APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Tourie Bryant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He pled guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and received a six-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to properly communicate with the petitioner; and (2) failing to “properly articulate” that the petitioner was waiving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress by pleading guilty and failing to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to review the plea agreement terms prior to his acceptance.  Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Jeffrey Owen Smithson (“the Defendant”) appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder, theft over $1,000, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon a witness’s testimony that the Defendant had been recently released from prison; and (3) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police as not voluntarily given.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Jordan, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, two counts of false imprisonment, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses; that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the testimony of a witness did not open the door to his prior conviction for domestic assault; that the trial court erred in restricting the testimony of a second witness to impeach the victim; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding the mens rea of recklessness for the crime of rape; that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its opening statement; that it was plain error to allow the victim to testify that the defendant was incarcerated; and that his convictions should be reversed under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tammy Marie Harbison, entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 in the Lawrence County Circuit Court.  As a Range I, standard offender, she received a three-year sentence, which was suspended following service of six months in incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for full probation.  Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment sentencing the Defendant-Appellant to serve her three-year sentence on supervised probation.

William Lance Walker (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Petition was denied after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call for the sequestration of witnesses during the Petitioner’s suppression hearing.  We conclude that the Petitioner has waived this claim by failing to include it in the Petition and by failing to present any proof about this claim at the post-conviction hearing.  Additionally, we conclude that, even if the issue were not waived, the Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged deficiency.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Anthony R. Smith, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, which was granted by the trial court.  The State appealed the dismissal.  Upon our review of this matter of first impression, we determine that the definition of “felony” provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-110 controls the determination of whether an out-of-state conviction constitutes a “felony drug offense.”  We reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Roger Joseph, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his instant petition, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. While acknowledging that the petition was filed well outside the statute of limitations, he claims that he has shown that due process requires the tolling of the statute based upon his mental condition. Based upon that assertion, he contends that the summary dismissal of the petition was erroneous. Following review of the record, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine prohibits our review of that issue and affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Appellant, Dwight David Foster, pleaded guilty to possession of less than point five (.5) grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of buprenorphrine, a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the agreed-upon effective sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he certified a question for our review. Upon the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of the Defendant’s car. The Defendant subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and a traffic violation. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, Linzey Danielle Smith, violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant.  The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant once cross and twice touch the fog line marking the outer right lane boundary on an interstate highway.  After being pulled over, the Defendant was charged with alternative counts of driving under the influence.  The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of her traffic stop.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment.  We hold that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore met constitutional requirements.  Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.  

The petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  Because the petitioner failed to follow the procedural requirements governing the writ of habeas corpus and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Amilcar C. Butler, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  On appeal, he argues that he illegally received concurrent sentences when he should have received consecutive sentences.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Valdez Domingo Wilson, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell more than twenty-six grams of a substance containing cocaine, possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, possession with intent to sell less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant received a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law that challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence discovered in his vehicle and home. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

The defendant, Horace Dunlap, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Because the defendant’s sentences have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Edward Church, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of rape of a child in Counts 1-3, five counts of aggravated sexual battery in Counts 4-8, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in Counts 9-10.  Upon motion by the State, Counts 9 and 10 were stricken from the indictment.  Upon the State’s election of offenses, Count 3 was amended to allege aggravated sexual battery.  A jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 60 years to be served at 100 percent.  Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences.

Petitioner, Darrell Kennedy, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and two counts of theft of property, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-one years in confinement. He filed a request pursuant to The Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 seeking retesting of various swabs that were analyzed in 1993. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jodi N. Teets, appeals her Robertson County conviction for assault.  Her single issue on appeal is a claim of insufficient evidence of bodily injury to sustain a conviction for an assault.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court‘s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In the proceedings below, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that false and defamatory statements made about him by the defendants, along with the defendants‘ subsequent lawsuit against him, caused him to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and incur $150,000 in attorney‘s fees. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint after determining that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Having reviewed the amended complaint and thoroughly considered the arguments raised on appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Jacob A. Wright, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of kidnapping.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant rented property managed by Appellee. Appellee filed a forcible entry and detainer action in the Shelby County General Sessions Court and was awarded possession of the rental property and past due rents. Appellant did not appeal this judgment. Rather, Appellant filed a separate civil warrant in general sessions court, seeking to be restored to possession of the property. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the question of possession of the property was res judicata based on the general sessions court‘s prior adjudication. The general sessions court granted Appellee‘s motion, and Appellant, relying on the civil warrant filed in the second general sessions‘ case, appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court. Again, Appellee moved for dismissal. The trial court granted Appellee‘s motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to address the question of possession of the rental property as this question was res judicata. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Melody Danielle Corum, entered guilty pleas to seven counts of aggravated burglary, seven counts of theft of property, one count of tampering with evidence, and one count of vandalism, for which she received the agreed-upon effective sentence of twelve years, suspended after time served.  Appellant’s probation was revoked after she was convicted of an additional theft of property offense; the trial court reinstated her probation and added a consecutive four-year sentence, suspended to probation, to her probationary term, for an effective sixteen-year term of probation.  The State obtained the instant probation of violation warrant alleging that appellant was found to be in possession of controlled substances, that she admitted using controlled substances, and that she had failed to pay restitution as required.  Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered her sentence into execution.  Appellant appeals the revocation, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion.  We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court's partial dismissal of a case concerning alleged negligence committed against Plaintiff/Appellee Brenda Osunde (“Mrs. Osunde”). Mrs. Osunde filed a complaint in the trial court alleging a medical malpractice claim against DMC-Memphis, Inc. (“DMC”), as well as a claim for common law negligence, after she sustained a fall while at DMC's hospital, Delta Medical Center. When Mrs. Osunde failed to disclose any experts pursuant to the trial court's scheduling order, DMC moved for summary judgment. In adjudicating DMC's motion, the trial court drew a distinction between Mrs. Osunde's “health care liability action,” which it dismissed for her failure to produce an expert, and Mrs. Osunde's common law negligence claim, which it ruled should proceed to trial. After ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stayed further proceedings and granted DMC leave to pursue interlocutory review in this Court. Although we agree with DMC that all of Mrs. Osunde's asserted claims give rise to a “health care liability action” within the meaning of the Tennessee Code, we disagree with DMC's assertion that expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Osunde's allegations of negligence. As such, we reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it purports to dismiss Mrs. Osunde's health care liability action, and we affirm the trial court's decision to allow this case to proceed to trial.