APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Father and Mother were divorced in April 2010; a parenting plan was entered into providing that the parties would share equal parenting time. In March 2012, pursuant to the parental relocation statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, Father notified Mother that he intended to relocate to Tucson, Arizona, for an employment opportunity and filed a petition requesting to modify the parenting plan and relocate. Mother filed a petition in opposition to relocation, stating, inter alia, that Father’s proposed move served no reasonable purpose. The trial court determined that Father’s move served no reasonable purpose; the court did not make the best interests determination as required by the relocation statute. Father appealed and this court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the court to consider the best interests of the child and to make findings in that regard. On remand, the court made findings relative to the factors as designated in the relocation statute and concluded that relocation was not in the best interests of the child. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.        

The notice of appeal in this matter was filed with the trial court after expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. This Court subsequently ordered the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. In response, the appellants filed a motion with the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01, seeking alteration of the filing date on the notice of appeal. The trial court granted such relief while the appeal was pending in this Court, despite the absence of a remand. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was deferred to the panel deciding this case. We conclude that absent a remand from this court, the trial court was without jurisdiction to act on the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01 motion while this appeal was pending. We therefore dismiss this appeal as untimely.

In this appeal, pro se Petitioner Mario D. Thomas challenges the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Because I find the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating, I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, we have defined “reasonable purpose” to mean “a significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial parent’s ability to participate fully in their children’s lives in a more meaningful way.” Redmon v. Redmon, No. W2013-01017-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1694708, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014). In my view, such precedent represents a departure from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, otherwise known as the Parental Relocation Statute. Giving the words “reasonable purpose” their natural and ordinary meaning, from this record, I find that Mother failed to show Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating with their child. As such and because no other Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(d)(1) ground was present that would prevent relocation, I would reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to approve the relocation.

The defendant, Steven J. Ballou, pled guilty to one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony, and received a sentence of five years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. As part of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved two certified questions of law. In the first question, he argues that an eighteen-month pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and was an intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. In the second, he contends that the loss of police cruiser dashboard camera videos that contained potentially exculpatory evidence violated his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the first certified question of law and conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the second certified question.

Three children were removed from their home as a result of a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, alleging that the stepfather was guilty of sexual abuse of the oldest child. After the children were removed from the home, it was found that the Mother knew of but had failed to report previous abuse. The children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected; the Department later filed a petition for termination of the Mother’s parental rights. Her parental rights were terminated as to all three children on the grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals the court’s holding that termination of her parental rights was in her children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant-property owner in a premises liability suit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We granted this interlocutory appeal in order to consider whether Knox County can rely upon the defense of quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the allegations against it in the complaint filed by the plaintiff Theodore Franklin Davis. At an earlier time, Davis entered into a plea agreement in criminal court. In the agreement, he consented to comply with all of the requirements of the Knox County Pretrial Services Office during his six-month probation. One of the requirements was that he would wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring unit (the SCRAM) to track his alcohol consumption. Pretrial Services – a department of the Knox County Sheriff's Office and an agent of Knox County – installed and monitored the device. Davis alleges that the agents of Pretrial Services were negligent in the installation of, and their refusal to adjust, the SCRAM. He alleges that the SCRAM exacerbated his diabetic condition. Knox County raised the defense of quasi-judicial immunity and later moved to dismiss. The trial court denied Knox County's motion, holding that it was not entitled to raise the defense of quasi-judicial immunity. We hold that Knox County is entitled to assert the defense of quasi-judicial immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-206 (2012). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff policy holder filed suit against defendant insurance company after the insurance company denied his claim for benefits. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to utilize the appeals procedure outlined in the contract for insurance before filing a lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a consolidated appeal from two separate actions arising from numerous competing petitions filed by the parents of two minor children. Due to the fact that the parents represented themselves during much of the trial court proceedings and at all times on appeal, the procedural history is muddled, the record is incomplete, and the briefs are of little assistance. The salient facts and procedural history are that a petition for divorce was filed in 2011 at which time both parties were represented by counsel. In December 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment whereby it declared the parties divorced, awarded Mother custody, and set child support. Father appealed, but soon thereafter he filed several petitions to modify custody and support. Mother answered and filed a petition for civil contempt against Father. The trial court found Father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support; he was incarcerated but released when the arrearage was paid. The court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Father from having contact with Mother. Father appealed several decisions in the second case. Based on post-judgment facts we agreed to consider, we are advised that Father filed an emergency petition in May 2015 to be granted custody due to Mother’s drug problems. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Father temporary custody, and the children remain in Father’s exclusive custody. Because Father has custody of the children, we are unable to provide Father meaningful relief with respect to this issue. The issues that are currently justiciable include: (1) whether the trial court is biased against Father; (2) the initial award of child support; (3) finding Father in civil contempt; (4) the injunction against Father; and (5) attorney’s fees awarded Mother. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
 

This is negligence case. Appellees rented a storage unit from Appellant. The storage unit flooded, and the flooding destroyed Appellees’ personal property. Appellees filed suit against Appellant in general sessions court, claiming negligence and gross negligence. Appellees prevailed in general sessions court, and Appellant appealed the case to the trial court. After a bench trial, the trial court found the exculpatory clause in the parties’ rental agreement was void. The trial court also found that the Appellant’s rental of the unit to the Appellees, despite its knowledge of the obvious condition of flooding and advertising its units as dry, constituted gross negligence. We affirm.

The employee successfully pursued a Request for Assistance (“RFA”) through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) for treatment of deep vein thrombosis resulting from a fall at work in February 2006. In January 2013, she filed a second RFA alleging that she required knee replacement surgery as a result of the same incident. DOL denied her request, and she filed this action in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The trial court dismissed her claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel. She has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment on that issue. Additionally, there are genuine issues of fact as to the equitable defenses. Therefore, we remand the case for further consideration consistent with this ruling.

In this divorce case, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce based upon the sole statutory ground of irreconcilable differences, adopting and approving the parties‟ signed and notarized marital dissolution agreement and signed temporary parenting plan. The trial court subsequently entered two different parenting plans, designating the second plan as the permanent parenting plan. The mother has appealed the entry of the subsequent parenting plans. Determining that the trial court lacked authority to enter a temporary parenting plan concomitant with a final decree of divorce, we vacate the later plans and reinstate the original temporary parenting plan, designating it to be the controlling permanent parenting plan in this action.

This appeal involves a challenge to a local rule of the criminal court in Shelby County. The lawsuit was filed in the chancery court. After a hearing, the chancery court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and entered a temporary injunction prohibiting the criminal court and its ten judges from enforcing a section of the local rule. We granted an application for an extraordinary appeal filed by the criminal court and its judges. We reverse the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the temporary injunction and remand for dismissal of the complaint.

Defendant, Blake Edward Childress, was convicted by a Hamblen County Jury of incest. He was sentenced to six years in incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress; (2) the trial court improperly allowed introduction of evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review, we determine Defendant properly invoked his right to counsel and, thereafter, was improperly subjected to continued discussion by a detective that produced an incriminating response. Consequently, the subsequent confession by Defendant was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. We determine the subsequent introduction of the confession at trial was not harmless error, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for new trial.

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order assessing a portion of the mother’s attorney’s fees against the father’s counsel. Because the father’s counsel did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, John Traion Davis, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal for failure of Defendant to state a colorable claim.

The Defendant, Corey Antuan Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of four counts of attempted first degree murder; four counts of aggravated assault; four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of evading arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each count of attempted murder, six years for each count of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one year and six months for evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support all four of the convictions for attempted first degree murder and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Luis M. (“Father”) to the minor child Analilia R. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions against Father, and that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals, arguing DCS failed to meet its burden of proof on the ground of persistent conditions. DCS raises its own issue of whether the Juvenile Court erred in failing to find the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

Reluctantly and respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 movant in this case stated a colorable claim to relief, and based upon the current wording of the rule, that is all that is required. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b).

Deangelo Jackson (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted second-degree murder and imposed an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the trial court erred when it held that the State would be allowed to impeach the Defendant’s testimony with evidence of his prior convictions for theft and felon in possession of a handgun. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Denver Case, of first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary with all of the sentences to be served concurrently.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by instructing the grand jury in the presence of the jury venire, and that the trial court erred by allowing the deliberating jury to view a video in the courtroom without the appellant’s being present. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Andre De'Lane Ross, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of a clerical error on the face of his possession of cocaine judgment. In this appeal, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion because, at the guilty plea hearing, the court found that his plea to this charge lacked a sufficient factual basis but a guilty judgment was, thereafter, erroneously entered. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce and the entry of a permanent parenting plan. Pamela Rose Beeler (“Mother”) filed for divorce from her husband Barry Allen Beeler (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”). After a prolonged and contentious legal battle, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The parties ultimately reached a settlement regarding the custody of their three minor children, which was announced in open court. Father appeals, arguing that, despite his agreeing to the settlement, he actually opposes the settlement and that the final judgment should be overturned. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We further find this appeal frivolous and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to Mother.