APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal in a divorce case of the Trial Court’s denial of Wife’s Motion seeking postjudgment interest. The Judgment was satisfied three years and four months after it was entered. The Motion for post-judgment interest was filed three months after the Judgment was paid. The Trial Court denied post-judgment interest on two grounds. The first was the Trial Court’s finding of an accord and satisfaction resulting from Husband’s payment of the judgment without interest. The Trial Court also held it would be unconscionable and inequitable for Husband to pay post-judgment interest. The Trial Court then exercised its discretion to deny post-judgment interest. Wife argues that the Trial Court can not deny post judgment interest for equitable reasons, that Husband failed to prove an accord and satisfaction, and that the accord and satisfaction affirmative defense may not be raised for the first time during legal argument, cannot be established without proof, and is waived if not pleaded. We hold the Trial Court erred, reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court, and remand the case for further proceedings. To avoid the appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality, the Trial Judge is to recuse himself from those further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. R. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed; Case Remanded
 

Kenneth A. McBride appealed from an Order of the Chancellor confirming the Referee's Report that concluded McBride had offered no new evidence on the issue of reducing child support, which had been previously adjudicated. We affirm.

This appeal questions whether a forum selection clause is valid and enforceable against the Plaintiffs, Larry Wells and Signal Capital Corporation. Pursuant to the forum selection clause, Signal One LLC and NationsBanc Capital Corporation filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss by finding the forum selection clause was valid. We affirm.

By this suit the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they are entitled to four separate prescriptive easements across property owned by the Defendant. Prior to the commencement of trial the Defendant conceded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to one easement and the Plaintiffs conceded that they were not entitled to another one. The Trial Court found in favor of the Plaintiffs as to the remaining two easements, resulting in this appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action for ejectment filed by Plaintiff John W. Johnson ("Plaintiff") against Defendant Bernice Wade ("Defendant"). Plaintiff filed suit in the Gibson County Circuit Court alleging that he was the sole owner of the tract of land where both Plaintiff's and Defendant's residences are located. Prior to Defendant's filing on an answer, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. Thereafter, Defendant filed an answer, a motion to dismiss, and a motion to compel Plaintiff to appear for deposition. Following Plaintiff's failure to appear for deposition, failure to prepare an order as directed by the court, and an attempt to file a premature appeal, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's case for failure to properly prosecute. Plaintiff appeals.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and ten counts of rape of a child. In this direct appeal Defendant alleges he did not receive a fair trial because (1) the bill of particulars did not sufficiently inform Defendant of the charges, and (2) the prosecution violated Brady vs. Maryland when it failed to turn-over potentially exculpatory evidence to Defendant pre-trial. Held: the bill of particulars adequately appraised Defendant of the crimes with which he was charged. Although the prosecution violated Brady when it failed to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to Defendant pre-trial, the error was harmless. Judgment of the trial court affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine: 1) whether private school tuition constitutes an extraordinary educational expense under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines; and 2) whether the noncustodial parent should be required to pay those expenses in addition to child support based upon the percentage of net income of the noncustodial parent. We hold that pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines private school tuition is an "extraordinary educational expense." We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals requiring the total amount of private school tuition to be paid by the obligor-father. We hold, however, that in appropriate cases a court may apportion the amount of tuition between the parties.