APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was originally convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and received an effective life sentence. He now contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. We conclude otherwise and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James L. Carrethers appeals his second-degree murder conviction. He was found guilty of that offense by a Davidson County Jury. He is presently serving an eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction for the crime. In this direct appeal, he claims that the evidence does not sufficiently support the conviction and that the lower court erred in denying a motion to suppress his inculpatory, pretrial statements. Because we are unconvinced of error in either respect, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael George Medina, appeals his conviction by a Smith County jury finding him guilty of first-degree murder. On appeal, Medina challenges (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, as it relates to the element of premeditation, and (2) the trial court's ruling which he asserts interfered with the defense's order of proof, thus, "forcing a premature election on defendant's right to testify." After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Clayton Eugene Turner, brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, incest, and assault. He argues two issues in this appeal: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's post-conviction request for the appointment of experts in the fields of DNA analysis and the transmission of infectious diseases. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jonathan Thornton, was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years and 11 months and 29 days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and (3) that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. Because the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence, the defendant's sentence is modified to a sentence of split confinement with nine months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation.

The petitioner, Natasha W. Cornett, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for our review are (1) whether the petitioner properly waived her right to a jury trial at sentencing; (2) whether her guilty pleas to three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000 were knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (3) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Alan Parrigan, was convicted of the offense of aggravated sexual battery. He received a sentence of ten years incarceration to be served consecutively to a sentence he was serving at the time of the commission of the instant offense. On appeal he raises three errors for our consideration. First, the appellant maintains that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of child abuse and neglect. Second, he alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Finally, the appellant contends consecutive sentencing is unwarranted in his case. After a thorough review of the record, we find that although the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of child abuse and neglect was error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that consecutive sentencing is fully supported by the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief concerning petitioner's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel, during the trial of the case, "opened the door" to the state's introduction of evidence of defendant's prior arrests. We agree with the post-conviction court's finding that petitioner failed to establish prejudice; thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Robert Spooner appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petition was filed in an effort to avoid Spooner's extradition to the state of Alabama, where he is charged with having violated his probation on a conviction of receiving stolen property. Because the lower court properly denied the petition, we affirm.

The appellant, Charles WilliamYoung, was convicted in a jury trial of the offense of theft over $500. He was sentenced to one year and six months and ordered to serve 60 days of incarceration, to pay a $500 fine and restitution of $800. The appellant's probation was revoked for the first time in 1997, but he was again placed on probation for 18 months. Two years later his probation was again revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his original sentence with 94 days of jail credit. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, or in the alternative, a writ of habeas corpus and alleged inter alia that a number of alleged constitutional errors occurred at both probation revocation hearings. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition.

We hold that the Post-Conviction Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-201, et seq., does not provide a cause of action for a collateral attack on a probation revocation proceeding. Moreover, the appellant's allegations, taken as true, would at most render the results of the probation revocation proceedings voidable, not void, and therefore the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the appellant. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.