APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and husband divorced. In her complaint for divorce, mother stated that her son was born of their marriage. Husband paid son’s child support. Upon reaching the age of majority, son filed a paternity action against alleged father. Son relied upon mother’s affidavit as proof of requisite sexual contact. The alleged father filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim arguing mother was judicially estopped from making the statements contained in her affidavit in light of her statements made in her divorce complaint. The juvenile court granted the motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a child custody case in which both Gerald Ottinger (father) and Kimberly Ottinger (mother) filed petitions for primary residential custody of their daughter, Marlah Whitley Ottinger. The trial court granted joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary residential custody to the father. The mother appeals, asserting that the court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert T. Irvin sued the defendants for refusal to continue to accept his donation of plasma to The Plasma Center. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order stating that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and, that if Mr. Irvin’s cause of action lies in medical malpractice, he failed to meet his requisite burden in responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was granted and Mr. Irvin appeals.

In this divorce action, the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce, and allocated the marital and separate assets.

This extraordinary appeal involves a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 request for a physical examination of an opposing party. Following a vehicular collision in Wilson County, one of the drivers and her passenger filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking damages from the driver and owners of the other vehicle. Issues involving the extent and permanency of the plaintiff driver's injuries caused by this collision arose after the plaintiff driver was injured in another accident, and the defendants requested permission for their medical expert to examine the plaintiff driver. The trial court denied the request, and the defendants filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have determined that, under the facts of this case, the trial court's denial of the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings of this sort. Therefore, we grant the Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application and reverse the order denying the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion.

Melvin Thomas Hartman, Jr., appeals a divorce judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for Hamilton County, On apeal he insists that the Trial Court erred in its award of certain jewelry to his wife, Paua Ruth Sheffied Hartment, as separate property which was in fact marital preperty. Mr. Hartman also insists that the Trial Court made an inequitable division of the marital estate since the Trial Court refused to consider the tax consequences of awarding Mr. Hartman certain retirement funds in exchange for Ms. Hartman receiving the equity in their home and other real property. Mr. Hartman filed a motion for reference to a Special Master due to the "complex valuation and categorization issues. "

This appeal involves an action for breach of an employment agreement. Defendants, Carol Cordell Coletta and Coletta & Company, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the chancery court which entered judgment in the amount of $31,800.00 in favor of the plaintiff, Clyde Norman Brewer, Jr.

This is a habeas corpus appeal. A jury convicted the petitioner of seven counts of rape of a child, one count of incest, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received an effective sentence of twenty-two years incarceration. In April 2003, the petitioner submitted a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging the sentences for child rape committed in 1992 are illegal because the record is unclear as to whether these offenses were committed before or after July 1, 1992, the effective date of the child rape statute. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals the dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Carrier, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor vandalism. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he received an effective sentence of three years, with the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lamar Advertising of Tennessee (Lamar) appeals from an order of the Chancerty Court of Knox County that upheld the validity of a provision of the kNoxville City Code, Article V, Section 10-N (Ordinance) that assesses a license fee per annum for the inspection of all existing ground and portable signs within the City of Knoxville. Lamar owns and maintains 350 outdoor advertising sturctures within the City of Knoxville and has challenged the validity of the ordinance.

The petitioner, James C. Murray, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit Leonard Rowe's testimony. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case is before us pursuant to the grant of two Rule 9 Interlocutory Appeals, one to Plaintiff Rhonda Lee Smith and the other to Larry Wallace, in his offical capacity as Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the juvenile court of Knox County wherein the court terminted the parental rights of the appellant (defendant). For reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal presents a multifaceted challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee’s abortion statutes. After a physician and a clinic in Knoxville were charged with violating these statutes, two other clinics in Memphis and Nashville, joined by three physicians, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Constitution of Tennessee. The trial court struck down the residency requirement, the waiting period, and the requirement that physicians inform their patients that an abortion is a major surgical procedure. After making its own substantive revisions in the statutory text, the trial court upheld the mandatory hospitalization requirement, the remaining informed consent requirements, and the newly enacted parental consent requirement. We have determined that the trial court erred by revising the text of several provisions. We have also determined that the emergency medical exception enacted by the General Assembly is unconstitutionally narrow, that the combined effect of the waiting period and the physician-only counseling requirement places an undue burden on women’s procreational choice, and that the remaining challenged provisions as construed herein pass constitutional muster.
 

This is a suit by David T. Bailey and E. Lynn Wagner in their own right and derivatively for the use and benefit of Southeastern Healthcare Services, L.P., a Limited Partnership in which they were partners, against Tom Holbert, as general partner, Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., D/B/A Marcum's Healthcare Services, and Carl Marcum and Gina Marcum Pinney, as Officers and Directors and/or Employees and Agents of and for Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., and Tom HOlbert, Carl Marcum and gina Marcum Pinney, Individually. The suit stems from the purchase by Southeastern Healthcare Services of a unit dosage pharmacy business from Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., for the sum of $275,000. The complaint alleged a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty.

I concur with the court’s conclusion that Mr. Montague’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 through 4-5-225 (1991 & Supp. 1997).

Homeowners of a new residence brought an action against a subcontractor for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that there was a breach of contract and awarded attorney's fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Subcontractor appealed insisting that because no violation of the TCPA was found, the trial court lacked a basis to award attorney's fees. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of attorney's fees.

The appellant, Marty Lavern Pyburn, was convicted by a jury in the Marion County Circuit Court of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of his prior conviction of aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes; (3) the admission of photographs of the crime scene; (4) the expert testimony of Dr. Charles Harlan; and (5) the trial court's charge to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) and Mother’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.
 

Mother and father of three children appeal termination of their respective parental rights. Mother appeals arguing that the trial court erred in finding persistence of conditions sufficient to terminate her rights. We reverse, finding that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with her children. Father appeals alleging that he was denied counsel and/or the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Father but thereafter relieved appointed counsel without stating a basis and did not appoint substitute counsel. Father retained an attorney on the eve of trial but this retained attorney only appeared on four of the seven days of trial and was absent during significant portions of the days he attended. Since the trial court initially found that Father was entitled to appointed counsel and never made a finding that Father was no longer entitled to appointed counsel or that he had waived the right to counsel, we find that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint substitute counsel. Father attempted to retain counsel; however, retained counsel's repeated failures to attend the hearings was equivalent to Father having no counsel. Thus, Father was deprived of the right to counsel. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Albert Yarbrough, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations and the petitioner’s allegations to be without merit. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the denial of his petition for relief. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner timely filed his petition for post-conviction relief. However, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition on the merits.

The Defendant, Danny Joe Wright, was convicted of driving under the influence second offense and violating the open container law. He was also found to have violated the implied consent law. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the arresting officer and that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the testimony of an expert witness in field sobriety testing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce custody case wherein the Trial Court denied the Father’s petition for change of custody and denied the Mother’s petition for payment of uncovered medical expenses and attorney fees. Both parties appealed. We have determined that the Trial Court did not err and we affirm its decision.

Following a jury trial on April 23, 2003, the defendant was convicted of one count of sale of a controlled substance more than .5 grams. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fined $3000. He appeals this conviction. The defendant argues two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant’s uncle to testify at trial as to the identity of an individual in the videotape of the drug sale. We affirm the decision of the trial court.