues that we have deemed waived; however, we have reviewed his sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent.

In 2006, the Petitioner, Louis Mayes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Louis Mayes, No. W2007-02483-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1312629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2009). In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in which he presented multiple claims, including his right to a hearing to present newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that the petition was timebarred. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

In 1994, the Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated burglary.  The Petitioner pled guilty in an agreement that provided that he would receive a life sentence for the two first degree murder convictions, twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years for the attempted aggravated burglary conviction.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed four unsuccessful petitions for habeas corpus relief.  See Dexter F. Johnson v. Carlton, Warden, E2008-02032-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 323126 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 27, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 30, 2010).  The Petitioner then filed a fifth petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed.  The Petitioner appeals, contending that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition because the State’s motion to dismiss did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-116, as the State did not attach a judgment form or indictment to the motion to dismiss.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

The Petitioner, Robert E. Bonds Peeples, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to secure an expert witness to testify regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from Lessee’s rental and operation of a hotel owned by Lessor. Lessee sought Lessor’s consent to an assignment of the lease to a third party. Not only did Lessor withhold consent to the assignment, Lessor terminated the lease based on conditions at the hotel that he deemed to violate the lease. Lessee sued alleging that Lessor wrongfully terminated the lease and unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court determined that Lessee had not breached the lease and that Lessor unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court awarded Lessee $150,000 in damages for Lessor’s unreasonable withholding of consent to the assignment. Lessor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Mother and step-father filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father on the ground of abandonment for failure to support and failure to visit the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) and § 36-1-113. The trial court found the petitioners proved both grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, filed a “Petition . . . for Extraodinary Relief” in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, asserting that four convictions in 1988 are invalid. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because the four convictions, entered as a result of a negotiated plea agreement, are void because they were illegally ordered to be served concurrently with each other. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

The defendant, Randall Cagle, pled guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of eight years, suspended to supervised probation.  As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence.  After review, we conclude that the certified question is overly broad and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
 

This is a divorce case in which Wife asserts the trial court erred in failing to award her alimony. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award spousal support, we affirm.

Angelo John Amalio, alias Angelo Gustavo Amalio (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of public intoxication. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would serve an effective sentence of five years to be suspended to supervised probation following service of eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration, with restitution to be determined by the trial court. After the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $3,600 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court and claims that the trial court failed to consider the Defendant’s ability to pay. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Jose Luis Vizcaino-Ramos, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. His direct appeal was unsuccessful. See State v. Jose Luis Vizcaino-Ramos, No. W2010-01325-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3330294, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2011). Petitioner subsequently pursued post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and failed to request a mental evaluation for appellant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tyler James Reed, stands convicted of felony murder committed in the perpetration of a burglary, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction, six years for the aggravated burglary conviction, and six years for the firearm conviction, with all sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress all of the statements he made on October 30, 2009, and the physical evidence obtained as a result of those statements; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the murder and aggravated burglary convictions; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding self-defense and voluntary intoxication; and (4) he is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.  Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
 

Plaintiff, a supplier of customized lamps that were used exclusively in Cracker Barrel restaurants, filed this action for breach of express contract and breach of contract implied in fact and at law against Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (“Cracker Barrel”), and its subsidiary CBOCS Distribution, Inc. (“CBOCS”). The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that both defendants were bound by the Supply Agreement entered into between the plaintiff and CBOCS, and that both defendants breached the contract by failing to purchase 120 days of floor-stock inventory after cancellation of the Supply Agreement or discontinued use of the “Approved Products” identified in the agreement. Defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that the Supply Agreement expired on July 31, 2011, and that, thereafter, the parties conducted at-will transactions not governed by the Supply Agreement. The trial court granted the motion dismissing all claims against both defendants finding,inter alia: 1) there was no contract between the plaintiff and Cracker Barrel; 2) the Supply Agreement between the plaintiff and CBOCS terminated by its own terms on July 31, 2011, and there was no written extension; 3) there was no contract implied in fact; and 4) there was no contract implied at law. We affirm the dismissal of all claims against Cracker Barrel because Cracker Barrel was never a party to the contract and the complaint failed to state a claim against Cracker Barrel upon which relief could be granted. As for the claims against CBOCS, we have determined that the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state claims against CBOCS for breach of express contract, contract implied in fact and contract implied at law. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims against CBOCS and remand the claims against CBOCS for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Verlin Ralph Durham, appeals the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the Department of Correction following his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal of the petition was error because the indictment in his case was facially void and that his conviction is illegal because he was convicted pursuant to a prior repealed statute. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.