APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this motion for a full court review of the Special Workers' Compensation Panel decision to determine whether the appellant, Clyde L. Long, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred as a result of a work-related incident as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the holding of the trial court and Special Workers' Compensation Panel, and that the appellant's injury did arise out of and within the scope of his employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special Workers' Compensation Panel is reversed. Because the trial court made no other factual findings, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make factual findings regarding: (1) the compensable medical benefits due to the appellant; (2) the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Long is entitled, and; (3) the proper permanent disability award to which Mr. Long is entitled. Additionally, in the interest of expediting the payment of Mr. Long's medical expenses and the receipt of disability benefits, we direct the trial court to hold such hearing within sixty days of the date of this Court's order.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Woods, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued over $500, and vandalism of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender for the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated burglary, three years for theft, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Paul, appeals the Robertson County Criminal Court's disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The lower court ruled that, because appellate counsel's single issue raised on direct appeal was deemed waived by the appellate court, the petitioner would be entitled to a delayed appeal. The court also dismissed without prejudice the remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, indicating that the petitioner could file a new petition for post-conviction relief after the conclusion of the delayed direct appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Donnie Thompson, of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to the maximum sentences of six years for voluntary manslaughter and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, with the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends his sentences are excessive. We reduce the sentence for voluntary manslaughter to five years, affirm the four-year sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and order the sentences to run concurrently.

We granted the plaintiff's application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Chancellor erred in holding that a contractor is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b), and therefore is limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence, where the contractor possessed a valid contractor's license when the contract was formed but did not maintain a valid license throughout the entire time contracting services were performed under the contract. After carefully considering the relevant statutes, we conclude that the Chancellor properly held that a contractor who does not maintain a valid license throughout the entire contract period is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b) and limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join all of the tortfeasors in a single proceeding under Samuelson v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1998). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment after concluding that the plaintiff’s settlement with one tortfeasor did not require dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against a second tortfeasor. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join the tortfeasors in a single proceeding and that Samuelson is not applicable to the facts of this case. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding that his statement taken by law enforcement officers did not violate his constitutional rights. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Tommy William Davis, was convicted of Class D theft of property over $1,000 and was sentenced to a term of six years incarceration, as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s proof, and he challenges the length of his sentence as premised on an invalid enhancement factor. Our review convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and that, although improper enhancement factors were applied, a sentence of six years is appropriate.

The defendant, Donald P. Wilcox, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his request for probation for his guilty pleas to violating a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony; violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of alprazolam pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

While I concur with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for theft of property over $1,000, I reach that result from a somewhat different approach than that taken in the principal opinion. The majority concludes that the defendant’s presence in and operation of a borrowed vehicle is sufficient proof to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband contained therein. Concededly, this has been the conclusion reached by this Court in a number of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146, at *111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, having re-read the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2001), I am convinced that mere presence in and operation of a vehicle containing contraband is, without other proof of a power or intention on the part of the defendant to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, insufficient to establish “constructive possession.” Nevertheless, I believe that the record of the instant case provides sufficient other proof that, when coupled with the proof of the defendant’s presence in and operation of the vehicle containing contraband, establishes the constructive possession necessary in this case to sustain a theft conviction.

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Pointer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a violent offender to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his person and his home, in ruling that his prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes, in allowing testimony of a prior violent incident between him and the victim, and, additionally, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial during jury voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant entered "open" guilty pleas to eight counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) his sentences are excessive; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Luna, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial because the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by a non-responsive answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Darrell Lamar Fritts, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the plea bargain process employed by the State of Tennessee is unconstitutional per se, thus rendering two of his convictions, which resulted from guilty pleas, void. The trial court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Martin, pled guilty to one count of obtaining prescription drugs by fraud, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of forgery, one count of telephone harassment, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of assault. The negotiated plea agreement resulted in an effective sentence of five years and six months. Pursuant to the agreement, service of two of the years was suspended, and the manner of service for the remaining three and one-half years was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentences totaling three and one-half years in confinement. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Earl Ferrell, Jr., appeals as of right the sentences imposed by the Bedford County Circuit Court following the defendant's guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He contends that the trial court should not have ordered him to serve his effective four-year sentence consecutively to a prior Rutherford County sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.