APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-four-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Shelley Denise Blair, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by relying solely on her pro se petition, and not considering the allegations of fact in the amended petition prepared by post-conviction counsel, in concluding that she failed to make out a prima facie case of mental incompetence to toll the statute of limitations.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

A jury convicted the defendant, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree (premeditated) murder for shooting her boyfriend.  The defendant received a life sentence.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to show premeditation or to negate self-defense.  She also raises numerous challenges to the jury instructions, including that the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of raising the issue of self-defense; that the self-defense instruction was confusing to the jury; that the jury instructions improperly failed to list the negation of self-defense in the litany of items which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the instructions failed to list lesser included offenses whenever the “charged offense” was referenced.  The defendant also asserts that there was reversible error in the use of a demonstrative aid in the prosecution’s closing argument.  After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves three former police officers who were terminated from their employment with the Union City Police Department. They filed this lawsuit claiming that they were terminated solely for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities, in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an exclusive causal relationship between their refusal to remain silent and their discharge and that the City terminated Plaintiffs for rational and non-pretextual reasons. We affirm.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Michael Dean Hodges, for aggravated child abuse in counts one through three and aggravated child neglect in count four.  After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of count one but convicted as charged in counts two and three and convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect in count four.  The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child abuse convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-five-years in confinement to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sever the charge of aggravated child abuse in count one from the remaining two counts of aggravated child abuse; that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a portion of his statement in which he admitted to prior bad acts; that the trial court erred by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on “knowingly” that failed to include language about non-accidental conduct; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that the appellant had been “in trouble” previously.  However, we conclude that the error was harmless. Nevertheless, we conclude that the appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault must be reversed because aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect.

Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., M.D. (“Dr. Mettetal”) and Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., M.D., Inc. (“Corporation”) appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that Dr. Mettetal breached his fiduciary duty to Mattie L. Mettetal (“Deceased”), improperly converted Deceased's funds to his benefit and the benefit of his Corporation, and failed to show that the funds were in keeping with gifts pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-110. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm.

Demontise Martez Drumwright a.k.a. Demontise J. Drumwright (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated burglary and robbery.  The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering the Defendant to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement.  On this appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it (1) considered the Defendant’s pending case in Knox County as a basis for denial of alternative sentencing and (2) ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Porrazzo, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain witness testimony and by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jordan Curry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest and his effective forty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Raphael Cortez Ferguson, pleaded guilty to facilitation of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to resell, a Class C felony, and received the agreed-upon sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The department of correction placed appellant in its special alternative incarceration unit and, approximately six months later, released him from custody subject to supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued, alleging the following infractions: (1) committing new criminal offenses for theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, criminal simulation, and identity theft; (2) testing positive on two drug screens; and (3) failing to complete community service as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered his sentence into execution. On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting his new criminal offenses and that the remainder of the evidence warranted a lesser consequence than complete confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mark Brooks, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, William Anthony McDaniel, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the Appellant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Vernon Campbell, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for his premeditated first degree murder conviction because the offense was committed in the Cherokee National Forest; and (2) that the indictment charging the Petitioner was invalid due to the State’s dismissal of a charge of felony first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2012, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice McAllister, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1)  denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) admitted evidence seized from his vehicle; and (3) imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement.  The Defendant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require a reversal of his conviction.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s award of a judgment against it. While he was an inmate in the State’s custody, Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell out of a pickup truck that was being operated by a State employee. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Claims Commission in which he alleged that the State’s negligence caused his injuries and sought damages for, among other things, the medical expenses that were incurred as a result of the fall. The State argued that it should receive a credit against any award of damages for the medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration because it paid those expenses through its contracts with two private medical vendors. The Claims Commission disagreed and held that evidence of payments made by the medical vendors for Plaintiff’s treatment was barred by the collateral source rule. The Claims Commission awarded Plaintiff $125,000 in damages, which included damages for the medical expenses that he allegedly incurred. On appeal, we conclude that because the State was required by law to pay for all medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration, the Claims Commission erred in considering the cost of the medical services provided to Plaintiff in calculating his damages. We therefore vacate the Claims Commission’s award of damages and remand this matter for a new trial on the issue of damages.

Appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and later filed a motion challenging his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion without appointing counsel after he had stated a colorable claim for relief. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of this eminent domain case. In the first appeal, City of Memphis v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family, LLC, et al., 391 S.W.3d 60 (2012), this Court held that Appellee City of Memphis, a municipal corporation for the use and benefit of Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division, was entitled to condemn a portion of Appellants’ property to erect poles and other facilities to provide utility services to MLGW customers. In addition to the provision of utility services, Appellee also sought co-location rights to allow telecommunications and cable providers to attach to MLGW’s poles. In the first appeal, Appellants argued that the co-location rights transformed the condemnation from public to private use. In our first opinion, we held that the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, mandated that MLGW would allow co-location rights. On remand, the trial court held that it was bound by the law of the case as set out in our first opinion and denied Appellants discovery concerning the co-location rights before granting those rights to Appellee. In the instant appeal, Appellants contend that our previous holding was incorrect because the Pole Attachment Act specifically exempts MLGW from the definition of “utility.” We agree, and reverse our previous holding to the extent that we held that the Pole Attachment Act is mandatory on MLGW. Because of our erroneous holding, the issues of whether MLGW is entitled to co-location rights and the proper compensation, if any, for these rights have not been addressed in the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it grants Appellee co-location rights and remand the case for discovery and hearing on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it allows Appellee to condemn Appellants’ property for utility purposes.

The defendant, Tom Moore, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to set aside his 1991 convictions of aggravated rape. Because the defendant has failed to present a cognizable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the order of summary dismissal.

This is a divorce action involving a five-year marriage between a husband who was employed overseas at the time of the parties' separation and a wife who had worked primarily during the marriage as a homemaker and caretaker of the parties' three minor children, including a child with special medical needs. Following a hearing in December 2012, during which the husband testified telephonically, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $3,500.00 per month in temporary support. Following subsequent hearings in April and May 2014, during which the husband also testified telephonically, the court, inter alia, granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds, delineated a residential co-parenting schedule, entered a judgment against Husband for support arrearage, and set the husband's child support obligation in the amount of $1,842.00 monthly and spousal support obligation in the amount of $1,000.00 monthly. The court reserved remaining issues for a bench trial, which it set for September 23, 2014, with notice that it would not allow the husband to testify telephonically unless the wife waived any objection to such testimony. At the beginning of trial, the court denied the husband's counsel's motion to allow the husband to testify telephonically upon the wife's objection. Also at the beginning of trial, the court ordered that the $1,000.00 previously ordered be continued as an award to the wife of alimony in futuro. The court also directed that its previous orders as to co-parenting time and child support be incorporated as a permanent parenting plan order. At the close of proof, the trial court distributed the marital estate and awarded to Wife $10,500.00 toward her attorney's fees. The husband appeals. Having determined that no income shares worksheet for child support purposes was attached to the final judgment, we vacate the amount of child support awarded and remand for the limited purpose of child support calculation according to the Child Support Guidelines based upon the trial court's previous findings concerning the parties' respective incomes and co-parenting time. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

The Appellant, Beau C. Vaughan, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The Appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred in ruling that his sentence for a felony conviction which occurred while he was released on bond for another offense was not statutorily required to be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying offense because the underlying offense was a misdemeanor; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling, in the alternative, that Rule 36.1 was not applicable because the convictions occurred before Rule 36.1 was enacted in 2013.  The State concedes that the trial court erred with respect to both of the Appellant’s issues.  However, contrary to the State’s concession, the Appellant’s sentence expired long ago; therefore, his motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief.  As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The Defendant, Anthony H. Dean, was convicted in 2000 of aggravated rape of a ninety-two-year-old victim and received a forty-year sentence as a violent offender. In 2015, the Defendant allegedly filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of the judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Shaun Steven Kidd, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Bruce Anton Parks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel on several bases. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff, a nurse, alleged that she sustained a hip injury in the course of her employment. She further alleged that she sustained an injury to the nerves of her leg as a result of treatment for the hip injury. In addition, she alleged a mental injury. Her employer contended that her hip problems were preexisting and that she failed to sustain her burden of proof as to the nerve and mental injuries. The trial court found that the hip and nerve injuries were compensable but the alleged mental injury was not. It also awarded certain medical expenses from unauthorized physicians. Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the award of benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the award of medical expenses but otherwise affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Terry Lee Adams, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, complaining because concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences were imposed on him in 1996 and 1998. The trial court denied relief, concluding that since he was on probation for the first conviction when the second sentence was imposed, consecutive sentencing was not required. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.