APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A divorce decree was filed in 1993 with the marital assets being divided by agreement of these parties. The decree awarded Husband’s military retirement benefits to Wife “as a division of marital property.” The decree also provided that inasmuch as Wife was to receive that pension, she should be responsible for the support of the parties’ two minor children. In 1999, after the children reached majority, Husband filed this “Petition to Discontinue Child Support and Modify Final Judgment by Restoring Retirement Benefits.” The Trial Court held that the divorce decree ordered Husband to pay Wife his military pension as a division of marital property, not child support, and therefore declined to modify the original decree. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County which convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for premeditated murder. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was the principal actor in causing the death of the victim. Nevertheless, the court found that his conviction could be sustained under a theory of criminal responsibility for premeditated murder because premeditated murder was a natural and probable consequence of aggravated robbery under the facts of the case. We then granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal. We hold that the natural and probable consequences rule can be used to sustain a defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder based upon criminal responsibility for the conduct of a co-defendant. The jury, however, must be instructed on all elements of a charge of criminal responsibility, including the natural and probable consequences rule. Because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences rule, the defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is no basis for invalidating the 1993 award to Wife of Husband’s Air Force retirement -- an award made by the trial court “as a division of marital property.” As a part of an unappealed-from final judgment, the trial court’s division-ofproperty award is not subject to challenge in this proceeding, see Vanatta v. Vanatta, 701 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), in the absence of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 basis for relief, and I find no such basis in the meager record before us.

In this appeal, we address whether prior inconsistent statements can be used substantively to corroborate a confession when the prior statements are admitted into evidence without objection. We also consider whether the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the limited use of the prior statements constitutes plain error. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that prior inconsistent statements could not be used as substantive evidence and that the failure of the trial court in this case to give a limiting instruction amounted to plain error. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that by not objecting to the admission of the statements, the appellee waived any objection to their use by the jury as substantive evidence to corroborate the appellee’s two confessions. Consequently, we hold that the evidence in this case is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, because the decision to forgo any objection to the hearsay testimony was a deliberate, tactical decision by trial counsel, we are precluded from considering admission of the evidence under a plain error analysis. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the appellee’s conviction and sentence for aggravated sexual battery.