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State vs. Jacqueline Heard & Irvin Salky
W1999-02414-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves an attempt by a taxpayer to redeem his property after it had been sold at a tax sale. The taxpayer filed a Petition to Redeem the property within the one-year statutory period, but failed to tender the money into court within the one-year period, as required by statute. The chancellor below granted the taxpayer an additional thirty days, as a matter of equity, in which to pay the money into court and redeem his property. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:D. J. Alissandratos |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/20/00 | |
Chuck Wallace vs. Bob Chase
W1999-01987-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute between the Appellants and the Appellees. The Appellees filed a complaint with the Chancery Court of Carroll County against the Appellants. The Appellants filed a counter-complaint against the Appellees. Following a trial, the trial court reformed the deeds of the parties. The trial court moved the disputed corner of the properties twelve and one half feet due south of a PK nail in the roadway. The trial court also granted a permanent easement for an existing driveway to the Appellants.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Ron E. Harmon |
Carroll County | Court of Appeals | 11/20/00 | |
Sabrina Burton vs. Carroll Co.
W2000-00549-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued county and county's volunteer fire department pursuant to Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act seeking damages for wife's personal injuries and husband's loss of consortium sustained while they were patronizing a "haunted house" operated by the volunteer fire department to raise funds. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants were negligent in (1) creating a dangerous and defective condition and failing to correct that condition; (2) failing to warn the public of the dangers and defective condition; and (3) failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendants have appealed. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:C. Creed Mcginley |
Carroll County | Court of Appeals | 11/20/00 | |
E.L. Billingsley and Oneida Farms, Inc. vs. Alvin D. Escue
E2000-00463-COA-R3-CV
The Trial Judge granted defendant summary judgment on grounds the action was time-barred. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Originating Judge:Dale C. Workman |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 11/17/00 | |
State vs. Maurice Shaw
W1998-00503-SC-R11-CD
We granted this appeal to decide two issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver and (2) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction and that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals upon the separate grounds stated herein.
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Joseph H. Walker, III |
Tipton County | Supreme Court | 11/17/00 | |
Lawrence Westfall vs. Brentwood Svc. Grp, Inc.
E2000-01086-COA-R3-CV
Lawrence O. Westfall filed suit against his former employer, Brentwood Service Group, Inc., seeking payment of post-employment commissions allegedly due him. The defendant counterclaimed for breach of a non-competition/non-disclosure agreement. Following a bench trial, the court below awarded post-employment commissions to the plaintiff and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim, finding that the parties had not agreed to the non-competition/non-disclosure agreement. The employer now appeals, claiming that the plaintiff is not entitled to post-employment commissions and that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the parties' alleged non-competition/non-disclosure agreement. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Jerri S. Bryant |
Bradley County | Court of Appeals | 11/17/00 | |
State vs. Thomas E. Davenport and John Simmons
M2000-00317-CCA-R3-CD
Both defendants were convicted by a Williamson County jury of selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. Both defendants were sentenced as Range II, multiple offenders. Defendant Simmons received a sixteen-year sentence, and defendant Davenport received a fifteen-year sentence. In this direct appeal, both defendants challenge (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) the length and manner of service of their sentences. Simmons further raises the following issues: (1) whether he was denied a speedy trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the absence of proper signatures on the indictment; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to require the state to elect an offense upon which to proceed. Additionally, Davenport makes the following allegations: (1) the trial court erred in allowing portions of the audio taped drug transaction to be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court erred in ruling his prior convictions were admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 609; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when the informant referred to Davenport's offering her a crack pipe. Based upon a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as it relates to defendant Simmons; however, we reverse defendant Davenport's conviction for the sale of cocaine and reduce it to simple possession of cocaine. We remand to the trial court to re-sentence defendant Davenport.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Timothy L. Easter |
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/17/00 | |
E2000-0816-COA-R3-CV
E2000-0816-COA-R3-CV
Originating Judge:Russell E. Simmons, Jr. |
Loudon County | Court of Appeals | 11/17/00 | |
Edgar Doyle, et al vs. Charles Frost, M.D., et al
W1998-00391-SC-R11-CV
In this appeal, the plaintiffs contest the trial court's overruling of a motion to amend their complaint to add the Jackson-Madison General Hospital District, a governmental entity, as a party defendant. At issue is the scope of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03, which allows the filing date of certain amendments to a pleading to "relate back" to the date of the filing of the original pleading. We are asked to determine whether Rule 15.03 applies to governmental entities. We conclude that it does and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Jon Kerry Blackwood |
Hardeman County | Supreme Court | 11/17/00 | |
Linda Taylor vs. James Taylor
E2000-00476-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a divorce in which the Trial Court awarded Linda May Taylor ("Wife"), age 58, alimony until she reaches age 65 or she retires, whichever occurs first. Wife was also awarded the parties' home. The Trial Court granted James Arnold Taylor ("Husband"), age 61, his interest in the marital home but ordered that Wife does not have to pay Husband for his interest in the marital home until Wife reaches age 65. Husband appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Lawrence H. Puckett |
Bradley County | Court of Appeals | 11/17/00 | |
State vs. Derrick Sayles
W1998-00425-SC-R11-CD
Shelby County -Derrick Sayles was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding the bond reduction and the charge reduction accorded to the State's principal witness immediately after his testimony. The State appealed. We hold that the trial court erred when it refused to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding benefits granted to the witness after his testimony; Sayles's right to confrontation was therefore violated. We cannot hold that this violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances resulting in the bond reduction and the charge reduction, both of which were granted after the witness had testified. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and this cause is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
State vs. Timothy Walton
W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Lee Moore Jr. |
Dyer County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
State vs. Timothy Walton
W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Lee Moore Jr. |
Dyer County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
Don Culbreath vs. First Tennessee Bank
W1998-00426-SC-R11-CV
Don L. Culbreath (Culbreath) filed suit against Community First Bank (Community First) seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Culbreath alleged that Community First fraudulently refused to pay Culbreath the proceeds of a new $150,000 loan that had been agreed upon by a bank officer and Culbreath and for which Culbreath had signed a demand note and deed of trust. Instead, the bank used the deed of trust to serve as additional collateral for Culbreath's existing indebtedness to the bank. Prior to trial, Community First merged with First Tennessee Bank, N.A. (First Tennessee), and First Tennessee was substituted for Community First as the defendant in the case. The trial court found in favor of Culbreath and awarded $209,156 in compensatory damages. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of punitive damages, the court awarded Culbreath an additional $9,000,000 in punitive damages. First Tennessee argues on appeal that as a successor corporation it should not be liable for punitive damages arising from Community First's actions. We hold that First Tennessee is liable for the compensatory damages awarded by the trial court and that it is also liable for punitive damages arising out of Community First's pre-merger conduct. However, we remand this case to the trial court for reassessment of punitive damages based upon the factors outlined in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Floyd Peete, Jr. |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
In the Matter of All Assessments, Review of Ad Valorum
M1998-00243-SC-R11-CV
This Court granted the applications for permission to appeal submitted on behalf of the Tennessee Board of Equalization and certain public utility companies. The purpose of our grant was to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Board of Equalization had exceeded its authority in granting a reduction in the assessed value of certain centrally-assessed public utility tangible personal property for tax year 1998. We hold that the Board of Equalization does have the legal authority, as part of the equalization process, to reduce the appraised value (and the assessed value) of centrally-assessed public utility property. Such a reduction is an appropriate remedy where the reduction causes the appraised value of such centrally-assessed personal property within each local tax jurisdiction to bear the same ratio to fair market value as obtains for the personal property within such local jurisdiction that is appraised and assessed by local taxing authorities. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Tennessee Board of Equalization for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
Mitchell Bingham vs. Tammy Bingham
E1999-01768-COA-R3-CV
In this post-divorce case, Mitchell Blain Bingham filed a petition seeking the custody of his minor child. The trial court, instead, awarded the child's custody to the child's paternal grandparents, who, prior to the trial court's order awarding them custody, were not parties to the action and had not previously petitioned for custody. Both of the child's parents appeal the award of custody to the paternal grandparents. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 11/16/00 | |
Willie Jean Johnson vs. James Johnson
W1999-01232-SC-R11-CV
The parties' marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") divided Mr. Johnson's "military retirement benefits" to provide one half of those benefits to Ms. Johnson. After the final decree was entered, Mr. Johnson unilaterally waived a portion of his military retired pay to receive the same amount in non-taxable disability benefits. The payment of Ms. Johnson's share of the military retired pay was reduced accordingly. Ms. Johnson requested a modification of the MDA to provide for alimony in an amount equal to the reduction. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the requested relief, relying on Gilliland v. Stanley, No. 3258, 1997 WL 180587 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 16, 1997). We interpret the petition to modify as a petition to enforce the divorce decree. We hold that when an MDA divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse obtains a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits as of the date of the court's decree. Any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the non-military spouse's vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce incorporating the MDA. The case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the decree.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Robert L. Childers |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
00243-SC-R11-CV
00243-SC-R11-CV
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Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
Memphis Housing Authority vs. Tara Thompson
W1998-00108-SC-R11-CV
The appellee, Memphis Housing Authority brought this unlawful detainer action seeking to evict the appellant, tenant Tara Thompson, after drugs were discovered on the father of her child while he was inside her apartment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the lease agreement imposes strict liability upon the appellant for the drug-related criminal activity of her "guests and other persons under her control." We granted permission to appeal to consider the appropriate standard that applies when a public housing authority seeks to evict a tenant for drug-related criminal activity. This is an issue of first impression in Tennessee. After due consideration, we hold that the lease agreement imposes strict liability for drug-related criminal activity engaged in by the tenant or any household member but permits eviction for the drug related criminal activity of "guests and other persons under [the tenant's] control"only if the tenant knew or should have known of the drug-related criminal activity and failed to take reasonable steps to halt or prevent the illegal activity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the appellee's motion for summary judgment under the legal standard announced herein.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Robert A. Lanier |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
Heatherly vs. Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
M1998-00906-COA-R10-CV
This extraordinary appeal involves a dispute between two homeowners whose house was damaged by fire and the two insurance adjusting companies hired by the homeowners' insurance carrier to investigate their claim. Believing that their claim had been fraudulently processed, the homeowners filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sumner County against their insurance carrier and the two adjusting companies. The three defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as to the adjusting companies. After the trial court denied the motions and declined to grant an interlocutory appeal, the two adjusting companies petitioned for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal. We granted the application and now reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss because the homeowners have conceded that they have no breach of contract claim against the adjusting companies and because we have concluded that the homeowners' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas Goodall |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 11/15/00 | |
State vs. Vincent Sims
W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
State vs. Vincent Sims
W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
Clifton vs. Acosta-Delgado
M2000-00253-COA-R3-CV
This is a post-divorce child custody dispute. The mother filed a petition to regain custody of the parties' three children after she had entered into an agreed order in 1995 granting custody to the defendant father. After hearing testimony on, inter alia, the father driving while intoxicated with the children in the car with him, the trial court found a material change in circumstances, granted custody to the mother, and ordered the father to pay child support. The father appeals, arguing that there was not a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody, that the trial court inappropriately considered his child support arrearage prior to the 1995 agreed order, and that the trial court miscalculated his income, resulting in an unreasonably high child support award. We affirm, finding a material change in circumstances warranting a change in custody, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the award of child support.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Muriel Robinson |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/15/00 | |
In re: Estate of Willette Bonita Carnahan
M1999-00494-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a will contest in which the defendant has appealed from a jury verdict invalidating a will on the grounds of unsound mind and undue influence. The deceased executed two wills. The first will was executed in 1985 naming the plaintiff who was a friend, employee, and the son of the family who cared for her in her later years as the sole beneficiary. The second will was executed in 1993 naming the defendant, a man who share cropped tobacco on her farm and was paid to mow her lawn, as the sole beneficiary. The plaintiff alleged that at the time the latter will was executed, the testator was of unsound mind and had been unduly influenced by the defendant. At trial, the jury returned special findings that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind on December 29, 1993, when the second will was executed and that she was unduly influenced by the defendant in making the last will and testament. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues: (1) whether there was material, substantial evidence to support the jury findings, (2) whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury regarding a presumption of undue influence and the burden of proof on finding a confidential relationship, and (3) whether the trial court erred in assessing court costs against the defendant and not awarding him attorneys fees. We affirm the judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Tom E. Gray |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 11/15/00 | |
State vs. Harold Bayuk
M2000-01654-CCA-R3-CD
The Appellant, Harold M. Bayuk, was convicted by a Hickman County Circuit Court jury of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and one count of driving on a revoked license. Following his conviction for DUI, the Appellant waived his right to jury sentencing and agreed to submit the issue of enhanced punishment to the trial court. The trial court found the Appellant guilty of DUI, third offense, and sentenced him to eleven months twenty-nine days, with 150 days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to serve 150 days instead of the statutory minimum of 120 days. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, vacate in part, and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction.
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Originating Judge:Timothy L. Easter |
Hickman County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/15/00 |