APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, LaQuenton Monger, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree felony murder by aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony murder conviction and twenty years imprisonment in the Department for the aggravated child abuse conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction of felony murder and further challenges the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of felony murder. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the appellant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse and remand the cases to the trial court for a new trial.

The defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with one count of the unlawful possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and one count of the unlawful possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. A separate indictment returned the same day charged one count of the unlawful possession of marijuana. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he subsequently pled guilty to two misdemeanor drug possession offenses in connection with the charges, and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 11 months, 29 days. The trial court refused his request for judicial diversion, but granted him probation, with the condition that he spend 90 days in a halfway house. In a timely filed appeal to this court, the defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to three months in the halfway house as a condition of probation. Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect the disposition of all charges against the defendant.

Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. He contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial where he was convicted of second degree murder. We affirm.

The defendant, Charles R. Blackstock, pled guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of rape of a child. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305, 39-13-522. The trial court imposed 25-year sentences on each offense. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of 75 years. The sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping and the consecutive sentencing order are affirmed. Because the trial court erroneously applied certain enhancement factors to each of the sentences for rape of a child, the terms are modified to 23 years.

The defendant, George E. Ratliff, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant alleges various errors by the trial court, challenges his sentence, and appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis on the ground of untimely filing. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the recent decision of our supreme court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). We remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Pursuant to State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1999), appellate proceedings on Defendant's appeal as of right from his conviction are stayed, pending the trial court's ruling on the error coram nobis petition.

The appellant, Charles Shelton, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by the Johnson County, Tennessee, Criminal Court. Following a review of the petition and the record herein we find that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED.

The Defendant was convicted of second offense driving under the influence and violation of the open container law. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration for the DUI conviction, suspended after service of ninety days, and to thirty days incarceration, suspended, for violation of the open container law. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s findings of guilt and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Stella Rodifer, was convicted of forgery, a felony; six counts of worthless checks under $500.00, misdemeanors; and one count of worthless checks over $1,000.00, a felony. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of two and four years, respectively, on each of the felonies. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days on each misdemeanor, two of which were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of seven years, 11 months, and 27 days. The trial court granted probation on the misdemeanors and sentenced the defendant to a Community Corrections program on the felonies. Four months later, the trial court revoked the alternative sentences and ordered the defendant to serve four years for forgery; eight years for felony worthless checks; and 11 months and 29 days (two consecutive) for each of the six counts of worthless checks, for an effective sentence of 13 years, 11 months, and 27 days. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by revoking her alternative sentences and by imposing lengthier, consecutive sentences. The judgments are affirmed.

The appellant, Kelly A. Hancock appeals as a matter of right from her conviction for driving under the influence. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. After a review of the evidence we affirm the conviction pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.