APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jermaine Davis, of nine counts of aggravated rape, and the trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of seventy-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court committed plain error when it included “recklessness” in the definition of aggravated rape in the jury instruction; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; (3) the trial court committed plain error by failing to compel the State to elect facts to support three of the counts charged; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant by ordering him to serve twenty-five years for each of the convictions and by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendants, Charles Hampton and Deanthony Perry, were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant Perry argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that Ladarrius Borrum was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Defendant Hampton argues that the trial court erred in denying his right to compulsory process and excluding relevant evidence, as well as challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of first degree murder. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Father appeals the modification of the primary residential plan and specifically the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’five-year-old daughter. In 2010, Father was designated as the primary residential parent of their two-year old child and the parents were awarded equal and shared parenting time based on an alternating weekly schedule. Over the next two years, the employment and marital status of each parent changed and Mother had three additional children. Based on these changes, Mother filed a petition in July 2012 to modify the primary residential plan requesting that she be designated as the primary residential parent. Finding, inter alia, that Mother was no longer employed, that she worked in the home caring for the parties’ child as well as her three younger children who were born after the initial plan went into effect, and that she had been acting as the de facto primary residential parent, the court granted Mother’s petition and designated her as the primary residential parent. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Transportation’s decision to deny the petitioner’s applications for billboard permits. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial.

The Petitioner, Michael Daniels, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur fully with the result reached in this case and agree with virtually all of the analysis. I write separately only to draw out and emphasize a couple of issues.

Petitioner, Marvin Green, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he alleged that an insufficient indictment and an improper offense classification rendered his conviction void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Walter Lee Hicks Jr., was convicted by a Marshall County jury of numerous offenses  that arose from an encounter with an officer of the Tennessee Highway Patrol.  The sentences imposed included four years for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, eight years for evading arrest and creating a risk of death and injury, and five years for giving a false report.  The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, with all remaining sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of seventeen years at thirty-five percent.  Appellant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for reckless endangerment and giving a false report, and (2) that the sentence imposed was excessive and contrary to law.  After thoroughly examining the record, we find no error in either the verdicts or the sentence, and we affirm the trial court.  However, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment to reflect that Appellant’s convictions for assault and felony reckless endangerment are merged.

This is a health care liability action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal to this court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Cortez Griffin, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, the Petitioner attacked his convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and criminally negligent homicide, arguing, among other things, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to file a motion to sever the robbery and murder offenses or pursue the trial court’s joinder of those offenses on direct appeal. On appeal, he challenges the denial of relief on the aforementioned bases and whether adequate findings were made by the post-conviction court. However, following our review of the record, we conclude that the petition is untimely. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

The Circuit Court of Montgomery County revoked the probation of Appellant, Justin David Fife, after he failed to report that he had been arrested for assault and was found to be in “constructive possession” of a handgun.  He argues on appeal that the gun was not his, that the discovery of the gun was the product of an illegal search, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence about the weapon.  After carefully examining the evidence, we affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment.

This is a detainer action in which Fannie Mae was awarded a judgment of possession of Defendant’s property in sessions court. Defendant refused to vacate the property and appealed to the circuit court. Fannie Mae filed a motion for summary judgment, while Defendant sought to void the judgment of possession. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and upheld the foreclosure sale. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Shira Jean Stafford, was indicted by the Jackson County Grand Jury for preventing or obstructing a law enforcement officer from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, or arrest in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602.  She was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months, to be served on probation.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, she appealed.  Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court’s decision to allow evidence regarding a civil case during the criminal trial; and the trial court’s failure to issue a curative instruction to the jury.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Oscar Berry, was convicted of first degree murder in 1991 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  He filed a direct appeal of his conviction, which was dismissed by this Court in 1992.  State v. Oscar Thomas Berry, No. 01-C01-9201-CR-00033, 1992 WL 275402 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 8, 1992).  His petition for post-conviction relief, filed in 1997, was dismissed by the trial court as untimely.  In 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the post-conviction proceedings.  He contended that several recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court established constitutional rights in post-conviction proceedings that did not exist at the time of his conviction, thereby allowing his case to be re-opened under the authority of Tennessee Code Annotated §  40-30-117(a)(1).  The trial court rejected his theory and dismissed his motion.  After careful review of the controlling law, we affirm.

Homeowners association brought declaratory judgment action against homeowners to enforce the development’s restrictive covenants. The trial court determined that the homeowners association’s architectural review committee (“ARC”) acted within its discretion in ordering homeowners to remove improvements the ARC found to be inconsistent with other homes in the neighborhood. We affirm.

Appellant, Kenneth Krasovic, was charged with one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and five counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon stemming from an automobile crash that occurred in Grundy County.  The jury found Appellant guilty on all counts and the trial court sentenced Appellant to a total effective sentence of twelve years and six months.  Appellant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied after a hearing.  Appellant then filed this appeal, arguing (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (2) that the trial court improperly limited counsel’s closing argument as to the defense of “sudden emergency.”  Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions and that there was no improper limitation of defense counsel’s closing argument.  We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a bench trial in a suit over the sale of a used vehicle. The trial court originally ruled in favor of the seller-defendants, finding that the plaintiff-buyer failed to meet his burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of the vehicle. The court found that defendant-sellers had violated one subsection of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but that plaintiff-buyer had failed to prove any actual damages, so the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon considering the plaintiff-buyer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court changed its original decision and found that the defendant-sellers had engaged in fraud, and the court rescinded the sale of the vehicle. Upon considering plaintiffbuyer’s second motion to alter or amend, the trial court clarified its ruling and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-buyer. Both parties appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate its original ruling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The jury found that Defendants were liable for damages arising from breach of contract and that Plaintiff was liable for damages arising from negligence. It also found that Defendants were entitled to treble damages under Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-2-503. Plaintiff appeals. Finding material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Joshua Allen Felts, on count one of theft of property valued less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor; on count two of attempted theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class E felony; on count three of attempted theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; and on counts four and five of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the State’s failure to preserve the chain of custody of the stolen items. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s conviction in count five. However, the State concedes, and we agree, that the State failed to establish the value of the stolen items in the remaining counts; therefore, we remand to the trial court for amendment of the judgments of conviction in counts one and four to theft of property valued less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and to reflect the reduction in the sentence on each of those convictions to eleven months and twenty-nine days. Additionally, we remand to the trial court for amendment of the judgments of conviction in counts two and three to attempted theft of property valued less than $500, a Class B misdemeanor, and to reflect the reduction in the sentence on each of those convictions to six months.
 

This appeal involves a claim for workers’ compensation benefits filed by a nurse employed
at the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. The nurse filed a claim with the Tennessee
Claims Commission because she believed that she had contracted tuberculosis when her hand came into contact with a patient’s blood. The claims commissioner dismissed the nurse’s claim on the basis that she failed to produce expert medical evidence that she had
tuberculosis, and the nurse sought judicial review under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. We affirm the
judgment of the Claims Commission.

A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant Brian Dunkley of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury convicted Defendant William Miller of one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced both defendants to effective sentences of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Dunkley asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted text messages into evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the trial erred when it denied his motion for new trial because the trial court failed to function as the thirteenth juror and because newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (4) the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors when it sentenced him. Defendant Miller asserts that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because the trial court failed to function as the thirteenth juror; and (3) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The Defendant, Jan Michelle Ell, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-403, 39-12-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and twelve years for the conspiracy conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition in which he sought relief from his death sentence, claiming that he was intellectually disabled. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying (1) his petition for writ of error coram nobis, (2) his motion for a declaratory judgment, and (3) his stand-alone claim under the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jessica C. (“Mother”) and Jesse W. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to the minor child Alexis C. (“the Child”). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was shown that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and for severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102, and that clear and convincing evidence was shown that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Greene County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

Ashley K. Moyers (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of sale or delivery of a Schedule II drug in a drug-free zone. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years’ incarceration and imposed the $40,000 fine assessed by the jury. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. She also contends that her $40,000 fine is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but decrease the Defendant’s fine from $40,000 to $2,000.