APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this suit wherein the Plaintiff, Thomas a. Smythe, seeks damages against the Defendant, Donald Cowan, for willfully interfering with contractual relations between Mr. Smythe and Phil Jones, the Trial Court granted summary judgment because in his opinion the Statute of Limitations barred the claim asserted. We affirm.

The defendant appeals from his convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, resisting arrest and criminal impersonation. The only issue raised by the defendant is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the co-defendant's conduct amounted to aggravated assault and that the defendant, as a party to the offense, was criminally responsible for that conduct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Blount County Circuit Court awarding the Plaintiffs discretionary costs including attorney fees. This appeal arises from an earlier action (second lawsuit) seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving the original lawsuit filed by the Defendant.

Pursuant to the wife's motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the trial court amended the division of the husband's Navy pension contained in an agreed order of divorce. We reverse the trial court's judgment.

This is a suit for damages against an insurance company for the alleged breach of a lawyer’s professional liability insurance policy. Plaintiff, Glenn McColpin, appeals from the judgment of the chancery court for the defendant, North Atlantic Casualty & Surety Insurance 2 Company, Inc. (hereinafter, “North Atlantic”).

This is a Rule 9 appeal from a judgment denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The issue is whether an insurance agent has the apparent authority to waive the conditions for issuance of a policy and the limitations on his authority as contained in the application for the policy. We hold that the agent has no such authority and therefore grant the motions for summary judgment.

This is an action by the appellant, Cultra Landscaping Supply Company (Cultra), seeking to recover the balance allegedly due on an open account. Cultra’s complaint, as amended, was filed against the Director of Highways, Department of Transportation, W. L. Sharpe Contracting Company, Inc. (Sharpe) and Charles Hill, individually and d/b/a C. H. Hill Landscape and 2The Director of Highways was named as a defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 54-5-124 (civil actions against contractors by claimants). Cultra’s complaint states that it “seeks no remedies” against Sharpe, but acts to put the latter “on notice” of said claim having been filed with the Department of Transportation. Prior to trial, a summary judgment was entered in favor of Sharpe. The order granting summary judgment provided that the State of Tennessee and the Department of Transportation were to retain certain funds to satisfy Cultra’s claim in the event it proved meritorious at trial, in accordance with T.C.A. § 54-5-123. After trial, an agreed order was entered with this Court dismissing the Department of Transportation, Director of Highways as a party. 2 Excavating (Hill). For purposes of this appeal, however, the only other party before us is Hill, the appellee.2 A bench trial resulted in a judgment for Hill. Cultra appeals on the sole basis that the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s findings. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Petitioner, Loretta Trull, appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing her petition for certiorari and affirming the decision of the Board of Review that disallowed her claim for unemployment compensation benefits.

We accepted this extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, to review certain pre-hearing actions of the Davidson County Criminal Court in this post-conviction case. Our grant of review extends to these issues: (1) whether a "next friend" may file a post-conviction petition on behalf of an incompetent prisoner; (2) if so, may the post-conviction court, sua sponte, order a mental evaluation of the prisoner or conduct other inquiries into the matter to determine whether the "next friend" petition was properly filed on the prisoner's behalf; and (3) whether the court below properly denied the petitioner's motion for recusal. We conclude that we improvidently granted extraordinary review in part, but we otherwise affirm the rulings of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.

In this action, Plaintiff Eddie Heath (“Heath”) filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether he provides a taxable service under the Business Tax Act. Heath brought suit against A.C. Gilless (“Gilless”), the Shelby County Sheriff, Jayne S. Creson (“Creson”), the Shelby County Clerk, as well as two employees of the Shelby County Clerk’s Office, Waylon Wininger (“Wininger”) and Pat Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”). The trial court dismissed Heath’s complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

The defendant was tried and convicted of second degree murder in the Cumberland County Criminal Court in connection with an aggravated assault of a bar patron who died approximately one month later. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to 25 years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on "diminished capacity" and with the length of the sentence he received. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment below.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the State of Tennessee never surrendered jurisdiction over defendant and that defendant's sentence did not expire. We accordingly affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a class A felony.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

Plaintiff's actin filed against the State pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tennessee Code Annotated  § 4-20-191, et seq. , was dismissed by the Trial Judge for failure to state of cause of action.  T.R.C.P. Rule12.02( 6) .

This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees.
 

Eldred L. Reid (Plaintiff) sued Jason Petty (Defendant) for “pain and suffering with mental stress” alleged to have resulted from the defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for pain medication. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the defendant was immune pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8- 307(h).

This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff, Gary Bernard Sanders, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at the Cold Creek Correctional Facility, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Jimmie L. Jones, a correctional officer at  the facility.¹

With its decision today, a majority of this Court has effectively permitted a defendant, who was sentenced to death in 1989 for the brutal execution of a 74-year-old grandmother, an opportunity to escape the ultimate punishment for his actions solely because he has managed to obtain a lower score on a revised I.Q. test than he was previously able to do. Before today, the Constitution of this State has never been held to provide blanket capital immunity to a class of persons based only on the fact of low intellectual ability and deficits in adaptive behavior. Instead, the Constitution has barred such executions only when the defendant’s mental condition displaces the following capacities: (1) the cognitive capacity to appreciate that certain action will lead to the death of others; (2) the moral capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of murder; or (3) the volitional capacity to behave in a lawful manner.

In this divorce action, the Plaintiff, Lawrence Woodward Hamilton, filed his petition 2 for divorce on July 20, 1993. The Defendant, Brenda Kay Smith Hamilton, filed a countercomplaint seeking a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted the Defendant’s request for a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded the parties’ marital residence as well as household furnishings to the Defendant. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay all outstanding marital debts other than the first and second mortgage on the marital residence, all expenses incurred by the Defendant as a result of this action including the Defendant’s attorney fees and $2,200.00 per month in permanent alimony. The trial court awarded the Defendant onehalf of the Plaintiff’s retirement proceeds and ordered the Plaintiff to maintain the Defendant on his health insurance policy for three years. The trial court further ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $50,000.00 life insurance policy naming the Defendant as the irrevocable beneficiary. The Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial court arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the Defendant permanent alimony and attorney fees. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.