APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce action, a mother filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, seeking modification of the residential parenting schedule. The father filed a counter-petition requesting that he be designated the primary residential parent. At the conclusion of the father’s direct examination, the mother moved for an involuntary dismissal of his counter-petition, arguing that he failed to prove a material change of circumstance that warranted a change in the primary residential parent. The trial court dismissed the father’s counter-petition and modified the residential parenting schedule. Because the trial court did not allow the father to complete his proof before granting the motion for involuntary dismissal, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the dismissal of her negligence action against Shelby County, Tennessee, brought pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court found that Appellant’s complaint contained a fatal deficiency in that it failed to allege Appellant’s injuries were sustained as a result of a government employee’s negligent act or omission while acting within the scope of his or her employment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Clark Beauregard Waterford III, of second degree murder for the stabbing of Ms. Faye Burns, and the Petitioner was sentenced to serve forty years in prison. After the Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing, DNA evidence favorable to the Petitioner came to light, and the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court determined that the Petitioner had not received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that the Petitioner had not established entitlement to relief based on the State’s failure to provide exculpatory evidence, and that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief, and we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr., of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine within a drug-free school zone. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel when trial counsel failed to communicate with him, failed to file pretrial motions, including a notice of his intent to use the entrapment defense, failed to investigate and summon witnesses, and gave deficient advice regarding testifying at trial. Because the Petitioner has failed to establish either deficiency or prejudice for each claim, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Casey Colbert, entered guilty pleas to two counts of bribery of a witness and two counts of coercion of a witness, see T.C.A. §39-16-107(a)(1) and §39-16-507 (2010). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions for bribery and the two convictions for coercion into single convictions of bribery and coercion. The trial court then imposed a six-year sentence for bribery and a four-year sentence for coercion, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Dennis Evans, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues (1) his conviction in Count 2 for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated the prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) that he is entitled to retroactive application of State v. Angela Ayers, No. W2014-00781-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7212576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016) (“Ayers II”), which requires this court to reverse and vacate his firearm conviction and dismiss Count 2 for lack of adequate notice; and (3) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him to accept the plea agreement offered by the State. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a retaliatory discharge claim brought by an employee against his employer, alleging he was fired in retaliation for claiming workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court ruled in favor of the employee, finding that the employee had made a prima facie showing that his termination was in retaliation for his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court also found that the employee established the employer’s stated non-discriminatory reason was pretext. Because the record does not reflect that the trial court exercised its own independent judgment, we vacate and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the Warren County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Office of the District Attorney General for the Thirty-First Judicial District based upon an imputed conflict of interests of an assistant district attorney general. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, Tywan Montrease Sykes, was convicted by a Blount County jury of a violation of the sex offender registry, for which he received a sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he established a secondary residence under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-208. Defendant further contends that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate his statements to investigators and establish the “body of the crime,” or corpus delicti. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory Eidson, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to appoint a court reporter; (2) he and his counsel were improperly excluded from the grand jury proceedings; (3) counsel was ineffective at the preliminary hearing; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to an officer before being read his Miranda warnings; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the results of his blood test; (6) the trial court was biased, failed to correct prosecutorial misconduct, and denied the Defendant his right to a speedy trial; and (7) the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a separate case. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant-Appellant, Raymond Crepack, was convicted as charged by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury in Count 1 of driving under the influence (DUI by impairment), third offense, T.C.A. § 55-10-401(1); in Count 2 of driving while the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath was 0.08% or more (DUI per se), third offense, id. § 55-10-401(2); in Count 3 of violating the open container law, id. § 55-10-416, and in Count 4 of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked for a prior DUI conviction, id. § 55-50-504(a)(1). The trial court merged the conviction for DUI per se, third offense, with the conviction for DUI by impairment, third offense, and sentenced Crepack1 to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served at 100%, to thirty days for the open container violation, and to six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. On appeal, Crepack argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the investigatory stop, which was based upon reports from an anonymous caller, amounted to an improper seizure without independent corroboration of his “poor driving,” and (2) the sentence for his DUI, third offense, conviction is excessive. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A tenured teacher serving as an assistant principal was transferred to teach at an alternative school after the local director of schools learned that the teacher did not hold an administrator’s license. On appeal, the teacher asserts that the transfer was arbitrary and capricious where the director of schools did not comply with the law concerning when assistant principals are required to hold administrator’s licenses. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the teacher’s complaint, ruling that the director of school’s belief that the teacher was required to hold an administrator’s license was reasonable. We conclude that the director of schools’ actions and beliefs were not reasonable under the circumstances; as such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a dispute over an automobile purchase. Robert Sawyers, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a claim against E & R Auto Sales, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County (“the General Sessions Court”) alleging that Defendant sold him a problem-riddled vehicle and seeking $13,000 in damages. The General Sessions Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court dismissed a counter-claim filed by Defendant and awarded Plaintiff $350.00. Plaintiff appeals pro se, arguing he should have been awarded more money. Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived his issue on appeal. Furthermore, the record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence. As such, the record presented to this Court precludes meaningful review of the issue on appeal. Given all this, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether a notice that the State intended to seek enhanced sentencing in one case is sufficient to provide notice that the State intended to seek enhanced sentencing in a subsequent unrelated case involving the same defendant. The defendant, Jimmy Williams, was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced as a career offender to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. At trial, the defendant unsuccessfully objected to his classification as a career offender based on the State’s failure to file a timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced sentencing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court’s ruling. He now appeals the sentencing issue and also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We hold that the State must file a timely and proper notice in each case for which it intends to seek enhanced punishment. Consequently, the defendant in this case did not receive proper notice of the State’s intention, and therefore, the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender. However, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; therefore, we affirm the defendant’s judgment of conviction for aggravated assault but modify his sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment form in accordance with this opinion. 

The Petitioner, Marvin Readus, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated kidnapping while employing a firearm, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Laura L. Beasley, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and two counts of vehicular assault, Class D felonies, with the sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of ten years, three years, and three years, respectively, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of sentences imposed, the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the denial of an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

A father’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by incarceration, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and upon a determination that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Father appeals; finding no error, we affirm

This appeal arises from an action to terminate a testamentary trust, the only assets of which were non-income producing real estate. The trial court ruled that the trust terminated by operation of law pursuant to the terms of the trust following the death of the primary beneficiary, the father of the residuary beneficiaries, and it ordered the clerk of the court to prepare a deed transferring the real estate to the seven beneficiaries. The trustees appealed, contending they have the sole discretion to determine the manner of distribution, which includes the option of selling the real estate to one of the trustees and then distributing the net proceeds from the sale to the beneficiaries. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the trust terminated by its own terms upon the death of the primary beneficiary. Although we agree with the trustees’ argument that they had the discretion to distribute the assets in kind or sell the assets and distribute the net proceeds to the beneficiaries, the record reveals they failed to do so in a timely manner. Because the trustees failed to “proceed expeditiously” to distribute the trust assets to the beneficiaries, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-817(b) requires, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A pro se plaintiff filed suit over the seizure of his bank account. The defendants all moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12, and the trial court granted the motions. We affirm.

Susie Plunk (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of her employment with Professional Home Health Care Services (“Employer”). Employer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Employee’s claim should be dismissed for lack of service of process or insufficient process. The trial court granted Employer’s motion finding that Employer was not served with process, Employer had sufficiently raised failure of service of process as a defense, and Employer had not waived that defense by participating in the litigation. Employee has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for a trial on the issues.

Appellant was previously terminated from his employment with the Shelby County Fire Department. After the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld Appellant’s termination, judicial review followed in the Shelby County Chancery Court, which affirmed the Merit Board’s decision. In his appeal to this Court, Appellant contends that the decision upholding his termination should be reversed due to a violation of his due process rights. We agree and reverse.

The petitioner, William Franklin Robinette, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Greene County Criminal Court jury convictions of solicitation to commit first degree murder, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

This appeal concerns the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and insufficient service of process of a lawsuit regarding the administration of two trusts of which appellant, Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr., was a beneficiary. Appellant first had summons issued and attempted service by mail on March 1, 2016. The case remained dormant for over a year before the appellant filed additional documents. The appellees subsequently filed motions to dismiss, basing the motions primarily on insufficient service of process. The trial court granted each defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that there was insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to the insufficient service of process. We affirm.  

The parties initiated divorce proceedings in 2012. Trial dates were set and then continued a number of times until August 2017, when the trial court issued an order stating that the trial would take place on October 31, 2017, and that there would be no more continuances. Neither the husband nor his attorney appeared for the trial, and the wife proceeded to present evidence in support of her case. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, designated her the primary residential parent, divided the marital property, awarded her child support, and awarded her attorney’s fees. The husband moved to have the divorce decree set aside based on excusable neglect, inadvertence, or mistake. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband appealed. On appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s refusal to set the decree aside. He also alleges the trial court erred in dividing the marital property, finding he was voluntarily underemployed for purposes of calculating his child support obligation, and awarding the wife her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.