APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a judgment finding the defendant violated a protective order and a subsequent judgment extending the protective order for one year. Specifically, the defendant seeks to set aside these judgments based on inadequate notice. Although the defendant appeared in court for a related hearing and admits that all notices were sent to her at the proper address, she contends on appeal that, because she was a frequent traveler, she was unaware of the two hearings at issue in this appeal until after they occurred. We have determined the defendant waived the notice issue by failing to bring it to the attention of the trial court and by failing to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Additionally, we have determined the appeal was frivolous; therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 27-1-122. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The Defendant, Jordana Jenyane Wright, pled guilty to Class E felony theft of property with an agreed-upon sentence of one year and six months of probation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court, in its decision to deny diversion, failed to properly account for the Defendant’s lack of a criminal record and improperly weighed irrelevant facts, such as the Defendant’s failure to implicate any potential co-defendants and the criminal history of the Defendant’s fiancé. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Demetrice A. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017
guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of a handgun after having been convicted of a felony and failure to appear, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Thomas McLaughlin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition alleged that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at a revocation hearing .Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Armin Lars Begtrup, was found guilty after a jury trial of two counts of aggravated perjury. He was sentenced to three and one-half years of supervised probation. The trial court granted judicial diversion. Defendant timely filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to a unanimous verdict and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review, we dismiss the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to consider the issues.

I agree that the majority opinion is correctly decided based upon the current relevant rules and case law. I write separately because I also agree with the statement in the Defendant’s supplemental brief that The denial of access to the appellate courts where the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, is convicted at trial, and is sentenced under judicial diversion is wrong. That is the Appellant’s rubric. The defendant who maintains his innocence has no appellate recourse to correct trial errors that may have resulted in a wrongful conviction if sentenced under judicial diversion.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance claim filed against his employer following a car accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The transferee of real property following a foreclosure sale filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the occupier. After the transferee prevailed in the general sessions court, the occupier appealed to circuit court. The transferee then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the transferee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.

Petitioner, Brian Pillow, was convicted by a Maury County Jury of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone. He received an effective sentence of twelve years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court should have granted a continuance when co-counsel was appointed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this dispute over the sale of real and personal property, the buyers complain that they did not receive all the personal property described in the bill of sale and that the real property was encumbered. Their complaint asserted claims for intentional misrepresentation, breach of the covenant against encumbrances, and breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the buyers damages for breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation. Both sides appealed. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the buyers’ reliance on the misrepresentation in the warranty deed was reasonable. In all other respects, we affirm.

In this forcible entry and detainer case, REI Nation, LLC (“REI”) filed a detainer warrant against LaTasha Chanta Tennial (“Tennial”) in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County (“the General Sessions Court”) to obtain possession of certain foreclosed-upon real estate (“the Property”) it had purchased. The General Sessions Court entered judgment for REI. Tennial appealed to the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Circuit Court”) for trial de novo. The Circuit Court found for REI, as well. Tennial appeals to this Court. Discerning no reversible error in the Circuit Court’s judgment, we affirm.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Mark Alan Kirby, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The agreement provided that Defendant’s sentence was three years as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was reserved for determination by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the entire sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant has appealed, asserting the trial court should have granted full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, John N. Moffitt, of reckless aggravated assault, as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, for slashing the victim’s arm with a pocketknife following a property dispute. State v. John N. Moffitt, No. W2014-02388-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 369379, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 24, 2016). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal; however, this Court also reduced the amount of restitution that the trial court ordered and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of restitution that the Petitioner could pay. Id. On March 10, 2020, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault was “an illegal and unconstitutional conviction” because the indictment failed to allege “recklessly,” which the Petitioner contends is a “required mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability” than that required for aggravated assault. The Petitioner alleged that he was entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he was “totally unaware of the fact about [sic] the illegal and unconstitutional conviction.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was time-barred and that the Petitioner’s allegations did not constitute new evidence and thus did not toll the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding involving a short-term marriage with minor children.  In conjunction with its divorce judgment, the trial court designated the mother as the primary residential parent, allowed her to relocate to Mississippi, and awarded her both transitional alimony and alimony in solido.  Father now raises several issues for our review on appeal.  While we affirm the trial court’s judgment pertaining to the parties’ parenting plan and its determination about the children’s best interests, we vacate a component of the in solido award given to the mother in a purported attempt to equalize the division of the marital estate.  We further vacate the award of transitional alimony and remand the case for that issue to be reconsidered by the trial court.  The balance of the judgment is affirmed.  The mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal is granted.

The petitioner, Christopher N. Hernandez, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and solicitation of a minor, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Jermarlon Sanders, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery, for which he received an eight-year term of imprisonment. In his appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Brandon Lee Clymer, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020). See Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz v. State, No. M2019-00062-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 4866766 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2019) (“Ruby-Ruiz I”), case remanded (Tenn. Aug. 7, 2020). Upon further review, we conclude that the supreme court’s holding in Howard does not apply to the untimely filing of an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. Consistent with the holding of the majority in our previous opinion in this case, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction court and remand the case for the entry of an order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal for the limited purpose of filing an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. The Petitioner’s remaining allegations shall be held in abeyance in the post-conviction court until the resolution of the delayed appeal.

Defendant, Joseph Christopher Hendry II, was indicted for one count of felony first degree murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and four counts of aggravated assault.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a sentence of 25 years to be served at 100 percent.  Defendant filed a motion seeking to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.  Defendant appeals.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Gregory Goff, of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault for which he received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court’s jury instruction regarding self-defense. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A franchisor sued a franchisee in Texas and obtained a default judgment, which it sought to enroll in Tennessee.  The franchisor moved for summary judgment, and the franchisee asserted there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether it had been served properly in the Texas action.  The trial court granted the franchisor’s motion, concluding that the Texas judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Tennessee, and awarded the franchisor its attorneys’ fees.  On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment but reverse the award of attorneys’ fees.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion granting the delayed appeal based upon the reasoning set forth in my dissenting opinion in this appeal filed on October 2, 2019. I strongly disagree that the Tennessee Supreme Court performed a mere perfunctory or administrative review of the Petitioner’s motion to late-file an application for permission to appeal to which the Petitioner attached his application before denying the Petitioner’s motion. Rather, I conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court has already reviewed the substantive underlying issues of the appeal in determining not to accept the late-filed appeal in the interest of justice. Accordingly, I would affirm the post-conviction court’s decision to deny the Petitioner delayed appeal, and I would deny a stay of the resolution of the remaining issues raised by the Petitioner.

A legal parent appeals a child support award.  He claims his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity for the child should be rescinded due to a material mistake of fact.  He also claims that requiring him to pay child support would violate public policy because he is not the biological father of the child.  Upon our review, we conclude that the legal parent failed to prove the existence of a material mistake of fact that would warrant rescission of the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.  We also conclude that ordering a legal parent to pay child support is consistent with public policy.  So we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Tarvis Weatherly, of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction which we affirm after a thorough review of the record.

The Appellee, Hunter Allen Helmick, was charged with possession of LSD with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class B felony. He filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police officers about LSD being in his car, arguing that the statements were the result of custodial questioning without his receiving Miranda warnings. He also argued that the trial court should suppress the LSD found during a search of his car because the police found the LSD as a result of his statements. The trial court granted the motion, suppressing both the Appellee’s statements and the drug evidence, and the State appeals the trial court’s ruling. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State that the trial court erred by suppressing the drug evidence. Therefore, the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the drug evidence is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the Appellee’s statements is affirmed.