APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Joy Kennedy, was found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and reckless driving. However, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that she had established the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. The State appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The sole issue on appeal is whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the defense of insanity had not been established by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that no reasonable juror could have failed to find that the Defendant was legally insane at the time of the crimes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife filed the present divorce action seeking, inter alia, alimony. The trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro based upon a perceived need rather than a demonstrative need. For the following reasons, we reverse.

Husband filed present divorce action against Wife alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Wife answered denying the inappropriate marital conduct and subsequently counter-complained for divorce alleging adultery. Wife amended her countercomplaint to request a legal separation or in the alternative an absolute divorce. The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce based upon its finding of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife alimony by requiring Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance for three years and, thereafter, pay Wife $50.00 a month. The trial court ordered a property division and required Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of divorce, distribution of marital property and debt, and award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in the amount of $50.00 a month but vacate the award of health insurance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The defendant, Mary Murr Turner, pled guilty to accessory after the fact, and the Cocke County trial court sentenced her to one year incarceration as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a child support and visitation dispute. Mother and Father, never married, have two minor children. The parties lived together from 1997 until March 2001, when Father was arrested for domestic assault. Father moved out of the residence. Mother filed a complaint seeking to be the primary residential parent, requested child support and arrearages and asked for temporary support and attorney fees. The juvenile court placed primary custody of the children with Mother, set visitation, and ordered Father to pay $4,000 a month in child support plus $31,586 in arrearages. Father appealed, taking issue with visitation, child support, arrearages, and the court's failure to make findings of fact regarding the alleged domestic assault. Mother appealed claiming the court erred by rejecting most of her claim for her attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's determinations concerning child support and visitation, modify the offset against the arrearage owed for child support, and reverse and remand Mother's request for attorney fees. Further, we find that the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact concerning the domestic abuse charge because the alleged domestic assault was not against a minor.

Defendant, Kenneth H. Laws, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and acquitted of false imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed a petition to reduce his child support obligation following his loss of employment as a mechanical engineer and his inability to find other employment. Relief was denied, notwithstanding that two children had attained their majority, and the petition was dismissed. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

The issue in this case is whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. The plaintiff sued the defendants for, among other things, breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On July 15, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Thirty-two (32) days later, on August 16, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiff now appeals. This Court, sua sponte, asked the parties for supplemental briefs regarding whether the appeal was timely. In light of the undisputed facts, we must hold that the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and, consequently, that the plaintiff’s notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
 

This is a zoning case. The property owner applied to re-zone the property from agricultural to business. The Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development and the county planning commission recommended that the County Commission deny the property owner’s application. The County Commission voted to deny the application. The plaintiff/appellant property owner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in chancery court, seeking to overturn the decision. The defendant/appellee County Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The property owner now appeals. We affirm, finding no genuine issue of material fact and that the County Commission had a rational basis for its decision.
 

The Appellant, Brian Douglas Williams, appeals the decision of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In August 2002, Williams entered “best interest” pleas to stalking, harassment, and aggravated assault and received an effective eight-year sentence. These sentences were suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. On October 18, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Williams had violated a condition of his probation by contacting the victim. After a hearing, Williams was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original consecutive sentences to the Department of Correction and the County Workhouse were reinstated. On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence fails to establish that he violated his probation. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Randy James, pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The issue before us is whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the fruits of a search where there were alleged false statements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joann Mallinak Glassell ("Plaintiff") was represented by attorney James M. Crain ("Crain") throughout divorce proceedings she filed against Richard Lee Glassell ("Defendant"). After a trial, the Trial Court ordered the equity from the sale of the marital residence to be divided equally between the parties. The Trial Court then applied various off-sets to the amount awarded Plaintiff, thereby reducing the net amount of Plaintiff's recovery to $0.00. The Trial Court concluded that Crain's attorney's fee lien was lower in priority to the various off-sets. Crain appeals, claiming the Trial Court improperly subordinated his attorney's fee lien to the off-sets and that his lien should be given priority. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and affirm as modified.

This case involves the timeliness of a grievance filed by Appellant, an employee of Roane State Community College. The hearing officer determined that such grievance was not filed within the limitations period. Appellant appealed this decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Appellant now appeals to this Court and we affirm.

I concur in the judgment that grounds for termination of parental rights in this case are not
established by clear and convincing evidence.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging Defendant breached its employment contract by failing to provide Plaintiff with phantom units when Plaintiff was terminated without cause. Defendant denied that Plaintiff's phantom units had vested, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to any phantom units at the time of his termination. The trial court found that the letter memorializing the Defendant's offer of employment was sufficiently definite and met the other requirements for a valid contract, including mutual assent. The trial court also found that the terms of the employment contract did not include any vesting requirements for Plaintiff's phantom units. As a result, the trial court found that Defendant had breached its employment contract and awarded Plaintiff the value of his phantom units contained in the employment agreement plus pre-judgment interest dating back to Plaintiff's termination. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Appellee purchased Appellant’s overdue Note from FDIC, who was receiver of The Bank
of Alamo. Appellee sought to enforce the Note and trial court entered Judgment for Appellee.
Appellant contends that Appellee had no right to enforce the Note because Appellee was not a holder in due course. Since no defenses to enforcement were raised by Appellant, the question of whether Appellee is a holder in due course is irrelevant. We affirm.
 

The petitioner appeals the denial of her post-conviction relief petition relating to her guilty plea to felony murder for which she received a life sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) her guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Christopher Kevan Hein, was charged with the first degree murder of his girlfriend and convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction, which had already been served by the conclusion of the trial. In this timely filed appeal as of right, he raises the following five issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from introducing taped statements that an unavailable witness, Thomas Hendrix, made to an undercover informant and to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") agent in which he described his participation in the burning of the victim's body and stated that the murder was committed by George Cate; (2) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from introducing Cate's statements to law enforcement officers; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing an officer who was not qualified as an expert witness to express his opinion regarding the tendency of suspects during interrogation to minimize their involvement in crimes; (4) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from calling an expert witness to rebut the officer's opinion; and (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of the defendant's application for food stamps, in contravention of state and federal law. Having reviewed the record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On December 17, 2001, Defendant, Jason D. Walker, entered a guilty plea in the Blount County Circuit Court to statutory rape. Defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years to be suspended on supervised probation. Defendant was ordered, as a condition of his probation, to attend a sex offender treatment program, establish paternity of the child resulting from the offense, and pay child support. A probation violation warrant was issued. Following a revocation hearing, Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty days of his sentence in confinement and the remainder on probation. Additional probation violation warrants were subsequently issued. Following another revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered that Defendant serve the balance of his original sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services to terminate the parental rights of Mother to two of her minor children. The trial court granted the petition and Mother appeals the decision. Because we find there was not clear and convincing evidence of a ground for termination, we reverse the judgment.

Appellant filed petition seeking credit against child support arrearage for necessaries provided to minor children. The trial court granted Appellant $10,236.50 in credit toward his support arrearage. Appellant appeals asserting that the trial court erred in giving a percentage of necessaries provided. Finding that the Appellant did not meet his burden of proof in his claim for necessaries and that the evidence in record preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse in part, affirm in part and remand.