APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, James Johnson aka Guy Bonner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition apparently challenged his 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and resisting arrest. Because the petitioner has established sufficient facts to make a threshold showing that he complied with the “mailbox rule,” he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he delivered his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Mack Jeffery Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Torian Dillard, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant contends his sentences are illegal because the State failed to provide proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-202(a). The defendant also argues the trial court improperly relied on two prior theft convictions in classifying him as a career offender. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) holding that “the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent;” and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother.

Charles Steven Blocker (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine in November 2010.  Surgery was required to treat the injury.  He was able to return to work for Powell Valley Electric Cooperative (“Employer”) after that injury.  His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was settled.  Employee suffered a second, gradual injury to his cervical spine in January 2013.  He was unable to return to work after that injury.  He brought suit in the Chancery Court for Claiborne County against Employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”).  The parties stipulated that Employee was permanently and totally disabled.  The only issue presented to the court was apportionment of the permanent total disability benefits between Employer and the Fund.  The trial court found that the second injury had caused a 9% permanent partial disability without reference to the prior injury.  Benefits were apportioned 9% to Employer and 91% to the Fund.  The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Dominique Greer, was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for felony murder and eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to the sentence for felony murder. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior robbery; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider the prior robbery for issues other than intent and identity; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Merritt to testify concerning Defendant’s cell phone records; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress; (5) the trial court erred by allowing a constructive amendment to the felony murder indictment; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s felony murder conviction; and (7) there was cumulative error. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court because the trial court committed reversible error in its final charge to the jury.

The Petitioner, Jeffery Lee Miller, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner seeks relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. The Petitioner argues that (1) the coram nobis court erred by determining that due process considerations did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard regarding reasonable diligence in its order and final judgment; (3) the coram nobis court’s grounds for dismissal were erroneous; and (4) the coram nobis court’s assessment of the State’s open file policy was erroneous. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Wife filed a complaint for divorce following a fifteen-year marriage.  The trial court granted Wife a divorce, distributed the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony.  The trial court granted Husband’s request to pay the alimony in solido award over a period of six years, with post-judgment interest payable at 10% interest per annum.  Husband appeals the division of some of the marital assets and debts, the award of alimony in solido, and the post-judgment interest award.  We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in solido, but we modify the post-judgment interest rate from 10% to 5.50% to conform with the interest on judgments statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121.

I concur in the results reached by the majority but write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the admissibility of evidence of the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll. The majority holds that the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll was properly admitted to prove identity and intent for the charged offenses. However, I believe that the probative value of the Defendant’s prior bad act is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. Thus, the evidence that the Defendant committed a prior robbery should not have been admitted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded.

The Defendant, Donald Gwin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior sexual battery conviction, similar to that for which he was on trial, could be introduced if he opened the door to its admissibility; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard that he wore an ankle bracelet for monitoring as part of the sex offender registry; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a local newspaper printed an article about his case; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire.  When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.  The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion.  Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion.  

Petitioner, Young Bok Song, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis concerning his multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and his sixty-five-year sentence. The petition was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Following the denial of suppression motions, the defendants, Lucy Caitlin Alford and Jeremie Alford, entered guilty pleas in Franklin County Circuit Court to felony possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law relating to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the search warrant issued in this case.  The defendants assert the affidavit, which was based on information provided by a confidential informant, failed to meet the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause, lacked independent police corroboration, and was materially misleading.  The State contends the affidavit was sufficient.  Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, including the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision of State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2014-00566-SC-R11-CD, 2017 WL 1246855 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017), we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1000 or more, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-two years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the postconviction court’s denial of relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present an alibi witness at trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves an option to purchase real estate. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded the tenant a judgment for $12,000. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, James R. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis that was dismissed by the trial court as being time-barred and for failing to allege newly discovered evidence. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Rawney Jean Taylor, of initiating a false report, a Class D felony; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to three years, two years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  The court ordered that she serve the three- and two-year sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of five years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that her three- and two-year sentences are excessive, that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing, that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, and that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Shane H. Bishop, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. He appeals from his sentence of eleven years, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Because Defendant was ineligible for an alternative sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Steffon Hodges, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was not advised of his rights before entering his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The Trial Court Judge announced a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the final hearing below and then subsequently entered a written order vacating the oral ruling. The order vacating the oral ruling contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court. Because there is no final written order terminating the parental rights of the appellant, Shanna K., to her children, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from an indigent tenant’s petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The tenant sought to remain in possession of the leased premises during the review without posting a possessory bond. The circuit court initially issued the writs and, in lieu of a bond, ordered the tenant to pay rent as it became due. The landlord objected, arguing that a possessory bond was mandatory under the applicable statute. The circuit court then ordered the tenant to post a bond and, after the tenant failed to comply, dismissed the previously issued writs. On appeal, the tenant argues that the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond and in dismissing the writ of certiorari with the writ of supersedeas. She also contends that the landlord executed the writ of possession in violation of the initial stay of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 62.01. We conclude that, although it erred in including court costs as part of the possessory bond in light of the tenant’s indigence, the trial court properly dismissed the writs of certiorari and supersedeas after the tenant failed to file a possessory bond. We also conclude that Rule 62.01 did not stay the dismissal of the writ of supersedeas. Consequently, we affirm.

Appellant, Walter Jr. Shegog, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. The petitioner also calls on this Court to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and ignore the Tennessee Supreme Court holding of Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.